duty to his neighbour? That it does so, I have before observed, is implied in the last clause of the text: "On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets." That it ever must, will appear from the following considerations: why may not he value his inter-cribed, comprehends one's whole est more than mine, because it is his? If my interest is worth more than my neighbour's, because it is mine, why may I not require him to love me more than himself?— And why may not he, for the same reason, require me to love him more than myself? Such absurdities will follow from the supposition, that any one ought to love himself more than a neighbour, who possesses an equal capacity for happiness. In the eye of true benevolence, things are valued according to their worth, without the least regard to their being mine or yours. And since mankind pos-, common nature, and have a similar interest, and viewed in the light of eternity, stand much upon the same level; it is fit and reasonable, that each one should be required to love his neighbour, his fellow-creature, his brotherman, of equal capacity, as much as himself. If one may love any one of his neighbours less than himself, because he has a smaller capacity for happiness and a less valuable interest; for the same reason, he ought to love another of his neighbours more than himself, because his capacity for happiness is greater and his interest more valuable than his own. sess a 1. It is the very nature of disinterested, impartial love, to restrain one from doing his neighbour wrong, or injuring him in his person, name, or interest, whether temporal or spiritual. The apostle says, "Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not bear false witness, Thou shalt not covet; and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. Love worketh no ill to his neighbour: therefore love is the fulfilling of the law." This corresponds with what the apostle says, in another place, respecting charity, i. e. true love: "Charity envieth not-doth not behave itself unseemly-is not easily provoked-thinketh no evil." He, who loves his fellow-creatures with a truly disinterested, kind and benevolent affection, can surely feel no motive to injure them, in word or deed, or to treat them in any way forbidden in the word of God. Such love, as has been described, obviously comprehends obedience to all the prohibitions of the Divine law, respecting our neigh bour. Thus, the second commandment in the law, as summed up by our Saviour, is like unto the first, equally rational, equally just and good. They both have the same foundation, the nature, fitness, and relations of things. He who obeys the one, obeys the other. He who loves God supremely, is ever disposed to love his neighbour as himself; and he, who loves his neighbour, which the word of God rebour as himself, will not fail to love God with all his heart. It now remains to enquire. 2. It is equally the nature of disinterested, impartial love, to prompt one to do all that for his neigh quires, and, in this respect, to do his whole duty. He, who really values his neighbour's interest, as he does his own, will cheerfully do all he consistently can, to promote it. He, who feels an impartial egard to his neighbour's happiness, will not hesitate to make all those sacrifices, which he ought to make, to supply his neighbour's wants and relieve his sufferings. No one can love his fellow-men as himself, without performing for them all the kind offices, which he can perform, without neglecting more important duties. He will, as he has ability and opportunity, do good unto all men. True love as naturally excites men to do whatever they ought for their neighbours, as to refrain from doing what they ought not. I may add, 3. That whenever men treat their neighbours as they ought, all the duty they perform, essentially consists in the exercise of true love. Though one should do ever so much, that has a tendency to benefit his neighbour, yet he does FOR THE HOPKINSIAN MAGAZINE. DIVINE PROVIDENCE IN MORAL EVIL. [Concluded from page 187.] REMARKS. no duty towards him, any further than he is actuated by love. This is plainly implied in the words of the apostle, "Though I bestow all my goods to feed the poorand have not charity (love) it profiteth me nothing." No duty is performed, whatever one may do for his neighbour with a view to benefit himself. Duty, whether towards God or one's neighbour, consists, not in external actions, but in the free, voluntary exercises, from which they flow. In these the moral agency of men consists; for these only are they accountable. These God searches and tries, in order to render to every man according to his works. It is manifest, therefore, that the whole duty of men to their neighbours is comprehended in disinterested, impartial love. [To be concluded.] glory his chief object of pursuit, in the works of creation and providence: and He requires all his intelligent creatures to pursue the same object, as their chief end. "Whether, therefore, ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." Accordingly, we find, that pious ministers often call upon sinners, to renounce their selfish interest and make the glory of God their chief I. In view of the foregoing observations, we may see what constitutes the glory of God. The Assembly of Divines in their Catechism, say, that 'God, for his own glory, hath fore-ordained whatso-object of affection and pursuit.— ever comes to pass. In his predictions of blessedness to the Church, God says, by Isaiah, "I will say to the North, Give up; and to the South, Keep not back; bring my sons from far, and my daughters from the ends of the earth; even every one that is called by name, for I have created him for my glory; I have formed him, yea I have made him." It is plain, from this passage, and a multitude of others, that God makes his own But, in order to place our affections on any definite object, it is necessary to understand in what it consists. And from this subject we may see that the glory of God consists in the display of his natural and moral perfections.And who can conceive of an object more important, or better adapted to fill heaven with joy and praise, than this? Who can ever again doubt the wisdom of God in causing moral evil to exist in this world, when it is so necessary to display the Divine glory? 66 II. The Providence of God is universal and particular. All persons, who believe in a God, admit that He governs the natural world. The revolutions and convulsions of nature, have usually been ascribed to his agency. It is, also, commonly admitted, that God exercises what is called a general providence over the moral world. But, many deny, that God's providential agency extends to all events. They say, if it does, then it will follow, that God is the cause of moral evil. But, what if this does follow? It is sometimes said, that if God causes some to walk in his statutes and others to err from his ways, he must necessarily be partial and unjust. But how does this appear? Partiality does not consist merely in treating persons differently; but in treating them differently, without any good reason." But, we have scen, that God has important reasons for making some to err from his ways. The full display of his own infinite perfections, requires, that a difference should be made in moral characters. This was true, in the case of Pharaoh. God told him to his face, "And in very deed for this cause have I raised thee up, that I might show my power in thee, and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth." And no reason can be given, why He may not have as good reasons for raising up others for the same purpose, that He did Pharaoh. Neither does injustice consist in treating persons better than they deserve; but in treating them worse." But God never has treated, and never will treat any of his creatures worse than they deserve. He never has destroyed, and never will destroy any persons before they are first fitted for destruction. And in forming the char 66 acter of his creatures, He displays neither justice nor injustice, but sovereignty."-It is also sometimes affirmed, that if God makes us to err from his ways, then we cannot be free agents and accountable for our conduct. This objection has often been made, and as often answered. It was so common in the days of the apostles, that they had occasion to take notice of it. After Paul had asserted the Divine agency in forming the characters of the vessels of mercy and the vessels of wrath, in these words, "Therefore hath He mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will, He hardeneth;" he anticipated this very objection, "Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault, for who hath resisted his will?" And he gave such an answer to it, as the Holy Spirit directed. We find it answered, by an appeal to the objector's conscience: "Nay, but Oman, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed, say unto him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?" In this answer, it is worthy of observation, that the apostle did not give up, or explain away the doctrine, that it is God, who makes men into such vessels as He pleases; but boldly maintained it, and by his appeal to the conscience of the objector, asserted also his activity and guilt. This answer ought to satisfy all those, who have any regard to the Divine declarations, and forever silence the objection. But, if any are disposed still to enquire, How can it be possible for men to be free and accountable when they are made to err from the right way? the question may be answered on philosophical principles. Though it was not the design of these observations, yet, in ascertaining the extent of the Divine Providence, we have also ascertained the mode. free and voluntary in all they do. It is, indeed, sometimes said, that if we are dependant for our actions; then we cannot help doing as we do. But, is it meant, that we are, in some instances, disposed to do differently, and cannot? This is, probably, always insinuated, in this objection. But nothing is more false. God never causes any of his creatures to act against their will; but causes them to choose to act according to his will. Will the objector go still further, and say, that we cannot help acting voluntarily, when we are made to act voluntarily? And what if we cannot? It is impossible to conceive of more freedom, or a better reason for accountability, than to act from choice. Holiness, or sin, does not lie in the cause of moral actions, but in the nature of the actions themselves. God governs the moral world, by | be to blame. If God makes the directing and moving the will of earth into a globe, and not into a his creatures. In order to display square; then, doubtless, it is a bis power and sovereignty in E-globe and not a square: and if He gypt, He turned the heart of the makes men to err from his ways; Egyptians to hate his people, to then, doubtless, they do err from deal subtilly with his servants.'- his ways. And if God does his But, who ever read the history of pleasure in the armies of heaven Pharaoh and the Egyptians, with and among the inhabitants of the any doubts respecting their free- earth, by making his creatures dom and guilt, in their oppressive freely and voluntarily fulfil his and subtile treatment of the Chil-decrees; then, doubtless, they are dren of Israel: "The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord; as the rivers of water, He turneth it whithersoever He will." But, who ever doubted the freedom or accountability of kings? If we do any thing voluntarily and heartily, we are conscious of being free and accountable: and the fact, that it is God, who works in us, both to will and to do, has no tendency to destroy, but to secure our freedom and accountability. In order to destroy our freedom and accountability, it would be necessary for God to make us act contrary to our will. But this is not only contrary to fact, but impossible in the nature of things. It is a gross absurdity to suppose, that a person can be made to perform a moral action, against his will. It is true, we may be compelled, by physical force, to do an overt action against our will; but it would not be a moral action. It is not by applying physical force, but by turning the heart, that Godworks in us both to will and to do, of his good pleasure." Hence the arguments, drawn from the analogy of physical causes, to prove that absolute dependence destroys freedom or accountability, are perfectly idle and sophistical. A person might, with as much consistency, and with as good logick, affirm, that if God, at first, made the earth round, then it was, necessarily a square; as to say, that if God makes us to err from his ways, then we cannot III. The same events are, frequently and properly, ascribed, in sacred scripture, to different caus es. God is said to have hardened Pharaoh's heart; and he is said to have hardened his own heart. In the history of Job, it is said, the Sabeans and Chaldeans plundered him of his property and slew his servants; but Job ascribed the same events to God; "The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord." It is said, respecting the crucifixion of Christ," It pleased the Lord to bruise him; He hath put him to grief." But Peter told by those, who are willing to be in the hands and at the disposal of an impartial and sovereign God. This IV. If it is God, who makes men to err from his ways; then the doctrine of reprobation is true in fact. Nothing more is meant by this doctrine, than God's eternal determination to make some vessels of dishonour. But we have seen, that He actually does this. And if he actually does make some for the day of evil; certainly there can be no objection against his Ac-having determined to do it, from the beginning; for all admit, that God has determined all his own actions, from eternity. doctrine does not depend for its support, on vain philosophy, or subtile metaphysics: though these have often been employed to overturn it. It rests on the broad foundation of unequivocal, Divine declarations. "And a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence, even to them, which stumble at the word, being disobedient whereunto also they were appointed.— Israel hath not attained that, which he seeketh for; but the election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded. But these, as natural brute beasts, made to be taken and destroyed, speak evil of the things which they understand not, and shall utterly perish in their own corruption." These passages cannot be evaded, except by those who manifestly wrest the scriptures to their own destruction. the Jews, that they had taken and with wicked hands crucified and slain him. There is no necessity of explaining away any part of these passages, to avoid inconsistency. Though it would be unphilosophical and absurd, to suppose, that two different causes both did the same thing, in relation to the production of the same effect; yet it is by no means unreasonable to believe, that two different causes may be active and perform differ ent parts in relation to the production of the same effect. cording to scripture and the common sense of mankind, God is the first, efficient cause of all things. He is said to work all in all, to work all things after the counsel of his own will, and to work in creatures both to will and to do of his good pleasure. But creaBut creatures also work out their own salvation and their own destruction. Human agency, however, is not the efficient, independent cause of any thing; but a second, dependant cause. Human agency bears the relation of effect to Divine agency. In the instance of Pharaoh and the Egyptians, and in all other instances of the kind, it was God, who turned their heart to hate his people; but it was the Egyptians and not God, who hated his people and dealt subtilly with his servants. The act of turning the heart, was one act, and the act of hating was another; which acts were consistent with each other, and both necessary to the production of the same course of events. The same analogy obtains, in regard to the production of good actions. It is God, who causes his people to walk in his statutes; but it is his people, and not God, who walk in his statutes. No difficulty, in seeing the reasonableness and consistency of human dependence and activity, is felt V. In view of this subject, those, who are disinterested, may confide in God, in the darkest time, and go on their way rejoicing. The Lord God, omnipotent, reigneth, and He will reign forever. He holds, in his hand, the hearts of all his friends and of all his enemies; and He can and does turn them whithersoever He will. All creatures, and all their conflicting |