hindered it is over, of actually exercising it* for the advantage of the party to whom of right it is due, and the advancement of the common good thereby, upon all fit occasions.

3. That no Subject of England, that either hath by taking the Oaths of Supremacy or Allegiance acknowledged, or that not having taken either Oath, yet otherwise knoweth or believeth that the Sovereign Power in England, to whom his natural Allegiance is due, is the King, his Heirs, and lawful Successors, can without sinning against his conscience, enter into any Covenant, Promise, or Engagement, or do any other act or acts whatsoever, whereby either to transfer his Allegiance to any other party, to whom it is not of right due, or to put himself into an incapacity of performing the duties of his bounden Allegiance to his lawful Sovereign, when it may appear to be useful and serviceable to him.

4. That therefore the taking of the late Solemn League and Covenant by any subject of England, notwithstanding the protestation in the Preface that therein he had the honour of the King before his eyes, and that express clause in one of the Articles of it, wherein he swore the preservation of the King's person and honour, was an act as clearly † contrary to the Oath of Allegiance, and the natural duty of every subject of England, as the assisting of the King to the utmost of one's Power (which is a branch of the Oaths), and the assisting against any person whatsoever, with his utmost power, those that were actually in arms against the King, which was the very end for which that Covenant was set on foot, are contrary the one unto the other.

5. And that also, for the same reason, no Subject of England that hath taken the Oaths and understandeth them, or is persuaded that the Sovereignty of this Realm doth of right belong to the King, his Heirs, and lawful Successors, can, without sinning in like manner against his Conscience, take the Engagement now offered; if he so understand the words, wherein it is expressed, as if they did contain in them, and require of the Promiser, an acknowledgment that the Supreme Power of this Realm, whereunto the Subjects owe their bounden Allegiance, is rightly vested in those persons that now

exercise it; or as if they did import an utter abjuration or renouncing of that Allegiance which was formerly held due to the King.

II. This being cleared, the next Inquiry must be, Whether or no the words of the Engagement will reasonably bear such a construction, as, to the understanding of a rational and conscientious man, may be deemed✶ consistent with his bounden duty and Allegiance to his lawful Sovereign? Whereof, I think, there need be no great question made, if it be well considered,

1. That all expressions by words are subject to such ambiguities, that scarce any thing can be said or expressed in any words, how cautelously soever chosen, which will not render the whole speech capable of more constructions than one.

2. That very many men, known to be well affected to the King and his party, and reputed otherwise both learned and conscientious (not to mention the Presbyterians, most of whom,† truly for my own part, when we speak of learning and conscience, I hold to be very little considerable) have subscribed the Engagement. Who in the judgment of Charity we are to presume would not so have done, if they had not been persuaded the words might be understood in some such qualified sense, as might stand with the duty of Allegiance to the King.

3. That, as you write, it is strongly reported and believed, the King‡ hath given way to the taking of the Engagement, rather than that his good Subjects should lose their estates for refusing the same. Which as it is a clear evidence that the King, and they who are about him to advise him, do not so conceive of the words of this Engagement as if they did necessarily import an abandoning of the Allegiance due to him, so is it, § if true, a matter of great consideration towards the satisfaction of so many as out of that fear only have scrupled the taking of it. For the doing of that cannot be reasonably

* Sanderson first wrote 'may be,' then 'seem,' then 'appear,' and, finally, be deemed.'

† 'most of.' These two words were added afterwards by interlineation.

'that the King,' as in the previous Edd. written, but the pen drawn through the word 'that.'

§'so is it.' In previous Edd. ' so

'tis.'

thought to destroy the Subject's Allegiance, which the King, who expecteth Allegiance from all his Subjects, advisedly, and upon mature deliberation alloweth them to do.

III. But all this being granted, that the words of the Engagement are capable of such construction, yet is not the Conscience thereby sufficiently secured from justly scrupling at the taking thereof, unless it may yet further appear that the Subject hath the liberty to make use of such a construction. Which is in effect the Quaere contained in your Postscript, viz. Whether, upon supposition that the words of the Engagement will bear more constructions than one, the Subscriber may take it in his own sense? Or is bound to take it in the Imposer's sense? Or whether it be necessary, or expedient, before he subscribe, to ask those that require his subscription, in what sense they require him to subscribe it? Upon the resolution of which Quaere, since, as I conceive, the last resolution of the judgment, wherein the Conscience is to acquiesce, doth principally depend, I shall endeavour to give you my thoughts therein, (wherein I acknowledge to have received much light and satisfaction from a Discourse written by a very learned, judicious, and pious friend, whereof I lately had the perusal, but for some reasons not thought fit to be published,) as distinctly and clearly, as the time I have to do it in will suffer.

*

1. First, then, for a man that is required of another to give faith by some Oath, Promise, or other Engagement, to take it in a sense of his own, manifestly different, even in his own apprehension, from the other's meaning, sufficiently expressed by words according to the common custom of speech, and the nature of the business which it concerneth, is so gross a conceit, that had not the impudence of the Jesuits, in maintaining the lawfulness of their Equivocations, and the sad experience of these late times (wherein thousands have cheated themselves into Perjury by thinking to avoid it) evidenced the contrary, it might well have been thought a thing incredible, that any man of common understanding should suffer his reason to be so infatuated by his affections, as to be deceived thereby. For if such latitude of construction should be ad

*. a very learned.' In previous Edd. 'a learned.'

mitted in Promises, and other Obligations of that nature, intended for the preservation of faith among mankind, there would not remain any possible means whereby for men to have assurance of one another's meaning. Wherefore I take that for a clear truth, that all Promises, and Assurances, wherein faith is required to be given to another, ought to be understood ad mentem Imponentis, according to the mind and meaning of him to whom the faith is to be given; so far forth as that meaning may reasonably appear, by the nature of the matter about which it is conversant, and such signification of the words whereby it is expressed, as according to the ordinary use of speech amongst men agreeth best thereunto. The reason whereof is, because the faith so required to be given, is intended to the behoof, and for the interest of him that requireth it: namely, to the end he may have the better assurance from him that giveth the faith, that what is promised shall be accordingly performed: which assurance he cannot have, if, after his meaning sufficiently declared by the words, it should yet be at the liberty of the Promiser to reserve another secret meaning in his own breast, differing therefrom.

2. But, secondly, what if the intention of the Imposer be not so fully declared by the words and the nature of the business, but that the same words may in fair construction be still capable of a double meaning, so as taken in one sense they shall bind to More, and in another to Less? I conceive in such case it is not necessary, nor always expedient, (but rather for the most part otherwise) for the Promiser, before he give faith, to demand of the Imposer, whether of the two is his meaning. But he may by the Rule of Prudence, and that, for ought I see, without the violation of any Law of Conscience, make his just advantage of that ambiguity, and take it in that sense* which shall bind to the Less. And this I ground upon the very same reason as before. For sith the faith to be given is intended to the behoof of him to whom it is given, it concerneth him to take care that his meaning be expressed in such words as will sufficiently manifest the same to the understanding of a reasonable man. Which if he but neglect † to do,

* in that sense.' In previous Edd. 'in the same sense.'

if he but neglect.' In previous Edd. if he neglect.'

no Law of Equity or Prudence bindeth the Promiser by an over-scrupulous diligence to make it out, whereby to lay a greater Obligation upon himself than otherwise he needed* to do.

3. But then, thirdly, if it shall happen (as often it cometh to pass, when we have to deal with cunning men, and may possibly be the case now, and undoubtedly was so in the business of the Protestation, † when the time was,) that he that requireth the faith to be given, do of purpose so contrive the words, that there may be left an ambiguity and latitude of sense therein: yea, and that it be very probable, and in a manner apparent, (upon the consideration of the point of interest, or other strong presumptions arising from circumstances or otherwise) even to the apprehension of the Promiser himself, that he hath some further reach in requiring that Promise from him, some more remote and secret intention than he is willing to discover. In that case what is to be done? I answer, that the Promiser in such case is no ways obliged, in giving his faith, to take notice of any secret § intention, but is at liberty to make use of that latitude of sense, which the other did rather choose to leave undetermined than to restrain, and so to turn the other's cunning dealing to his own best advantage, by taking it in the more favourable construction, and that which bindeth to less. For it is the

* ' than otherwise he needed.' In previous Edd. than he need.'

† I, A. B., do in the Presence of Almighty God, promise, vow, and protest, to maintain and defend, as far as lawfully I may, with my life, power, and estate, the true Reformed Protestant Religion, expressed in the Doctrine of the Church of England, against all Popery, and Popish Innovation within this Realm, contrary to the same Doctrine, and according to the Duty of my Allegiance, His Majesty's Royal Person, Honour, and Estate; as also the Power and Privileges of Parliament; the lawful Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and every person that maketh this Protestation, in whatsoever he shall do in the lawful pursuance of the same. And to my power, and as far as lawfully

I may, I will oppose, and by all good ways and means endeavour to bring to condign punishment, all such as shall either by force, plots, or conspiracies, or otherwise, do any thing to the contrary of any thing in this present Protestation contained. And further, that I shall in all just and honourable ways endeavour to preserve the Union and Peace between the three Kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland; and neither for hope, fear, nor other respect, shall relinquish the Promise, Vow, and Protestation.-See 'Englands Oaths, Taken by all men of Quality in the Church and Commonwealth of England.' London, 1642.

‡'the words.' In previous Edd. 'words.'

§'any secret.' In previous Edd. any such secret.'