Sermon. also,that their wicked, selfish hearts are opposed. The moment, then, they admit that they understand the word of God, they condemn themselves in the thing which they allow. This they cannot brook. Hence, they fly to the miserable and false subterfuge, "We do not understand;" when, at the same time, if they would be honest and candid, they would frankly say, "We do not love to hear.” The How then can the truths of the 5. We learn, from our subject, that ministers of the gospel have no good reason to forbear preaching plainly, because mankind do not love to hear the truth. truths of the Bible are all according to godliness; are reasonable, and commend themselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God. Why, then, should ministers forbear to exhibit them in their length and breadth, and with great plainness of speech, because they excite carnal opposition? No good reason can be given. A temporizing spirit, in preaching the gospel, is carnal policy, which takes sides with the wicked heart, rather than the Bible, and reason, and conscience, and the authority of Almighty God, who says, that doeth the syst of the Lord deceitfully!" 6. We learn the absurdity of saying, that the truths of the Bible may be preached plainly, and yet in such a manner as not to give offence to sinners. This is one of the great cries of the present day. There is a constant appeal from the preaching of one minister to that of another. This, or that, or the other minister, it is said, preaches plainly; but yet he does not offend. Saints and sinners are all pleased; and he gains their hearts, as well as their understandings." But this is a gross solecism. Light and darkness, cr fire and water, are not more opposed, than the truths of the Bible and the hearts of sinners. I 66 7. Our subject shows us why the truths of the Bible are represented as an infallible standard by which to try the state of the heart. The hearts of mankind never take any middle ground with respect to truth. They invariably approve or oppose, the very moment the truth is exhibited. The Bible, then, is a sure and infallible touchstone. No one, who will bring his moral character to compare with the word of God, has the least excuse for remaining self-deceived. This is the infallible standard, by which the moral characters of mankind will be tried in the great day of final de Finally, sinners at the last day, must be stript of every excuse for having rejected the truths of the Bible, and the gospel of Jesus Christ. We have seen. that the truths of the Bible are plainly revealed; that they are easy to be understood; that they are reasonable, and commend themselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God. No sinners, in the day of judgment, then, can find the least excuse for rejecting the truths of the Bible and the gospel of Christ, but a wicked, rebellious heart. This excuse will be their condemnation, and sink them down to inherit the blackness of darkness forever. AMEN, "O GEGRAPHA, gegrapha.” FOR THE HOPKINSIAN MAGAZINE. METAPHYSICKS. In the North-American Review, No. XLIV. July, 1824, is an ingenious and able Review of Dr. Brown's Sketch of a system of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. From the Introduction to this Review, I extract the following very just observations, on the utility and importance of the Science of Such being the universal and inevitable lot of humanity, we cannot conceive of a more useful, or directly practical employment, than for those individuals, whose opportunities and powers of contemplation permit, to sit in the seclusion of study, apart from actheir thoughts exclusively on the tive engagements, and there to fix constitution of the mind; to trace action up to its central sources; "It cannot be regarded as a to take a full survey of the menproof of the superiority of the pre-pecially the extent of the human tal phenomena; to estimate es sent age, that comparatively so little attention is bestowed on in- powers; to analyse, to describe, tellectual philosophy. In spite of to classify every internal prothe occasional fluctuations of pub-perty and faculty; to lic taste, we are persuaded, that Mind. the science of mind is still destined to take the precedence of all others. The flippant and superficial remark has been made, and that, too, by very high authority, that the philosophy of the mind is a useless pursuit, because every one may become his own mental philosopher; that one has only to look within, and he will there find all that the profoundest thinker can acquaint him with. Never was hazarded a bolder or more assailable error than this, Is botany a useless science, because herbs and flowers enough to fill whole catalogues, may be found within a mile from the cottage of every hard-working farmer? Is astronomy a vain pursuit, because every sailor on the watch, by only turning his head upwards, can count the stars moving over him, and mark the courses which they take? Has one man in a thousand the ability to fasten his attention on the operations of his own mind; and do not the occupations, habits, passions and characters of a large majority of mankind, lead their thoughts away from themselves, and fix them on external things? sag gest modes of applying them in their proper directions and to their proper objects; in one word, to unfold before the sight of their fellow beings, that which so very few know, what they are, and what they can become. Now, though there are not many men capable of originating these comprehensive, self-inspecting surveys and estimates, yet, after they are made, there are large numbers that can read them with enjoyment and profit. It is no small thing to direct a man's attention to himself; yet this is effected by the very sight of a book on the mind. We feel justified, on the whole, in laying down the following general results, which may be expected from good treatises on mental philosophy. Not to enumerate several advantages, of comparatively subordinate value, such as the mental discipline acquired by the prosecution of the study itself, the very dignity of the subject as a theme of speculation, the accession of a mere appropriate accomplishment, if nothing more, to a well-furnished mind, and the like; the First unquestionably great advantage is, to make us resolve upon and feel habitually conscious of our powers; a state of mind which necessarily precedes all wise and energetic action. The Second good result proceeding from this study is, that philosophical examination smooths the way directly to moral self-examination, which is the nurse of virtue. A Third effect is, to excite sentiments of piety by the contemplation of the most excellent and wonderful of the known works of God." Who, after reading the above just and high encomium upon Intellectual Philosophy, or the Science of Mind, would expect to see the learned Reviewer joining in the vulgar attempt to depreciate and vilify the science of Metaphysicks? But such is the fact. Whether he feared, that by recommending the Science of Mind, he should be understood to commend those theological works and those evangelical preachers, whom it is so common to stigmatize with the epithet metaphysical. I shall not presume to say; the following Extract, however, shows, that he is very willing to join the popular cry and to represent Metaphysicks as not merely an abstruce, but imaginary science, having for its object, things occult and unknowable, and for its foundation mere hypothesis and conjecture. These are his words: an "It is high time to cease confounding the science of the mind with Metaphysicks. This word, by common use, has now imperceptably acquired a new signification, no longer to be found in the dictionaries, and no longer expressive of a distinct science. We will try to explain and fix its present general acceptation. Metaphysicks is that which ascribes imaginary and plausible causes to existing appearances. and speculates upon the nature of what is hidden and unknown. We would distinguish it from philosophy, inasmuch as philosophy ascertains the causes of phenomena, and learns from experience the properties of things. Metaphysicks will be found to enter more or less into every department of learning. When Newton discovered and applied the law of gravitation, he was. strictly speaking, the philosopher. When he ascribed that gravitation to the influence of a subtle, etherial fluid, pervading all bodies, (though the theory almost prophetically accorded with some things, which we now know respecting electricity) he was only the metaphysician. When Hauy vy unfolded the mechanical composition of chrystals, and even demonstrated the necessary forms of their ultimate particles, he acted the part of a philosopher; but in attempting to account for the transmission of light through them, one night theorize ever so plausibly, and still be nothing more than a metaphysician. When Locke divided our ideas into those of sensation and reflection, although his division might have been incomplete or even redundant, yet, being a classification of known phenomena, it was perfectly philosophical. But when he accounted for our sensations of different colours by the emission of differently shaped atoms from the surface of bodies, he was metaphysical. When the Edinburgh Review traced the influence of French literature upon the poetry of the English Augustan age, it was convincingly philosophical; but, at another time, in accounting for the pleasure derived from Mr. Campbell's poetry, it worked itself up into a fit of beautiful metaphysical frenzy. Philosophy reasons rightly from right data; the reasoning, or the data, or both, of metaphysicks, may be either right or wrong. A spice of metaphysicks in a man's mind is a very good thing; in some writers a slight mixture of it has made many an author popular. It flatters the reader's own consciousness of being profound, and it stimulates his imagination to ascribe uncommon resources to the writer. Most men of genius are not without the metaphysical characteristick. It is the pioneer to discoveries of unknown relations among things. To improve any science, or to break into any original track of thought, one must have some tendency towards this quality. All the great chemists we have ever heard of have been endued with the metaphysical impetus. It is conjecture, and fancy, and refined curiosity, which prompts them to experiments, and it is not until they confirm by fact even the most sagacious of their conjectures, that they are honoured with the name of philosophers. The science of electricity, if we may strictly call it science, is, at this moment, half philosophy and half metaphysicks. The science of the mind was once almost entirely metaphysicks, and rightly bore that name, which it still erroneously bears, though very much purified from the admixture. Aristotle, however, mingled a good deal of philosophy with the sciHis followers, and the schools of later date, made it nearly all metaphysicks again. Des Čartes and Malebranche began to restore it to its proper balance, but were still too inveterate metaphysicians to produce the requisite equilibrium. Locke combined the metaphysical and the philosophical attributes to an enviable degree. Hence the improvements in this science which are dated from him. His followers of the French schools, together with Berkley and Hume, Hartley and Priestly, made very few real ad ence. vances, in consequence of the undue preponderance of metaphysicks in their speculations." Thus far the Reviewer.-Now, all this is prettily and promptly said, and might be pertinent and proper, if we would allow the Reviewer's definition of metaphysicks to be correct, that Metaphysicks is that which ascribes imaginary and plausible causes to existing appearances, and speculates upon the nature of what is hidden and unknown. The Reviewer acknowledges, that this is a signification no longer to be found in the dictionaries. It is, indeed, a signification, that never was found, and, I trust, never will be found in the dictionaries, nor in any other book, which shall give proper explanations of the terms used in the science of intellectual philosophy. If we look into the best dictionaries, we shall find the word metaphysicks defined to be, "Ontology, the doctrine of the general affections of beings."This is the original meaning of the term, answering to its derivation from two Greek words, which signify beside, or above nature. The science of metaphysicks was originally understood to be of a higher order than mere physicks or natural philosophy: It was the science of being, which lay at the foundation of all other sciences, and comprehended the encyclopedia.. But, in modern times, philosophers have found it convenient to use the term metaphysicks, in a more restricted sense. If we look into the writings of the most distinguished mental philosophers, who have adorned the two last centuries, we shall find they use the word metaphysicks, as synonymous with intellectual philosophy, or the science of mind, in distinction from physicks and all those sciences, which are conver 66 metaphysicks: "This word, by common use, has now imperceptibly acquired a new signification." What are we to understand here, by common use? No philosopher, who has written on the mind, if we except the Reviewer, has, to my knowledge, used the word in his sant with material objects. This is, indeed, admitted by the Reviewer. He says, "The science of the mind was once almost entirely metaphysicks, and rightly bore that name, which it still erroneously bears." The fact is undeniable; but the Reviewer assigns an imaginary and plausi-"new signification." Certainly, ble, i. e. in his sense, a metaphysical cause for it. Did intellectual philosophers give the name metaphysicks to the science of mind, because they considered that science, to which they devoted their time and talents, as almost wholly made up of fanciful conjecture and occult speculation? Had Locke and Edwards and Berkley and Stewart and Reid such a contemptible idea of that noble science, in which they made such achievements? Did they not rather call their favourite study metaphysicks, because it was the science of mind, in distinction from the science of matter? new those Divines, who are reproached know not who they are, that 6 But Suppose some Doctor should take it upon him to attach a signification' to the word physick, and represent it as meaning no more than the trial of experiments with roots and herbs. It would be easy for him to say, that the science of healing diseases was once mere empiricism, and was, therefore, properly called physick; but it is high time to cease con- I will now briefly state my obfounding the science of medicine jections to the disuse of the word with physick.' And so one might metaphysicks, or to the using of it say, that the science of the heav-in a new and dishonourable sense. enly bodies ought not to be called 1. It is the proper word, accordastronomy; for though this name ing to the usage of eminent wriwas proper enough, while the sci-ters, for ages past, to express the ence was little more than telling science of mind, or intellectual fortunes by the stars, yet it ought philosophy. no longer to be confounded with 2. It is a convenient word, as it that sublime science, which calca- supercedes the necessity of a cirlates the magnitudes, distances cumlocution to express the meanaud revolutions of the solar orbs.ing, which, by its etimology and But, the Reviewer gives a spec- its long continued use, it is adaptial reason, why the science of the ed to convey to every enlightened mind should no longer be called mind. |