of (g) Jeremiah, perhaps they will hear and turn every man from his evil way, &c. and this is faid, not that God underfood not whether they would do this or not, αλλ' οιονεὶ τὸ ἰσοςά σιον τῶν δυνάμεων γίνεσθαι δεικνὺς; but to demonfirate the almoft equal balance of their power fo to do, and that they might not defpond or remit of their endeavors by an imagination that God's foreknowledge laid a neceffity upon them; is ex olin' auToïs τῇ ἐπιςρέψαι, καὶ αὐτὴ αιτία γένηται τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, as not leav ing it in their power to turn to him, and fo was the caufe of their fin.

4thly. They argue from the deportment of men towards them who offend out of neceffity, allowing this as a fufficient excufe that they could not do otherwife. You would not, faith (h) Athenagoras to the Roman emperors, honor the good, or punifh bad men, εἰ μὴ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἦν καὶ ἡ κακία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ; vice and virtue were not in their power. And if men, faith Chryfoftom, do thus pardon their fellow men when they are neceffitated to do a thing (i) τῷ δὲ ὑπὸ ειμαρμένης πολλῷ μᾶλλον ουδε γινώσκειν ἐχρῆν much more fhould this be done to men compelled by fate to do what they do; for if it be abfurd to punish them who by the force of barbarians are compelled to any action, it muft be more fo, τὸν ὑπὸ δυνατωτέρας δυνάμεως κατανα[καζόμενον Sinny didóval, to punish him who is compelled by a stronger power. 5thly. They add, that if fate obtain, then the divine judgment must be overthrown; for they, faith (h) Origen, who take away, rò è̟Q' nuĩ, this liberty, take away with it praife and dif praife, and good and evil actions, with them a future judgment, and all threats against and punishment of offenders, and all the promifes made, and the rewards annexed to a life of holiness, ἀδὲν γαρ ἔτι τέτων ἐυλόγως ἔσαι γινόμενον ; for upon this fuppofi tion none of these things will rationally be done. If fate be ef tablifhed, faith (1) Eufebius, οἰκήσεται φιλοσοφια, οικήσεται καὶ Ἐντ clea, philofophy and piety are overthrown; there can be no religion, no praife for perfons ftudious of virtue, no blame of men addicted to the greatest impiety, all these things depending, ἐκ αὐτοπροαιρετᾶ μελέτης καὶ ἀσκήσεως, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἄφρων ἀναδε xns upon the neceffity introduced by the stars, and not upon meditation and exercife proceeding from our own free choice. (g) Chap. xxvi. 3. xxxvi. 3.- (b) Legat. pro Chrift, p. 27, -(i) De Fato Orat. 3.- (k) Orig. apud Eufeb. Præp. Ev. 1. 6. c. 11. P. 281. C. D. (1) Ibid. c. 6. F. 242. D. p. 243. A.

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t

CHAPTER V.

Shewing that thefe late notions, concerning the Liberty or rather Servitude of the Will of lapfed Man, were generally condemned by the Primitive Chriftians.

THIS will be evident from thefe following confidera

⚫tions.

SECTION I.-ft. That they place the freedom of the > will from neceffity amongst the doctrines, quæ per prædicationem apoftolicam manifeftè traduntur, which were manifeftly delivered to the church by the preaching of the apostles, and by ecclefiaftical tradition. Hues, we chriftians, faith (a) Justin Martyr, do not think as do the Stoicks, that all things are done according to fate, ἀλλὰ κατα μὲν προαίρεσιν ἑκατὸν καὶ Topher, aμagrave; but that every man doth well or ill according to the freedom of his will or choice. (b) Origen speaks thus, Eft et illud definitum în Ecclefiaftica Prædicatione omem animum effe rationabilem liberi arbitrii, et voluntatis; this allo is defined by ecclefiaftical tradition, that all fouls are ration al, and have free will and choice. Whence we may gather, that they are not fubject to neceffity fo as to be compelled to do good or evil; for we are under no neceffity to do well or ill. And though there is in the rational foul a power to do evil, it is not evil upon that account, faith (c) Didymus Alexandrinus; but becaufe The will freely ufe that power : καὶ ἐκ ἡμῶν μόνον ἡ δόξα αὐτῆ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων ὀρθῶς περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ζώων φιλοσοφησάν row, and this is not only ours, but the opinion of all who Speak Orthodoxly of rational beings. ́(d') Theodoret having eftabHifhed this doctrine of the liberty of man's will from neceffity, and his power to choose good or evil by reason, and by the ful frage of the holy fcriptures, concludes thus; raula x édidax tojiev, Siddoxoney, thus have we (chriftians) been taught by our ancestors, and thus we teach. St. Auftin lays down this as the true definition of fin, (e) peccatum eft voluntas retinendi, vel confequendi id, quod juftitia vetat, et unde liberum eft

(a) Apol. 1. p. 45.- (b) De princip. in Proem. (c) Ed. Combef. p. 28. (d) Adv. Græcos, Serm. 5. p. 542, 543, 548.de Duab. Animab. 11, 12.

& Or, rightly philosophize.

(e) Lib.

abftinere; fin is the will to obtain or retain that which juftice forbids, and from which it is free for us to abflain. Whence he concludes, that no man is worthy of difpraife or punishment, qui id non faciat quod facere non poteft, for not doing that which he hath no power to do; and that if fin be worthy of difpraife and punishment, it is not to be doubted, tunc effe peccatum cum et liberum eft nolle. These things, faith he, the Shepherds fing upon the mountains, and the poets in the theatres, and the unlearned in their affemblies, and the learned in the li braries, and the doctors in the fchools, et Antiftites, in facris locis, et in orbe terrarum genus humanum, (f) and the bishops in the churches, and mankind throughout the whole earth. Yea this, faith he, is fo manifeft, nulla hinc doctorum paucitas, nulla indoctorum turba diffentiat, that it hath the univerfal confent of the learned and unlearned. (g) Gennadius, in his account of ecclefiaftical doctrines, lays down this for one, that no man perifheth by the will of God; fed per feipfum electione Arbitrii, ne ingenuitatis libertas atque poteftas femel homini attributa, ad fervilem cogatur neceffitatem, but only by himself, and his own free choice, left the free choice, liberty and power once granted to man, fhould be reduced to a fervile neceffity.

SECTION II. 2dly. This will be ftill more evident from what St. Auftin, with the concurrence of all the ancient fathers) have faid in confutation of the Manichees who taught thefe three things.

ft. That there were two principles, the one good, and the author of good, the other evil, and the author of evil.

2dly. That the God of the law was not the true God, and that therefore the Old Teftament was to be rejected.

3dly. That fin arofe not from the free will of man, but from the fubftance of matter, and fo fome fouls were wicked not by choice, but by nature. Now against this wicked herefy St. Auftin urgeth many arguments, in which he hath the fuffrage of the ancient fathers.

*

And (1) he lays down thefe as certain and indifputable (h) rules, viz. de quo refiftere non valente quifquam quidpi am mali fecit juftè damnari nullo modo poteft, that no man can jufly be condemned for doing that evil which he was not able to refift for all men, faith he, will pronounce without any hesitation, nihil iftos omninò peccaffe, that thefe men have done no evil. For if fouls be fo compelled to act, ut refiftendi poteftas nulla fit, non peccant, that they have no power to refift, they fin not. If therefore, as Le Blanc faith, the reformed teach

(f) De Vera Rel. c. 14.(g) Cap. lvi.(b) Lib. de Duab, Anim. c. io.

men are fo depraved by the fall, ut non poffint nifi malè agere, that they cannot but do evil; they offend not in fo doing

2dly. This he propounds as a thing manifeft, (i) non peccare animas ex eo quod non funt tales quales effe non poffunt, that no fouls offend in not being fuch as they cannot be: Seeing then they who cannot do what is truly good, cannot be good; it must be alfo manifeft that if the fouls of lapfed men cannot do what is truly good, they offend not in not being good.

3dly. He afferts, that no man is worthy of difpraife, or pun od ifhment, (h) quid id non faciat, quod facere non poteft, for not doing that which he cannot do and this, faith he, will be owned by every man who confults, fecreta confcientiæ fuæ, legefque divinas penitus naturæ infitas apud animam, the fecrets of his confcience, and the divine laws written in his heart. Whence alfo it moft clearly follows, that lapfed men cannot be worthy. of difpraife or punishment, for not doing that good they cannot do.

4thly. His fourth rule is this, (7) Ex eo quod non accepit nullus reus eft, no man is guilty for not having that which he hath not received; and his inference this, that no man can duly blame another for being deficient, quia non ultra effe ac cepit, where he hath no power to go farther; fince he owes only what he hath received, and cannot exceed the bounds fet "him: If then man by the fall hath loft all power of doing good, and hath not fince received ftrength to do it, this deficiency cannot be his guilt. Now in thefe rules the ancient fathers exactly accord with him; for we have heard already from Juftin Martyr, Pfeudoclemens, Origen, Eufebius and Epiphanius, that a neceffity of finning frees men from all fault, for that which he cannot avoid, or for being that which he could not ceafe to be (b) Origen lays it down as a moft certain rule, that no man can be blameworthy for not doing what he cannot do and that as for Judas himself, en av de 4056 àutã @gɔńäτέτο εἰ ἐπανα[κὲς προδότης ἦν, he could not have been blamed had he been a traitor out of neceffity, and could not have been like the reft of the apoftles. Methodius, in anfwer to Origen, faying that the flesh makes the foul to fin, replies, (c)si AUTRY τὴν σάρκα ἔλεγε μὴ δύνασθαι ὑποτάσσεσθαι τῷ νόμῳ το Θε8, that if he faid this flesh could not be fubject to the law of God, no man could be blamed for theft or adultery, &c. by a juft judge, ἀδυνάτως ἐχήσης τῆς σαρκὸς ὑποτάσσεσθαι τῷ νόμῳ το Θεό, the flefh not being able to be fubject to the law of God. And (d) Pfeudo Juftin to that question, (how God requiring us to

(i) Lib. de Duab. An. c. 12. (k) Ibid. -(1) De lib, Arb. 1. 3. c. 15. 16. (b) Apud Eufeb. Præp. Ev. 1. 6. c. 11. p. 288. (c) Apud Epiph. Hær. 64. n. 51. p. 577. —(d) Qu. 103. and Refp. p. 458.

fulfil the law, and not fin, which is beyond our strength, could punish men for tranfgreffing it; it being manifeft, that & τὰ ὑπερδύναμιν μὴ ποιήσας ἐπεί εἰσιν ἀδύνατα ὑπάρχει ἀνεύθυνο, that no man is criminal for not doing that which is beyond his power, and therefore is to him impoffible) anfwers, that God con demns us not for not doing what is impoffible, but for not will ing to do what is poffible : τοῖς γὰρ δυνατοῖς, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔσιν ἢ éπav©, 1⁄2 5 ↓óf@ vietai, for praife or difpraife belongs only to things poffible, and which are in our power to do or not; and that we all offend, διὰ τὸ μὴ μίρεσθαι, καὶ ἐ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασε Sai, not because we cannot, but because we will not do what we ought to do. Add to this what hath been before cited from Irenæus, declaring, that our Lord and his apostles could have no reason to require us to do good, if it were not in our power to do what they exhort us to: From Tertullian, faying, that God would not have given a law to him who had it not in his power to obey it: From Origen, inquiring, how could God require that of man which he had not in his power to offer to him? and that of Theodoret, that God cannot justly punish a nature which hath it not in his power to do good, but is boundin the bonds of wickedness.

2dly. St. Auftin lays down this as the true definition of fin, (e) That it is the will to do that from which we have the liberty to abftain; for, faith he, (f) if men, libero ad faciendum, et non faciendum, motu animi careant, fi denique his abftinendi ab opere fuo poteftas nulla conceditur, peccato teneri non poffunt, want the free motion of the will to do, or not to do, or if they have not the power to abstain from what they do, they can not be guilty of fin; for if a man cannot do otherwife, he finneth not. (g) Acknowledge, faith he, that fin must be free from neceffity, non quia homines non poffunt, fed quia nolunt fervare legem, and must be done, not because men cannot, but be caufe they will not obferve the law; and hence thou wilt dif cern the rife of all fin, and the diftribution of punishments:Accordingly we have learned from Origen, that the foul doth not incline to either part out of neceffity, because then neither vice nor virtue could be afcribed to it. God, faith (h) Hilas ry, hath permitted to every man, libertatem vitæ fenfufque the liberty of life and judgment, non neceffitatem in alterutrum affigens, laying them under no neceffity of doing good or evil, ut præmium fibi voluntatis bonitatis acquireret, that he might be rewarded for the goodness of his will.

And again, (i) God, faith he, hath permitted to every man the liberty of choofing and doing what he will, et ob id uniuf

44.

662.

e) L. cont. Fortun, Man. p. 165.(f) L. de fide contr. Man. c. (g) De Actis cum Felice Man. 1. 2. c. 5. (b) In Pf. 21, p. (i) In Pf. 119. p. 968, 969.