believe them to be one substance in another sense, as shall be shewn in its proper place. But because this doctrine is very liable to be mistaken, I must here briefly premise two things, in order to state and settle a little more clearly the true notion of unity and distinction. 1st. I desire it may be observed, that by three distinct substances the Fathers do not mean three of a different nature, but only three numerical substances agreeing in one common nature, which unity of nature is sufficient to denominate any three substances one nature, though not one individual being for three men or three Angels are, in their sense, but one nature, yet not one undivided being, because separated and divided from each other. Therefore it must be observed further, 2ndly. That by three distinct substances they mean not three actually divided or separated from each other; but three, who by virtue of their infinity must be conceived most inseparably and eternally united into one, yet with distinction and without confusion. Thus in short the Fathers reconciled their notion of a Trinity with the Unity of the Godhead, making the three persons what we call specifically one by an unity of nature, and numerically one by an undivided union: so that according to their notion something more is required than a bare specific unity to make three persons one being [as well as three ;] and that is actual union without confusion: which is the closest unity three persons are capable of without being confounded into one. Some other notions of unity will be considered, and those more fully explained in their proper place; but thus much was necessary to be premised at present in order to prevent the heavy charge of Tritheism, which some have so liberally, but most unjustly, bestowed upon this hypothesis; thereby arraigning all antiquity at once and condemning the most genuine sense of all the best and primitive Fathers. The proposition now to be shewn I could make good with great variety of arguments: but they will not come within the compass of a sermon, therefore I shall content myself barely to hint a few, and to insist upon one which I think will be an infallible argument against the Schoolmen. Arg. 1. Now then first, the very definition, which the ancients give of persona and hypostasis does fully evince the thesis, for if one person be defined rationalis naturæ individua substantia, then three persons must be rationalis naturæ tres individuæ substantia; unless the Schoolmen can teach us to distinguish between the definition and the thing defined. [It is true the schools retain this very definition, as well as the term persona itself; but every man sees, it is utterly inconsistent with their hypothesis of an absolutely single substance, and therefore whilst the Fathers speak sense and reason, in allowing the three Persons to be three Substances in one sense as well as one Substance only in another, the Schoolmen, who deny them to be three real Substances in any sense, are justly charged with a contradiction.] Arg. 2. The Fathers expressly say, that there are three Substances in the Trinity, taking them for individual Substances agreeing in one common nature: and they tell us further, that to say there is but one absolutely single Substance in that sense, is heresy, and particularly the heresy of Sabellius. [There is nothing more certain than that the Greeks by hypostasis always mean substance and not mere modes or qualities: sometimes it signifies substance or nature in general, the same with the known senses of soía and essentia; but more commonly it is used by them for a particular substance or individual: and yet in this sense, it is well known they always said there were three hypostases against Sabellius, i. e. three distinct individual substances of the same common nature. In compliance with whom, the Latins, using the word substantia in the same sense, say against the same heretic that there are three Substances in the Trinity. St. Hilary in particular* asserts that they are per substantiam tria; and that there is, propria unius cujusque substantia,] and upon this account they rejected the • Hilar. de Synod. p. 227. words μονούσιος and ταυτούσιος, and even ὁμούσιος itself, whenever it was abused to signify a particular substance. Arg. 3. They expressly tell us, that when they say the three Divine Persons are of one nature and one substance, they then take substance in a larger sense, for nature and essence in general which never subsists but in particulars: so that by the three Persons being ouośotot, they only mean that they are not reposσiol, of a different nature from one another. Thus they often explain themselves, when they distinguish betwixt soía and hypothesis, as betwixt a general and particular substance. And all this is pretty fairly owned by Estius himself,* who tells us, that when the Arians demanded of the Orthodox what the three persons were, they would not then say they were tres Res, or tres Entes, or tria Entia, for fear of seeming to own with them that there were three distinct essences of a different nature and unequal to one another, but that at other times they made no scruple to assert that they were tres Res and tria Entia. Now what are tres Res and tria Entia, but three individual substances, unless they be mere modes and accidents? If substances, then immaterial, if immaterial, then rational and intelligent Beings, if rational and intelligent, then three Minds or Spirits ; unless there be any other intelligent substances besides minds or spirits. This deduction is clear and rational, and agreeable to the sense of all antiquity; who in their discourses of the Trinity always distinguish betwixt general and particular substance; as carefully as philosophers do betwixt substantia prima et secunda: this is so fully demonstrated by Petavius,† in his 4th Book De Trinitate, cap. 7. that though his authorities could not prevail upon him to forsake the hypothesis of the schools, [perhaps for reasons best known to himself,] yet they cannot but convince any impartial reader. Arg. 4. The Fathers often tell us, that the three Persons. are united into one Being without confusion, which is a very inconceivable thing upon the hypothesis of one single substance, mind or spirit; for whatever things are properly united Esti. Sent. lib. 1. dist. 26, sect. 3. + Petav. De Trin. lib. 4. c. 7. must be substances really distinct from one another: for there is one proper union of one single substance with itself. Yet the Ancients looked upon this to be so proper an union, that they made use of it as a known instance to prove that the two natures in Christ, his Divinity and humanity, soul and body, were united without confusion: which would have been a very impertinent instance, had they believed the three persons to be only one single substance. Nay, it would have proved the quite contrary to what they designed, and the heretics might have retorted it upon them and have said, that as the three Persons in the Trinity were but one single Substance, so the two natures in Christ were but one single nature after union. But I pass over these and the like arguments to insist upon one, which I conceive is an invincible argument (at least ad hominem) against the Schoolmen. The Fathers constantly assert, that the substance of the Son is begotten of the substance of the Father: but now the Schoolmen themselves tell us, that the consequence of this assertion is, that the Father and Son are two distinct substances, numerically distinct from one another, whence we may form this regular syllogism. Arg. 5. They who assert that the substance or being of the Son is begotten of the substance of the Father do thereby assert that the Persons in the Trinity are three distinct individual substances. But the generality of the Fathers do assert that the substance of the Son is begotten of the substance of the Father; therefore they believed the three Persons to be three individual substances in the sense so often explained. The first proposition of this syllogism is allowed us by Bellarmin, Estius, and generally all the Schoolmen, who are agreed in this, that the consequence of, Essentia in Divinis generat essentiam, must be, that there are distinct individual essences or substances in the Trinity. Estius's words are these, "Si essentia essentiam gigneret, fatendum esset in Deo esse plures numero essentias."* And Bellarmin to the • Esti. in Sent. lib. ii. dist., 5. sect. 2. p. 25. same purpose, "Si essentia gignit et gignitur; ergo duœ sunt essentiæ ; nec enim intelligi potest unum et idem a seipso produci; i. e. If essence begets or is begotten, then there must be two numerical essences; else this great absurdity will follow, that one and the same thing must be produced by itself."* [I do not now stand to take notice, that this great absurdity does certainly fall upon the Schoolmen by denying the distinct substances of the persons, whilst they allow that the person of the Son is begotten of the person of the Father, but not his essence of his essence; which distinction of a person from his own proper peculiar essence is an airy notion, that might sufficiently be exposed; but I only observe what is to our present purpose, viz. that it is confessed by all the schools, that substance generating substance does imply numerically distinct substances.] And here Calvin likewise falls in with the schools; for in his Admonitio ad Fratres Polonos contra Blandratam,† amongst his Theological Tracts he makes use of the same principle to prove his own heterodox notion of the Son's being auroltos, God of himself, and not of the Father: "if," says he, "the Father has his essence from himself, and the Son his essence from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both, then there are three essences:" he means three individual substances or essences only numerically distinct from one another; which he, as well as the Schoolmen, thinks absurd, but however they all agree in this, that it is the natural consequente of asserting that the Divine substance of the Son is begotten of the substance of the Father. Therefore if the second proposition of the syllogism can be made good, that the Fathers do generally assert, that the essence of the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father, it will infallibly follow, at least upon the Schoolmen's principles, that they likewise believed the three persons to be three individual substances or essences numerically distinct from one another, notwithstanding their belief of the indivisible unity of the Godhead. Now that they have asserted Bellar. De Christ. lib. ii. c. 7. Tom. 1. contr. sect. at profecto. |