mitting citizens of the United States to enter the military and diplomatic service of Japan; and in your reply of 3d April, you state that the Department has no authority, by law, to prevent them from entering the service of a foreign power. Referring to these two letters, I have now to relate the particulars of a conversation which took place at the interview referred to in my last, which bear upon this point.

With curious inconsistency, the Chinese officials brought forward the employment of American officers and ships by the Japanese in their descent upon Formosa, as a violation of the spirit of Article I of the treaty of Tien-tsin, when they had not themselves deemed that act to amount to a declaration of war. How can the United States permit her citizens to help and direct Japanese troops, they asked, when this arti cle provides that if another nation acts unjustly or oppressively toward China, she will try to bring about an amicable arrangement between them? Even if it was not so stated in the article, this permission, in their view, involved a complicity in those acts of injustice or oppression which its spirit was intended to adjust, if not restrain. To this I replied, that it was fairly implied in the spirit of the article that the United States must be the judge, in a measure, of the nature of those acts here called unjust or oppressive; it was never designed that she should interfere until she knew the facts and reasons for them, and could do so intelligently. The wording of the article involved a full hearing of the matter at issue; and it was hardly applicable in the present instance, as they admitted that they had received nothing from the Japanese government in explanation of their intentions. I then inquired if Soyeshima had not discussed the matter with them when he was in Peking last year? They answered that he had said nothing to them about his government sending a force to occupy any part of Formosa, and they would not admit that he had discussed the question of the wrongs suf fered by Japanese subjects at the hands of the savages there. But it is generally known that there was considerable talk upon these points at that time, and Mr. Low's dispatch (No. 264) of June 13th conveys the impression that the Japanese embassador had then stated his grievance, and the redress he proposed to take if the Chinese refused to do any thing.

They then inquired if, in the event of hostilities arising between China and Japan, Americans who were engaged in the ranks of the enemy should be killed by Chinese troops, what notice would be taken of it by their own Government?

I answered that all Americans who entered the military service of the Japanese did so at their own risk, and that the American Government would take no notice of their death under such circumstances; all persons composing a hostile force could only be regarded as enemies by China.

They did not pursue their inquiries in this direction. I referred them to the translation of Wheaton's work for an authoritative explanation upon the usages in such cases in western lands; but both of us felt, no doubt, that those usages are much modified by the principle of exterritoriality found in our treaties, particularly in military operations.

The employment of our citizens in peaceful pursuits, or even to aid in the suppression of a rising of their own subjects, was referred to by them as of a different character from the same persons engaging in active hostilities against them on behalf of Japan; and they would have admitted the same principle when applied to their employing foreigners against Japan. Their objection showed that they had thought

over this point; and it has its force; but there was no discussion, and it was evident that they had no wish to pursue it.

I have nothing to add to the remarks of Mr. Low in the dispatch above cited, which can strengthen them. This principle of self-government to foreigners was granted by the Chinese in the face of an overpowering force, and when they had had no practical experience, almost, of its nature and results. During the Taiping rebellion, all foreigners who aided the rebels took their own risks, and made very little noise about their doings. When Burgevine was captured in 1865, the fact that he had once been a trusted officer in the service of the imperialists, and had left them to join the rebels, led me to allow him to remaiu a prisoner until instructions were received. Mr. Seward replied, that upon a just conviction, he might be left in the hands of the Chinese, adding, but this is to be understood to rest upon our own consent, upon the grounds of national honor, and not from Chinese right under treaty stipulations." (See my dispatch No. 3, and Mr. Seward's No. 7, of 6th November, 1865.)

I infer that the implied freedom of action to Americans to enter the military service of other nations, in that there is no law to prevent them, had primary reference to service in Christian nations, and when thus employed by those nations, allegiance to their own ceases. But does not this doctrine of ex-territoriality materially alter the nature of this service? There is no provision that I know of contemplating the naturalization of an American citizen in Japan or China; and it is understood here that foreigners in these countries cannot change their na tional character, and claim the protection of another country.

If an American citizen enters the military service of the Japanese, and another enters the same service in China, it is to be supposed that the rulers of both countries engaged these men to help them fight, if necessity required; but if they are to be led against nations with whom the United States are at peace, they are bound to refuse to serve, and to leave the flag thus employed. But supposing they refuse to desert it, and they appear in arms against each other, one under the Chinese and one under the Japanese flag, we have the spectacle of our countrymen fighting on behalf of two non-Christian governments, each side claiming the protection of its own country against the wrong doing of its employers while trying to do all the harm they can to the opposing nation. It appears to me that this is not at all unlikely to take place within a few months, if the Japanese pursue their aggressive policy in Formosa. Mr. McLane's decree of December 5, 1854, making it a misdemeanor to fight for or against the Emperor of China within his dominions in case of rebellion, is still in force; but I do not know whether a similar one has been issued in Japan. This decree was effectual in restraining an attempt made about the time of its publication to aid the Canton government to destroy banditti near that city; but no conviction was ever made under it during the Taiping rebellion. I think, however, it had no little moral effect in deterring many from joining the imperialists, though after Ward's force became famous, and he was killed, Mr. Burlingame applied to have Burgevine put in command of the force, thus neutralizing the decree in effect.

The British government requires that previous permission be obtained before its subjects can enter the Emperor's military service.

It is very desirable, if Mr. McLane's decree conflicts with the implied liberty to our countrymen of entering the military service of the Japa nese or Chinese, which the absence of an actual prohibition seems to involve, that instructions be given in time. At present it seems to do so.

Your dispatch of April 3, 1873, refers to General Le Gendre alone, who is not now in the employ of the United States, and was free to accept the offer made to him. This I told the Chinese officials, when they complained that American officers were employed against them; but in respect to Lieutenant Commander Douglass Cassell and Major Wasson, who, I believe, are still in our Navy and Army, I answered them verbally, that as yet there were no hostilities existing, and consequently these officers were not doing anything at which China could complain. It is highly probable that, if the Japanese carry out their designs upon Formosa and Corea, as shadowed forth in Mr. De Long's dispatches Nos. 302 and 309, active hostilities will arise in this part of Asia, which will almost certainly involve us in their issues and conduct. I may be pardoned, therefore, for bringing this question of employing our conntrymen on either side to your notice, after what Mr. Low has written. International law, which is applicable to western nations in times of war, has not been well defined in its application to these oriental powers, and their rulers are in constant perplexity how far they can go. We all wish to encourage them in utilizing foreign skill, science, and integrity in acquiring and applying our arts and improvements for their advantage; and as soon as they become expert in their new powers they are not unlikely to employ them to overcome their enemies.

I am, &c.,

S. WELLS WILLIAMS.

No. 35.]

No. 143.

Mr. Williams to Mr. Fish.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

Peking, May 30, 1874. (Received July 20.) SIR: I have the honor to inclose for your perusal a very clear account of the events which occurred at Shanghai on the 3d and 4th instant, taken from the "Courier," and a copy of Mr. Seward's report of his efforts in aiding to suppress the riot, (inclosure 1,) from which you will learn all that is of importance.

Mr. Seward's position as senior consul at Shanghai gave him much advantage in taking immediate action, and I have heard only one opinon in commendation of his promptness and sagacity. Preventive efforts are always difficult to estimate, but in this case everybody ac knowledges that the landing of a detachment from the United States Steamers Ashuelot and Yantic, at the hour it did, was most opportune. The mob was in fact rendered powerless by its appearance. I sincerely hope that the Department will fortify and indorse the public voice by its special approval of his action.

You will no doubt observe on the perusal of the printed narrative that the animus of the editor is strongly against the Chinese, and he does not seem to be disposed to wait till he can hear their side. I do not refer to the mob, for whose conduct I find no excuse, but to the proceedings of the Ningpo guild. It is not easy, at any time, to learn the exact truth about native opinion, but in this instance the views of the guild were early made known, and their temperate memorial (inclosure 2. and liberal proposition to arrange the matter sent to the council three

months before the outbreak, places the latter, by its refusal or vacillation, in a position it could easily have avoided.

It is an outbreak much to be regretted, and its details will be reported through the provinces, I fear, so as to deepen the dislike and dread which is felt against foreigners. In the case of the Tien-tsin riot in 1870 it was easy to deny the truth of the rumors which excused it, that foreigners stole children for the sake of their eyes and hearts; and. there are myriads of natives in other places who could corroborate the denial and help to re-assure their countrymen that the facts were otherwise.

But when the native newspapers circulate the story that half a score of their people have been shot or killed in Shanghai for resisting the encroachments of foreigners upon the graves of Chinese buried there, it will strike a sympathetic chord in the hearts of their readers. In a case somewhat similar, when Amaral, the enterprising governor of Macao, was assassinated in 1849 for cutting roads through the graves outside the city, the act was upheld by all natives as a just retribution for the dead. In this case at Shanghai the arguments and facts will tell against foreigners, and there will be very little opportunity to place either of them in a right light.

The argument used by the editor, that the guild knew that the roads had been long before mapped out to be opened through the graves, and the plea that many places in Shanghai, now covered with houses, had once been graveyards, are both entirely aside of the merits of this particular question. However, it is impossible to judge equitably until one knows the facts about the occupation of the French in this part of Shanghai.

I add a copy of my reply to Mr. Seward, (inclosure 3,) and defer further remark until another time. If this riot furnishes a good argument for a fusion of the two settlements, all parties would be ultimately the gainers. I have, &c.,

S. WELLS WILLIAMS.

No. 362.]

[Inclosure 1 in No. 35.]

Mr. Seward to Mr. Williams.

UNITED STATES CONSULATE-GENERAL,
Shanghai, May 11, 1874.

SIR: I have heretofore advised you that a riot occurred in the French settlement on Sunday last.

Up to this moment no official inquiry has taken place in regard to its causes, or the merits of the grievance, as alleged by the Chinese. The consul-general for France has indeed, as it would appear, taken some conclusions, but he has not communicated them to his colleagues; nor do we know of them excepting from the local prints and newspapers. Under these circumstances I shall contine this report to a statement of my own connection with the affair in its various aspects, and I shall transmit to you with it such printed documents as will set forth all the information that I can now communicate.

The riot took place on Sunday, the 3d instant. I was informed of the existence of a difficulty while at my house, more than two miles from the scene, at about half past 6 o'clock in the evening. I at once drove to the residence of Dr. Yates, which was not more than a third of a mile from the place in question. I found that Dr. Yates, his son-in-law, Mr. Seaman, and Mr. Hill, had been observing the tendency of the affair, and they assured me that it was not unlikely to assume serious proportions.

Acting upon a preconceived idea of what should be done under such circumstances, I determined to ask our gunboats to land the largest possible force, and to place them where they could be of most use in a defensive way, and I proceeded to the French consulate to state my information and my conception of the measures which should

be taken. Upon leaving Dr. Yates's house I saw that a fire had broken out, and that crowds of excited people were already moving down the Rue du Consulat, breaking the street lamps, and otherwise indicating their excitement. On reaching the French concession, I told Mr. Godeaux, the consul-general, what I had learned, and expressed my opinion that it would be well to land a force from the gunboats. He at once assented to this, and I proceeded to the Ashuelot and Yantic to secure the same. The commanders of these vessels yielded a ready assent to my request, and actually landed about a hundred men by 8.30 o'clock. Not anticipating that the rioters would have any disposition to proceed further in the face of the fact that this force was in hand, and that a squad of fifteen or twenty men from a French gunboat had been previously landed, I requested the commanding officer of the sailors to take them to the French cousulate; I at the same time requested Mr. Bradford to remain with them, and to advise with Mr. Godeanx and the commanding officer in regard to their disposition, giving to him at the same time such general instructions as seemed appropriate. A meeting of the consuls had been called while I was thus engaged, and the hour for assembling having arrived, I proceeded to the place named for it, the Main-guard, to which the municipal council and the volunteers had also been summoned.

The question here arose what course should be pursued; and upon this point the chairman of the municipal council, as commandant of the volunteers, requested instructions from the consuls.

It was my opinion that one or two of the fire companies should proceed to the scene of the fire, guarded by the volunteers and our sailors, in order to put out the fire and make such a demonstration as would overawe the rabble; and this course was determined upon, the consuls and the chairman proceeding with the troops.

I may say that I was assured strongly that this course was the only one which could be pursued, having regard to all interests. If a fire was going on it should be put out. If the rabble was disposed to carry matters farther, nothing less than a demonstration of our ability to suppress them would answer. Neither was any danger to be apprehended. A Chinese mob will not fight foreigners, excepting as a pack of wolves will attack human beings, when in numbers and witn full swing for their savagery. A quad of fifty men present during the day near the scene of the trouble, would have overawed the rabble and prevented all bloodshed.

In marching to the locality of the fire, I took about fifty of our sailors with the volunteers. I remained with the commanding officer, and informed both him and the commandant of the volunteers that I would be the sole medium of communication between them. I took this course because the responsibility of landing these men was mine, and because I felt unwilling that they should be asked to do any active work without my full knowledge and assent.

I should say here, that prior to my return to the French settlement from the Maingnard, reports had been received that the police station at the southern river corner of the settlement was in danger, and that Mr. Bradford had gone to its relief with a guard of the sailors.

Upon reaching the scene of the disturbances I found that, as I anticipated, the danger was over. The fire, too, was pretty nearly burned out, it having met obstructions which prevented it from spreading. Such measures were taken, however, to suppress it entirely, as were appropriate.

At this time information was brought that a band of the rioters had taken refuge in the Ningpo Joss-house, a rambling structure covering more than an acre of ground situated at the southwestern end of the settlement. It seemed advisable to determine Whether this was the fact, and the force excepting an appropriate patrol moved at once to the place. The Chehsien, or district magistrate, who had previously appeared upon the scene of the riot, accompanied us.

The door of the joss-house, or wei-kuan, was found closed, and upon calling out to those supposed to be inside, no answer was received. Mr. Medhurst and myself then asked the magistrate to break in one of the doors, so as to enable us to make with him an inspection of the premises. This was effected by the foreign firemen with axes, the door selected having been barricaded with coffin material. The entry having been elected, a squad of the magistrate's soldiers with the magistrates and several of the consuls, proceeded to search, but found not one person.

It is likely that no one was there, and that, anticipating such a search, even those who usually occupy it had taken their departure. The force was then marched back to the municipal hail and the French consulate, at which places our sailors were to bivonac for the night.

Sguals were agreed upon to call out the volunteers and fire companies if this should be necessary, and at 2 a. m. I returned to my residence.

I should mention that before retiring from the French settlement I waited on the French consul, and through his chancelier proposed a consuls' meeting for the next morning at his office. He returned word, further thanking me for the aid rendered to En, but intimating that he did not care to have me call the meeting. I make this statement not to find fault with Mr. Godeaux, but to be accurate in my narrative.