I also inclose to each of the gentlemen named a dispatch to the same effect.

The best information I can get leads me to believe that Mr. Le Gendre has not been, and is not now, in Formosa, but he is in Japan directing the affair. The Chinese officers seem to blame him more than any other one person, and are very anxious he should be at once stopped from having anything to do with it, even as adviser.

The Japanese openly avow an intention to remain in Formosa and occupy the savage territory, and report that the greater part of its inhabitants have already surrendered to them with this understanding, but say they have no desire to interfere with that part of the island belonging to China. It is my opinion, however, that in the event of a declaration of war by China, they will, if possible, take possession of the whole place, including the treaty-ports.

I have, &c.,

[Inclosure in No. 36.]

J. J. HENDERSON.

The Viceroy to Mr. Henderson.

[Extract.]

JUNE 9, 1874.

Now, we have investigated this Formosa business, as well as the statements of the Taotai of Formosa, and the captain of the Yang Boo, to the effect that this expedition to the savages of Formosa has been planned by the former consul at Amoy, Le Gendre; also, one Cassel and many others were assisting, &c. We have also examined and found that Formosa has long belonged to China, and the savages are certainly under Chinese jurisdiction, and other nations have nothing to do with them. On this occasion Japan has sent soldiers to punish the savages without previous consultation with the foreign office and the Japan commander-in-chief, Hiang, without awaiting a communication from me, on his own motion took soldiers and formed a camp at Liang Kian, in entire violation both of international law and the treaty between China and Japan. We twice sent communication to Hiang, Japan, commander-in-chief, requiring him to take back his soldiers, and twice sent communication to the board of trade to be forwarded to your honorable self to be examined and acted on, all which is on file.

We have received your dispatch in which you show your desire to carry out tre aty obligations, and in settling matters to preserve lasting peace and friendship, as well as you purpose to perform your duties, for all which we desire to express our hearty thanks.

We have appointed Chian, second in the board of trade, having rank of Taotai and formerly acting prefect of Foochow, to go to Amoy, and have sent a communication to Li, Admiral at Amoy, telling him to await the coming of Chian, and then with him have a consultation with the United States consul, and with him concert some plan of action. And in accordance with the provisions of article 1 of the treaty of the eighth year of Heinfung, (1858,) that the two countries shall mutually assist in preserving friendly relations, we ask your honorable self to request the Japanese cominander, Hiang, to take his soldiers back to Japan.

And if in the vessels that are gone to Formosa there are any citizens aiding the Japanese, we ask you to punish those that are acting improperly, whether on land or sea, in accordance with the eleventh article of the treaty and the laws of your country. From the time when your honorable self arrived in China you have always managed affairs in strict accordance with right; so that the streets are full of praises of yourself by rulers and people, and we ourselves are truly thankful.

Now that there are affairs in Formosa over which you are consul, you can show your friendly feelings by acting in accordance with treaty, by taking measures in connection with Admiral Li and Prefect Chian. Thus can you show friendly feeling.

We have sent a communication to Admiral Li, and also one to Prefect Chian, ordering him to go to Amoy and arrange the whole affair with you, for which purpose we give them full powers. And we request you to act with these two, not only as officials, but as friends.

Hoping thus, with best regards.

To Mr. HENDERSON,

United States Consul, Amoy and Formosa.

No. 788.]

No. 162.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Davis.

UNITED STATES CONSULATE-GENERAL,

Shanghai, July 21, 1874. (Received September 11.) SIR: I have the honor to inclose to you further extracts from the North China Daily News, in regard to the Formosa expedition. Two of these are taken from the issues of the 5th and 7th of July, and give brief statements, the one by a Japanese, and the other by a Chinese correspondent, of the diverse views held in regard to the expedition. Two others are from the issue of the 14th of July. The one sets forth the strength of the Japanese navy, the other remarks upon the activity shown at the Shanghai arsenal.

The Chinese have available six vessels which have been constructed here. Four of these are gunboats of six hundred tons, more or less. Two are heavy frigates. They have also some fifteen vessels constructed at the Foochow ship-yard. These are mostly gun-vessels of one thousand tons; are all new and steam well. They have still other craft, which have been used in the different provinces for revenue purposes and in cruising after pirates. I should say, roughly, that the number of these vessels is six or eight. They are small, but would be useful in a contest with the Japanese.

In point of fact, the Chinese navy is probably to-day well able to cope with the Japanese, notwithstanding the advantage the latter have in the possession of two iron-clads. These latter are inferior vessels, imperfectly clad, and with indifferent steaming capacity.

The extract of the 15th July gives a letter from the Japanese consul at Amoy to the Taotai at that port; and that of the 17th, a letter from a foreign correspondent in Formosa, which speaks favorably of the occasion of the expedition and its management. The extracts of the 21st give some desultory information of no particular interest.

After Mr. Dreyer, of the telegraph company, had left Shanghai on this mission, I learned privately from Mr. Sheppard, our active officer at Tien-tsin, that the Chinese commissioner to Formosa had, among other things, recommended the establishment of a telegraph between Foochow and Formosa. This I communicated to Mr. Dreyer by telegraph, and, as a consequence, he visited Formosa, and has made a contract with the commissioner for the cable and the dependent land lines at each end. The cable will be about ninety miles long, the Formosa land line two hundred, and the Foochow end about fifty. This contract remains to be approved by the telegraph company at Copenhagen. The assent of the Chinese government has, I believe, been given already.

The present moment seems opportune for the creation of telegraph facilities between this and Peking. I have urged Mr. Dreyer to proceed thither at once, have asked Mr. Sheppard to do what he can with the Viceroy Li, and suggested the matter to Doctor Williams.

I am, &c.,

GEORGE F. SEWARD.

[Inclosures in No. 788.]

[From the North China Daily News, July 14, 1874.]

NAVAL FORCES OF JAPAN.

We are enabled to give the following particulars about the Japanese navy, taken from a statement which was drawn up by a competent authority, about the end of last

year:

Rio-jio-kan, wooden corvette, screw-steamer; 280 horse-power; length, 215 feet

greatest breadth, 33 feet; draught, 174 feet. Protected by a girdle of 4-inch iron plates, 3 feet above and 4 feet under the water-line, about 15 feet fore and aft being without armor. Carries 12 cast-iron rifled guns, muzzle-loaders, 10 of which have a caliber of 5 inches and 2 of 63 inches. The greatest speed of this vessel is 9 knots, and for this reason, as well as for the insufficiency of its armor, it may be a match for a wooden vessel of the same strength, but would have no chance whatever against the most ordinary iron-clad. This vessel visited Shanghai last year.

Nishiu-kan, wooden corvette, screw-steamer; 250 horse-power; leagth, 201 feet; greatest breadth, 29 feet; draught, 14 feet; carries 6 cast-iron guns of about 5 inches and I Armstrong muzzle-loader of 7 inches. She is said to be a fast and serviceable vessel, and is, we believe, the one now in port.

Tsukuba kan, wooden corvette, screw-steamer; 200 horse-power; length, 197 feet; greatest breadth, 294 feet; draught, 15 feet; carries 6 steel Armstrong guns of 5 inches, 2 cast-iron guns of about the same caliber, and 2 smaller bronze guns of native fabrication. This vessel is very old and used up; her greatest speed not more than 6 knots. Kasuga-kan, wooden paddle-steamer; 300 horse-power; length, 243 feet; greatest breadth, 27 feet; draught, 11 feet; carries 4 bronze guns of 5 inches, 2 cast-iron guns of about the same caliber, and 1 Forbes gun of 7 inches.

Ho-shio-kan, compound-system gunboat, screw-steamer; 75 horse-power; length, 145 feet; greatest breadth, 223 feet; draught, 7 feet; carries 1 Armstrong breech-loader of 7 inches, 1 idem of 54 inches, and 2 small steel guns.

Mo-shuim-kan, wooden gunboat, screw-steamer, of about the same dimensions as the preceding; carries 1 Forbes muzzle-loader of 7 inches, 1 Armstrong muzzle-loader of 5 inches, and 2 smaller Armstrong guns.

Dai-itchi-Teibo-kan or Teibo I, wooden gunboat, screw-steamer, 60 horse-power; length, 132 feet; greatest breadth, 22 feet; draught, 74; carries one cast-iron gun of 6 inches; 1 Krupp gun of 54 inches; and 2 small steel guns.

Dai-in-Teibo-kan or Teibo II, same construction and dimensions as the preceding; carries 2 Armstrong muzzle-loaders of 6 inches, and 2 small steel Forbes guns.

Un-yo-kan, wooden gunboat, screw-steamer, about the same dimensions as the preceding; carries 1 rifled muzzle-loader of about 6 inches, 1 of about 5 inches, and 2 small Armstrong guns.

Chiotagata-kau, small wooden gunboat, screw-steamer of 40 horse-power; carries 1 breech-loader of 5 inches, and 2 small guns.

Kotetz'en, iron-clad ram, screw-steamer, with two propellers 500 horse-power, length 153 feet, greatest breadth 27, draught, 13 feet; carries 3 very large and 2 smaller guns. This ram is old and completely unseaworthy; in fact last year it was not considered as belonging to the active navy any more. As, however, it may, perhaps, still be fit for defending the entrance of a harbor, we have not felt justified in omitting it. Latest advices from perfectly reliable sources fully confirm the unseaworthiness of this ram, and further inform us that the other so-called iron-clad, the Rio-jio-kan, is undergoing boiler repairs, which cannot be finished for a considerable time. The gunboats are said to be generally in good order.

The Japanese have, moreover, five or six transports, not at all or insignificantly armed; two of these are sailing-vessels.

As we said at the beginning, these particulars have been taken from a statement drawn up at the end of last year, but they may stand even now, as we hear that no additions of any importance have been made to the Japanese navy since that time. The actual strength of the active navy of Japan would, therefore, be as follows:

JULY 15.

Dispatches re Formosa.

A copy of a reply addressed to Lo Taotai at Foochow, by Mr. Fukushima, His Imperia 1 Japanese Majesty's consul for Amoy.

AMOY, June 17, 1874.

I have the honor to inform you that I returned to Amoy to-day, the 17th of the month, from Formosa, and received your letter of the 21st of the 4th moon, (Chinese calendar,) in which you state that you had been informed by his excellency Li, the viceroy of Fohkien, on the 18th of your 4th moon, touching the subject of his excellency's official letter addressed to his excellency Saigo, commander-in-chief of the Formosan expedition, and requesting me to communicate the matter to Mr. Shinagawa, consul for Shanghai, &c. I fully comprehend the position, and beg to say that I do not consider such a matter can be treated by us, but that it is a subject for the commander alone to decide as he sees fit when he receives the viceroy's dispatch. From my personal experience in the Formosan territories, through which I lately traveled, and partly also from my opinion of the circumstances under which our commander has invested the country of the savages by special instructions from his Japanese majesty, I apprehend that there would be found some difference in the views of our commander from those entertained by the viceroy, as expressed in his excellency's letter.

For instance, as regards the territories which are occupied by aborigines, and which have long been claimed to be under the control of your government, I would remark that I put a few questions to the aborigines as to whether their territory as well as themselves had ever been subject to the sovereignty of China. They said "they had not," and substantiated their denial in an especial manner by showing that their taxes are paid only to their chief. They maintain that they have never been under the control of the Chinese government. It seems to be their custom to quarrel and even fight furiously with each other, taking possession of ground by force and robbing each other, up to the present time, there being no authority to execute impartial justice or to exercise control over them.

I would here mention an instance in which they lately applied to our commander, begging for his adjudication in a question respecting a right of property in ground, which had been contested for forty years. In disposition they seem to be amicable, though they are generally reckless and of a morose temperament, never getting rid of a sense of injury when despoiled of their property by wicked people, from whom they suffer on account of their having no proper court in which to make complaint.

They regarded therefore with extreme satisfaction the approach of our invading party. Placed as they were, it was as if they had met a light on a dark night, and they showed every kindness by helping the army to their utmost and begging protec tion from us, which seems to show that they were much gratified by the entrance of the invaders within their boundary, and that they preferred them to any others.

I therefore think that our commander confidently believes that those savages as well as their territories have never been under the sovereignty of your government, and under the special instructions he holds from his Japanese majesty is daily exerting his energies toward reducing them to a proper condition. His commission, however, extends only to military affairs, and is limited to the measures necessary in reference to the savages. Consequently, I think, he could do nothing in the matter, nor even discuss with his excellency the viceroy the question as to the jurisdiction of your government, over that territory, this being a subject which ought to be left to the decision of our respective governments.

From my private considerations of this affair, I would express the hope that your high commissioner or authorities will negotiate it in an impartial and amicable spirit with our minister, and thus continue our friendly relations on a permanent footing. I have, &c.

No. 797.]

No. 163.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Davis.

UNITED STATES CONSULATE GENERAL,

Shanghai, August 11, 1874. (Received September 17.) SIR: I have the honor to inclose to you herewith a series of telegrams that have passed between the consul at Amoy and myself, showing the arrival of General Le Gendre at Amoy, his arrest, &c.

It is notorious that General Le Gendre has a special concern in the

Japanese expedition to Formosa. You are aware that, during the time of his service as our consul at Amoy, he made many visits to the island. At a later moment he appeared in Japan, "having a very full and complete set of maps, charts, photographs, &c., of the coast, mainland, and people of Formosa" (Mr. De Long to Mr. Fish, No. 302, November 6, 1872.) He was then brought into communication with the Japanese government, and there followed negotiations for his employment by that government, "with a distinct reference to the use of his services as an adviser in military operations, should they become necessary." (Mr. Fish to Mr. De Long, No. 164, December 30, 1872.) The military operations here referred to would appear to be those since undertaken in Formosa, ostensibly to punish savage inhabitants of the island for alleged maltreatment of shipwrecked Japanese. This matter is thus spoken of by Mr. Low, in his dispatch No. 264, of June 13, 1873:

There are, he says, (the Japanese ambassador,) only two questions of importance which he desires to discuss with the Chinese government.

First. Whether China is responsible for the acts of the aborigines on the island of Formosa. If the government answers this question in the affirmative, he will then demand redress and indemnity for the murder of some natives of Loochoo, who were wrecked there a year and more ago. If the answer be given in the negative, notice will be given that Japan proposes to send a military force to Formosa, to chastise the savage and semi-civilized tribes that practically hold undisputed possession of a large part of the island, and, as there are no safe harbors on that part of the island where the aborigines reside, permission will be asked to land troops at one of the ports open to trade, and to march them through Chinese territory that lies between the ports and the points where the troops are intended to operate against the savages. Second. To ascertain the precise relations between China and Corea, &c.

General Le Gendre was associated with the embassador on this mission. (See Mr. Low's letter, No. 256, May 13, 1873.)

It has been reported that the Chinese disclaimed responsibility for the acts of the Formosan savages.

It has been reported again that they agreed to take some steps to restrain them for the future. At any rate, in the early part of this year, the Japanese set on foot an expedition to Formosa of an extensive character. My several dispatches in regard to it have laid before you all the general information which I have gathered, and will have demonstrated that it was not intended for a raid against a few scattered miserable savages.

That expedition sailed from Japan in the middle of April. The southeru part of Formosa, from sea to sea, was at once occupied. The savages were encountered and beaten in conflict or driven into inaccessible mountains. Long since the ostensible purposes of the expedition were accomplished, but the Japanese still remain. They have put up houses of such description as warrant the belief that they are intended for permanent occupation. They have constructed a few roads where their utility for military purposes is not manifest. It is said that large numbers of troops are massed near Nagasaki, ready to be moved in case of the outbreak of war. Meanwhile the Chinese, who beyond a doubt would be glad to see the Japanese evacuate the island and let the matter drop, have been in negotiation with Japan, and, as if in anticipation of war, have mobilized large forces and are everywhere preparing for

war.

Of the view which the United States representative at Peking takes you are doubtless informed. I may, however, quote from his dispatch to me of June 17 last :

I suppose my instructions to Mr. Henderson have reached you in passing, and I have therein given my views of the countenance and aid which our countrymen are affording