as the dregs and reliques of the same perturbation, from which the first Vow also proceeded, they must upon the same account, to wit, per defectum plenae deliberationis, undergo the same censure of Rashness with the first. The same I say for the kind. Some difference, I grant, there is for the degree; but Majus et Minus non variant speciem, we know. And the consideration of that difference is only thus far useful in the present Case, that the more deliberate those after-acts were, the more culpable they are, and the less capable either of excuse or extenuation; and consequently do oblige the party to so much the more serious, solemn, and lasting repentance.

4. But concerning rash Vows, inasmuch as the knot of the Question lieth not there, it shall suffice to note these few points. First, That every Rash Vow is a sin; and that upon its own score, and precisely as it is rash, although it should not be any other way peccant. All acts of Religious Worship, by the importance of the Third Commandment, are to be performed with all due sobriety, and attention, and advisedness. How much more then a Vow! which is one of the highest acts of worship, as being a sacred contract, whereunto God Himself is a party. See Eccl. v. 2, 4, 5. Secondly, That Rash Vows are for the most part, besides the Rashness, peccant in their matter also. For they are commonly made in passion; and all passions are evil counsellors, and anger as bad as the first. The wrath of man seldom worketh the righteousness of God. Thirdly, That a Rash Vow, though to be repented of for the Rashness, may yet in some cases bind. As, for example, a man finding himself ill used by a shopkeeper of whom he had formerly been accustomed to buy, voweth in a rage that he will never buy of him again. This is a Rash Vow, yet it bindeth, because if the party had never made any such Vow at all, it had never been unjust or uncharitable, nor so much as imprudent, in him for to have done the same thing, which by his Vow he hath now bound himself to do. So if a man, impatient of his ill luck at cards, should vow in a heat never to play at cards any more, he were in this case also bound to keep his Vow, because there neither is any sin in keeping it, nor can be any great necessity why he should break it. That therefore, fourthly, if at any time a Rash Vow bind not, the invalidity thereof proceedeth not merely, nor indeed at all,

from the Rashness, (which yet is a very common error amongst men,) but from the faultiness of it otherwise, in respect of the matter* or thing vowed to be done: when that which is so vowed, is either so evil in itself, or by reason of circumstances becometh so evil, that it cannot be performed without sin.

5. That therefore concerning the Vow in the present case I declared my opinion, that it is not at all Obligatory, it is done upon this ground, which is a most certain truth, and consented to by all, that Rei illicitae nulla Obligatio.† If a man shall vow any thing that is contrary to Piety; as if, having taken offence at some indiscreet passage in a sermon of his own Minister, he should vow that he would never come to Church, or hear him preach again: or that is contrary to Justice, as to take away the life of an innocent person, as those forty persons that had vowed they would neither eat nor drink till they had slain Paul: or never to make restitution to one whom he knew he had wronged: or contrary to Charity; as to be revenged of, or never to be friends with one that had done him wrong or that is contrary to Mercy; as if, having lost some money by lending to his friend, or having smarted by suretyship, he should vow never to lend any man money, or become surety for any man again. Let such a Vow, I say, as any of these, or any of the like nature, be made either rashly, or deliberately, and strengthened with Oaths and Imprecations, in the most direful and solemn manner that can be devised to tie it on the faster; yet it is altogether null and invalid as to the effect of Obligation. Whence those common sayings, In male promissis rescinde fidem;‡ Ne sit juramentum vinculum iniquitatis, &c. And we have a good precedent for it in David, after he had in a rage vowed the destruction of Nabal, and all that belonged to him; which vow, upon better consideration, he not only did not perform, but he blessed God also,

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* Compare Bp. Andrewes' Speech in the Star-Chamber, concerning Vows, in the Countess of Shrewsbury's Case. Vows then are to be made, and are to be kept, if they be made aright. But how, say you, shall we know whether they be right made? If they be made of a right

matter. Look then to materia Voti. For the Vow is, as the matter is, ever. Every beast is not meet for sacrifice; nor every thing matter meet for a Vow.'

† Compare De Juramenti Obligatione, Prael. ii. §. 13. Ibid.

for so providentially preventing the performance of it, by the discreet demeanor and intervention of Abigail.*

6. Now the reason why such Vows are not binding is very cogent and clear. Even because the party, at such time as he is supposed to have made such Vow as aforesaid, lay under another (a former, and therefore a stronger) Obligation to the contrary. And it is agreeable to all the Reason in the world, that he, who either by his own voluntary act hath bound himself, where lawfully he might so do, or by the command of his lawful Superior, that hath a right to his service and may exact obedience from him, is already bound to do, or not to do this or that, should not have power to disoblige himself therefrom, at his own pleasure, or to superinduce upon himself a new Obligation contrary thereunto. Obligatio prior praejudicat posteriori. As in the case of Marriage, a precontract with one party voideth all after-contracts with any other; and if a man convey lands to several persons, by deeds of several date, the first conveyance standeth good, and all the rest are void; and so in all cases of like nature. The Obligatory Power thereof that is in Vows, Oaths, Promises, &c. is rightly said by some, to be a constructive, not a destructive power. The meaning is, that such acts may create a new Obligation where was none before, or confirm an old one; but it cannot destroy an old one, or substitute another contrary thereunto in the place thereof.

7. And the reason of this reason also is yet further evident, for that Quisquis obligatur, alteri obligatur. When a man is obliged by any act, it is also supposed that the Obligation is made to some other party, to whom also it is supposed some right to accrue, by virtue of the said act obligatory; and that that other party is by the said act sufficiently vested in that said right, of which right he cannot be again divested and deprived by the mere act of him who instated him therein, and is obliged to perform it to him, unless himself give consent thereunto, without the greatest injustice in the world. Now God having a perfect right to our obedience, by His own obliging precept, both for the not doing hurt to any man, and for the doing good to every man upon all fit opportunities; and this right also confirmed, and ratified by our own obligatory

* Compare De Juramenti Obligatione, Prael. iv. §. 4.

act in a solemn manner, before many witnesses at our Baptism, when we vowed to keep all God's Commandments; it were unreasonable to think that it should be in our power, by any after-act of ours, to disoblige ourselves from both or either of those Obligations. For then we might by the same reason free ourselves from the obligation of that latter act also, suppose an Oath or Vow, by another subsequent Oath or Vow; and from that again by another; and so play fast and loose, make Vows and break them in infinitum. Evident it is therefore, that every Vow, requiring anything to be done which is repugnant to any office of piety, justice, charity, or mercy, which we owe either to God or man, is void, and bindeth not, because it findeth us under the power of a former contrary Obligation, and hath not itself power sufficient to free or discharge us from the same.

8. The general Rule thus cleared, it remaineth to examine concerning the particular Vow now in question, whether it be void upon this account or no? It will be found hard, I believe, to free this Vow from being repugnant to the rules of justice; but impossible, I am sure, to reconcile it with the perfect Evangelical Law of charity and mercy. First, Civil and Political Justice requireth that every man should obey the wholesome Laws of his country, and submit himself to be ordered thereby. Now, put the case, which is possible enough, that the Daughter's husband should, for lack of support from his Father-inLaw, or otherwise, live and die in great want, leaving his wife and many small children behind him, destitute of all means for their necessary sustenance. The Law would, as I suppose, in that case, upon complaint of the Parish, and for their ease, send the Daughter and her children to the Father, and compel him to maintain them out of his estate. Which order he ought to obey, nor can refuse so to do, without the high contempt of public Authority and manifest violation of the Civil Justice, notwithstanding his Vow to the contrary. The Law must be obeyed whatsoever becometh of the Vow: in that case therefore it is evident the Vow bindeth not.

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9. But say that should not happen to be the case, which yet more than any man can positively say beforehand, the Parent is nevertheless in Moral Justice bound to provide due maintenance for his children and grandchildren, if he be able. St. Paul saith that fathers ought to lay up for the children.

True it is, he speaketh it but upon the by, and by way of illustration, in the handling of another argument, very distant from this business; but that doth not at all lessen the importance of it, such illustrations being ever taken a notiori, and from such common notions as are granted and consented unto by all reasonable men. The same Apostle having, amongst other sins of the Gentiles, mentioned disobedience to parents in one verse, in the very next verse mentioneth also want of natural affection in parents. And the disobedience in the child can no more discharge the parent from the obligation of that duty he oweth to the child, and of affection and maintenance, than the unnaturalness of the parent can the child from the duty he oweth to the parent, of honour and obedience. For the several duties that by God's Ordinance are to be performed by persons that stand in mutual relation either to other, are not pactional and conditional, as are the leagues and agreements made between Princes, where the breach in one part dissolveth the obligation on the other; but are absolute and independent, wherein each person is to look to himself and the performance of the duty that lieth upon him, though the other party should fail in the performance of his.

10. Something, I foresee, may be objected in this point, concerning the lawfulness of the parent's withdrawing maintenance from the child, either in whole, or at least in part, in the case of disobedience. Which how far forth it may or may not be done, as it would be too long to examine, so it would be of little avail to the present business. For it is one thing to withhold maintenance from a disobedient child for the present, and to resolve so to continue till he shall see cause to the contrary; and another thing to bind himself by Vow or Oath never to allow him any for the future, whatsoever should happen. Let be granted whatsoever can be supposed pleadable on the Father's behalf in the present case, yet there will still remain two particulars in this Vow, not easily to be cleared from being unjust. First, let the Daughter's disobedience deserve all this uttermost of punishment from the offended Father; yet how can it be just, that for the Mother's fault, the poor innocent, perhaps yet unborn children, should be utterly and irrecoverably excluded from all possibility of relief from their Grandfather? Secondly, it is (if not unjust, yet what