ble to Rationalism, than to the opposite system. It represented all knowledge, faith and volition as arising from sensible things. It thus led to scepticism, by its dependance on the uncertainty, versatility and inconstancy of experience. Although its author adhered to the Christian faith, and was correct in his morals, yet his philosophy promoted infidelity and loosness of principle, both in religion and morality. Setting all this aside, it was not easy to find from Locke's system a passage to Christianity as a supernatural revelation, and containing mysteries above reason and nature. This system, founded so entirely upon sensation and experience, excluded from Christianity every thing which may be termed spiritual, as founded upon the mind itself, and which was the ground work of supernatural theories. Locke also, in another of his works, represented Christianity as so rational and simple, that we. may without any impropriety assert that it had a manifest tendency to deism. His philosophy found many friends and defenders, especially in France, who applied the principles deducible from it to the injury of all positive religion, and even to the support of materialism and atheism. BAYLE, a cotemporary of Locke is not to be considered as belonging to this class; his literary character is that of a sceptic, who attacked and weakened all systems of philosophy and theology, and was constantly opposing the one to the other. France had produced little fruit of pure deism; it had either kept philosophy entirely distinct from religion and theology, or it had used it to undermine them both; but it influenced in this way many philosophers in England and Germany, to defend, purify, and more firmly to establish the deistical system.

WILH. LEIBNITZ appeared in opposition to the philosophy of Locke and the sceptical doubts and raillery of Bayle. He admitted, properly speaking, no impression from external objects, not even of our own bodies upon the mind, but supposed that all perceptions and ideas arose from the

inward principle of the soul itself. He shewed especially, that universal and essential first principles did not arise from experience, but were an a priori knowledge. The idea and the existence of God he deduced a priori. His whole system was a firmer foundation for religion than that of Locke. In opposition to Bayle he endeavoured to exhibit the consistency between the evil which is in the world and divine providence, between faith and reason. In this latter investigation he effected a union between his philosophy and Christian theology, and placed weapons in the hands of theologians against Rationalism. He started with the principle, that the two classes of truths, those revealed by God, and those taught by reason, could not contradict each other. He moreover divided the truths taught by reason into two classes, those which were necessarily true, and whose opposites were absolutely impossible; and those which are only hypothetically true or necessary, or whose necessity depends merely upon the order of nature which God has chosen, and which he may at any time alter. With respect to the first class, he maintained that no truth really revealed can contradict them; but with regard to the others, that they might be repealed, and were actually repealed by miracles, which removed the condition upon which they were truths. In this view he ad mitted an opposition between philosophical and revealed truth. It was not an opposition of reason considered absolutely, and revelation; but an opposition between what was only conditionally true and a revelation which removed the condition. Faith was here not opposed to reason, but was itself most reasonable; it was a faith in the exceptions and changes which God himself had made in the course of nature, and therefore a faith perfectly consistent with reason. Leibnitz thus taught that there was, properly speaking, no real opposition between reason and faith, between philosophy and revelation. He further maintained that it was true philosophy, and truly reasonable, to

believe what God had revealed, even when it stood opposed to our limited understandings and imperfect knowledge. The divinely revealed mysteries of the gospel, he regarded as truths which the human mind could not of itself discover, nor establish, and consequently could not comprehend; but yet could explain and defend, since they did not contradict reason, but were perfectly consistent with it. This he undertook to prove as it regarded the several Christian mysteries. Thus he opposed Naturalism, and his principles were soon embraced by many theologians to defend their theological systems, and to set them off in a philosophical attire. These principles received a more systematic finish, and a wider circulation through CHR. WOLF. He wrote a system of natural theology, in which he expressly opposed the errors of deism and naturalism, and presented a systematic theory of a supernatural revelation; wherein he endeavoured to exhibit and prove the possibility of such a revelation, its contents and criteria, and the condition upon which it could be intelligently believed. A party of Leibnitzian-Wolfian philosophers soon arose, principally in Germany, and among protestants, but not confined to them, as the influence of this philosophy was visible in other countries, and among the catholics, in the aspect and treatment of theological subjects. As Wolf himself became a martyr to his philosophy, and as the theologians of Halle, who were followers of Spener, and their numerous party, opposed themselves to the followers of Wolf, the zeal of the latter, as might be expected, was the more excited and carried to an extreme. They not only maintained the utility of their philosophy in theology, but they produced a complete system both of doctrines and of morals founded upon its principles. Its influence was even felt in pastoral theology, in sermons and catechetical exercises. Notwithstanding this philosophy had embraced the cause of revelation, it promoted in many a disposition for the opposite system. Wolf had laid more stress upon

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reason, in the things of religion, than was favourable for its subsequent and durable defence; and he incurred the suspicion of being only in appearance its advocate, while some of the principles of his philosophy were in direct opposition to some of the essential principles of Christianity. He had not been able to prove, that in any case we can with perfect certainty satisfy ourselves of the supernatural origin of a revelation. Subsequently some of his best disciples and followers became open deists. It was through the influence of his philosophy that more systematic connexion, precision, perspicuity, and a more philosophical use of words, especially in German, were introduced into theology, and the Aristotelian scholastic philosophy discarded.

The most distinguished opposer of this system was CRUSSIUS, who opposed to it a system of philosophy, the perfect harmony of which, with the orthodox Lutheran theology, and Biblical morality, he endeavoured to exhibit. This system is unquestionably the production of a philosophical mind, but appears in itself little suited to answer the purpose of an orthodox faith, it was adopted by numerous and zealous advocates, especially among theologians; but as it maintained its standing only for a short time, as it produced no effect beyond the limits of Germany, and as the Wolfian philosophy still preserved the ascendency, it does not require any further notice.

In France, in the meantime, philosophy continued decidedly inimical, not only to all systematic theology, but, to Christianity and religion in general. In Great Britain, sceptics appeared, who, whilst elegant and distinguished writers, shook the foundation of religion, morals and Christianity. In Germany, respect for the LeibnitzianWolfian philosophy gradually declined. It was found little suited to purposes of improvement, and not sufficient to answer new objections; fault was found with its method, its proofs and repetitions; it was thus either neglected or

rejected; men questioned its solidity, and found it more convenient, and more fashionable, to embrace the popular philosophy of the famous French and English writers. From these writers, from experience and observation, from histories and travels a new philosophical system was formed, and various works, some profound and some elementary, were composed. Men became more and more averse to research. This period of philosophy in Germany was by no means favourable to theology. It lost its principles, its leading points, its aim, and its commanding interest. It became a mixture of empirical, weak and unfledged opinions and doctrines. It lost the spirit of investigation, of pure religion and morality.

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KANT at length produced a revolution in philosophy, which is the most remarkable of the eighteenth century, and which extended its influence beyond Germany and still continues its effects. He was excited to this effort by the scepticism of HUME, against whom he wished to defend the certainty of human knowledge, and especially religion and morality. It was at the same time his professed object to refute materialism, spinozism, atheism and even naturalism, so far as this last would derive theology merely from nature, and endeavoured to prove the absolute impossibility of a revelation. For all these purposes he found the previous systems inadequate. therefore created a new philosophy, in which he commenced with an accurate and rigid examination and estimate of the powers of the human mind, thence to determine what man could know, and what he had to do, believe and hope. He presented a system not derived from experience, but from the mind itself. The ideas of religion and morality he evolved from unassisted reason, which he represented as the original principle in religion and the supreme judge in matters of faith. For the existence of God he admitted no decided proof, but a strong moral ground of faith. He taught simple moral deism. He did not speak