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541

THE

RULE of FAITH.

PART I.

The explication and state of the question.

$. I.

"T

SECT. I.

of the

HE queftion he propounds to himself The exto debate, is, "What is the rule of plication "faith?" In order to the refolution Terms of whereof he endeavours,

the Que

ftion.

First, to fix the true notion of these two terms, RULE and FAITH: which way of proceeding I cannot but allow to be very proper and reasonable, but I can by no means think his explication of those terms to be fufficient. He tells us, "That a "rule is that which is able to regulate, or guide ❝ him that useth it :" in which description, as in many other paffages of this book, he is plainly guilty of that which he taxeth in Mr.* Whitby, that is, * P. 180. "the confounding of a rule, by making Regulating "and Guiding to be equivalent words." But for this I am no farther concerned than to take notice of it by the way: the fault which I find in this definition is, that it doth not make the thing plainer than it was before; fo that no man is the wifer for it, nor one jot nearer knowing what a rule is. He pretends to tell Englishmen what a 6 L 2 rule

PART rule is; and for their clearer understanding of this

I.

P. 4.

66

word, he explains it by a word lefs removed from the latin, "a rule is that which is able to regu"late him that ufeth it;" juft as if a man fhould go about to explain what a lawgiver is, by saying,

he is one that hath the power of legiflation." Of the two he had much better have faid, that a rule is a thing that is able to rule him that ufeth it, though this be nothing but an explication of the fame word by it self.

§ 2. Not much better is his explication of the term faith, which he tells us, in the common sense of mankind, is the fame with believing. * He declared indeed beforehand, "that he did not in"tend to give rigorous fchool-definitions of either "this or the former word ;" and (to do him right) he hath not in the leaft fwerv'd from his intention. It were to be wifh'd he had prefac'd fome fuch thing to his demonftrations; for the reader will find, that they are not a whit more rigorous than his definitions; the latter of which doth very much refemble the country-man's way of defining, who being ask'd by his neighbour what an invafion was, after fome ftudy told him very gravely," that an "invasion was as if he should say an invasion.” In like manner Mr. S. tells us, "that faith (or "which is all one, belief) is the fame with believing;" which, in my apprehenfion, is but a country definition, unless the interpofing of those folemn words [in the common sense of mankind] may be thought to mend the matter. This puts me tranfition (as) he calls it) where he gives the reader an account what

86

❤ P. 159. in mind of what Mr. S. fays in his

feats

I.

feats he hath done in his book: "he will fee (fays SECT. "he) I take my rife at the meaning of the words "Rule and Faith; this known, I establish my first "principles in this prefent matter to be these, viz. "a rule is a rule, faith is faith." This is the right felf-evident method he talks fo much of, and his principles agree admirably well with his definitions. If he had but proceeded in the fame method, and added, "that a rule of faith is a rule of "faith; that oral tradition is oral tradition; and "that to say, oral tradition is the rule of faith, is "as much as to fay oral tradition is the rule of faith," the whole bufinefs had been concluded without any more ado; and I think no body would have gone about to confute him.

§ 3. Rejecting then his way of definition as inept and frivolous, and no ways tending to give a man a clearer notion of things; I fhall endeavour to explain a little better (if I can) the meaning of these terms.

A rule (when we speak of a rule of faith) is a metaphorical word, which in its first and proper fenfe, being applied to material and fenfible things, is the measure according to which we judge of the ftraightness and crookedness of things; and from hence it is transferred by analogy to things moral or intellectual. A moral rule is the measure according to which we judge whether a thing be good or evil; and this kind of Rule is that which is commonly called a law, and the agreement or difagreement of our actions to this rule, is fuitably to the metaphor, called rectitude or obliquity. An intellectual rule is the meafure according to which we

judge

PART judge whether a thing be true or false; and this is I. either general or more particular. Common no

tions, and the acknowledged principles of reason, are that general rule, according to which we judge whether a thing be true or falfe. The particular principles of every science are the more particular rules according to which we judge whether things in that science be true or falfe. So that the general notion of a rule is, that it is "a meafure, by "the agreement or disagreement to which we judge "of all things of that kind to which it belongs."

§ 4. Faith, though both among facred and profane writers it be used many times more generally, for a persuasion or affent of the mind to any thing wrought in us by any kind of argument; yet, as it is a term of art used by divines, it fignifies that particular kind of affent which is wrought in us by teftimony or authority: fo that divine faith, which we are now fpeaking of, is an affent to a thing upon the testimony or authority of God; or, which is all one," an affent to a truth upon "divine revelation."

$5. A rule of faith is the measure, according to which we judge what matters we are to affent to, as revealed to us by GoD, and what not. And more particularly, the rule of chriftian faith is the measure, according to which we are to judge what we ought to affent to, as the doctrine revealed by CHRIST to the world, and what not.

§ 6. So that this queftion, "What is the rule "of chriftian faith?" fuppofeth a doctrine revealed by CHRIST to the world; and that that doctrine was intelligibly and entirely delivered by CHRIST

to

II.

to his apoftles, and fufficient confirmation given SECT. to it; that this doctrine was in the fame manner published to the world by the apoftles, who likewife gave fufficient evidence of the truth of it. All this is neceffarily fuppofed in the queftion: for it would be in vain to enquire whether this or that be the rule of chriftian faith, if fuch a thing as the chriftian faith were not first fuppofed. When therefore we enquire what is the rule of chriftian faith? the meaning of that enquiry is, by what way and means the knowledge of CHRIST's doctrine is conveyed certainly down to us, who live at the distance of so many ages from the time of its first delivery: for this being known, we have the rule of faith; that is, a measure by which we may judge what we are to affent to, as the doctrine of CHRIST, and what not. So that when any queftion arifeth about any particular propofition, whether this be part of CHRIST's doctrine, we may be able by this rule to refolve it.

$ 1.

SECT. II.

rule of

TH HE next thing to be confidered, is his Mr. S's refolution of this question; by which we faith. fhall know what his opinion is concerning the rule of faith; for that being known, the controverfy between us will eafily be ftated.

His opinion in general is, that oral or practical tradition (in oppofition to writing, or any other way that can be affigned) is the rule of faith. By oral or practical tradition, he means "a delivery* P. 41. "down from hand to hand (by words, and a con"stant course of frequent and vifible actions, con

"formable