but become such through the Church." Calvin holds similar language-Non alius est in vitam ingressus nisi nos ipsa (ecclesia) concipiat in utero, nisi pariat, nisi nos alat suis uberibus, &c. If by this is meant that the Church, by her ministry, her teaching, her ordinances, her manifestation of a divine life, is the ordinary channel or medium through which faith is produced, and the union is formed between Christ and the believer, there can be no objection to the statement. It doubtless, in this sense, contains an important truth, which, in these days of new and extra measures, is too much undervalued. If, however, it is intended, that the connection with the life of the visible Church is the necessary antecedent to a connection with the life of the Redeemer, it seems to us contrary to all the analogies employed. It would make the Church itself the vine, or else the branches to be the primary source of life. We do not think the latter is the meaning intended either by Dr. Nevin or by Calvin.

ARTICLE V.

MR. MARTIN'S EXAMINATION OF PROF. TAPPAN'S REVIEW OF EDWARDS ON THE WILL, REVIEWED.

By A. T. BLEDSOE, Esq., Philadelphia, Pa.

We have often heard it alleged, that Professor Tappan, in ascribing the scheme of fatalism to Edwards, has entirely misconceived his philosophy of the will; but, in our opinion, it will be found much easier to make such an assertion than

to prove it. This charge has been repeated by an able writer in the Repository,* who seems to have exerted his utmost ingenuity to make it good. Yet, after all, if it should turn out that it is the disciple, and not the opponent, of President Edwards, who has "capitally and essentially" misconceived his doctrine, it would be no new thing under

* Jan. No. 1843.

the sun. Indeed, we can more easily conceive, that the amiable desire to bring the system of so justly venerated a master into harmony with the truth, should have blinded the eyes of a loving disciple to its true features, than that "an anxiety to fasten on it the scheme of a physical necessity," should have deceived and misled a candid and truthloving opponent. Whether the former disposition has misled Mr. Martin, the writer in question, or the latter has betrayed Prof. T. into a misstatement of Edwards's system, it is the principal object of the present article to inquire.

In this discussion, we do not intend to enter into all the minute criticisms which have been made upon Prof. Tappan's masterly review of Edwards. This would lead us into a variety of particular details which would become exceedingly tedious to the reader, without a sufficient return for such a tax upon his patience; and besides, it would give our article the appearance of an attempt to adjust the respective merits of Prof. T. and his reviewer, rather than the air of a sober and serious inquiry after truth.

The first point, then, in regard to which there is any important diversity of sentiment, is that which refers to the relation between the sensibility and the will. The review of Prof. T. possesses the very great merit, that it has exhibited and set forth the great accession of strength which the cause of necessity derives from identifying the "sensitivity and the will.” Mr. Martin does not deny the correctness of the statement, that Edwards has confounded these two faculties of the soul; but he thinks that Prof. T. has "scarcely paid sufficient attention to the cautious hesitancy with which Edwards always expresses himself" on this subject. P. 37.

Now, is it true that Edwards has always expressed himself with such cautious hesitancy? If we have read his works aright, he is very far from having done so. For, he expressly declares, that there are two faculties of the soul, the understanding and the will. And again, he explicitly asserts," that the affections of the soul are not properly distinguished from the will; as though they were two facul

ties in the soul." "The affections are no other than the more vigorous and sensible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul." From the first of these sentences, one would suppose that Edwards intended to identify the affections with the will; but, in the second, he expressly identifies them, not with the will itself, but with the exercises of the will. This identification is here as pointed and positive in the statement of Edwards himself as it could possibly be in Prof. T.'s representation of his doctrine. His "cautious hesitancy" does not always adhere to him; in the above passages, as well as in many others which might be produced, it entirely vanishes.

It matters but very little, however, whether President Edwards held to this identification with a cautious hesitancy, or with a dogmatical confidence. The main question is, whether he has wrought this "manifest error," as Mr. Martin calls it, into his scheme of necessity, and made it an integral part and parcel of his logic. If he has done this, it is a poor apology, to allege that he has built with materials of whose soundness he himself entertained very serious doubts. Whether he has done so or not, we shall see in its proper place.

Mr. Martin attaches importance to the cautious hesitancy with which Edwards always speaks on this point, because he has, in many instances, taken the diametrically opposite ground, and maintained, not that desire is the same with volition, but that it is the cause thereof. P. 37. He confesses that Edwards has affirmed the identity alleged; but he also contends that he is equally explicit in denying it. He complains that Prof. T. has not expressly noticed this inconsistency. And why? Was Prof. T. bound to point out and dwell upon every defect and flaw in the work of President Edwards? Certainly not: and it is well, perhaps, that he has left some of them to be exposed by the disciples of the great New England metaphysician.

But why should Prof. T., in justice to Edwards, have noticed this inconsistency? This question we shall permit the writer under consideration to answer in his own words.

"What is the value of all this oft-repeated argument, which alleges that Edwards identifies them, and imputes fatalism to his system, in consequence of the identification, the reviewer's own inconsistent denial of his allegation will serve sufficiently to show. If Edwards did identify them, he had too much acuteness to persist in an error so manifest, and he relieved his system of its embarrassments by a happy inconsistency for which his critic has not given him credit." P. 45.

This is the burden of the complaint, then, that Prof. T. has not given Edwards credit for his "happy inconsistency." Let him, then, have the full benefit of it. Will it deliver him, even during the happy moments of his inconsistency, from the scheme of fatalism, which is involved in the identification of will and desire? By no means. It does not follow, that because the identification of will and desire leads directly to the scheme of fatalism, the separation of them necessarily leads away from it. It is true that, when Edwards identifies the two faculties in question, he makes the road to fatalism direct, short, and palpable; for, if a volition is a state of the sensibility, and this is necessitated, as it is conceded to be, the work of the necessitarian is done. The scheme of fatalism is established. It rests upon the very foundation on which Hobbes placed it, and on which it has too securely stood from his time down to the present day. But it does not follow, as we have said, that the distinction. in question is a rejection of that scheme; for when Edwards distinguishes between them, he is careful to make the necessitated state of the sensibility, the necessitating cause of volition. By his inconsistency, therefore, he does not break the chain of necessity; he merely introduces another link into it. He contradicts himself, it is true, as Mr. Martin alleges; but instead of delivering himself, by a happy inconsistency," from the scheme of fatalism, he does, by a most unhappy consistency, cling to it. This is the true state of the case; and if Prof. T. has not given his author credit for a happy inconsistency, it is because he did not deserve it.

Those who have felt constrained to take sides against President Edwards, must content themselves, in the best way they can, to labor under a very great disadvantage. His disciples, even the most candid and philosophic among them, find it very convenient, at times, to manufacture his great name and reputation into an element of logic. The writer under review is not altogether free from this very common fault. "Edwards had too much acuteness," says he, "to persist in an error so manifest." But did he not persist in it? Did his acuteness enable him to see through it, and expel it from his works? No such thing is pretended. It is admitted by Mr. Martin, that he fell into this manifest error, and that it is to be found in the present editions of his work. What is meant, then, by his having had too much acuteness to persist in it? The meaning of the writer evidently is, not that Edwards has seen through his error and rejected it, but that he has, "in many instances," taken up with contradictory positions. Now, if it is any evidence of acuteness for an author to occupy contradictory positions, we know of nothing which is so well entitled to the character of acuteness as dulness itself.

We are very far from intending to intimate, that Edwards had not sufficient acuteness to see through the "manifest error" in question; but that it was possible for him to persist in it, we think is sufficiently proved by the fact, that he has actually done so. He not only persisted in it, but he was enabled to do so by means of his acuteness. Locke had pointed out the distinction between will and desire; and the acuteness of Edwards was aroused, not to illustrate and vindicate this distinction, but to overthrow it, in order that he might establish an identification which is so great a prop and support to the particular scheme he had undertaken to advocate. His departure from the manifest error in question was not the work of his acuteness; if it had been, the error itself would have been abandoned. All his acuteness was enlisted-calmly and deliberately enlisted on the side of this error; and if he has departed from it at all, in other parts of