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But this prohibition, it would seem, was not meant by Christ to extend to judicial oaths.

For, the whole passage runs thus.

"Ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old time, Thou shalt not fors wear thyself, but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths. But I say unto you, swear not at all; neither by heaven, for it is God's throne, nor by the earth, for it is his footstool; neither by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the Great King. Neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or black. But let your communication be yea, yea; nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil."

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And, 1. It does not appear that the Jews, in judicial oaths, ever swore 99 66 by heaven,” “the earth,' Jerusalem," or "their heads;" and, consequently, it is probable that judicial oaths were not alluded to here. 2. The prohibition expressed by "not at all" is to be understood as in conjunction with, not separated from, the succeeding words, "heaven," "earth," "Jerusalem," and "head:" that is; Do not swear, says Christ, by any of these forms, for all are equally reprehensible. He seems to suppose that some made a distinction between swearing by the name of God, which is an oath forbidden in the Decalogue, and swearing by other oaths not forbidden there. In opposition to which, he tells them, that because all those things bear the same relation to God that his name does, to swear by any of them was in effect and substance to swear by him. For which reason he says, "Swear not at all,” that is, neither directly by God, nor indirectly by any thing related to him.

3. Our Saviour himself did not make any objection to a judicial oath, when adjured by the living God to say whether he was the Christ or not. And St. Paul also calls on God to witness to the truth of his assertions, and thus in reality takes an oath and lastly the author of the epistle to the Hebrews, vi. 16, speaks of the custom of swearing judicially, without any mark of disapprobation.

203 Does Dr. Paley think that Christ's prohibition extended to judicial oaths?

204 What is his first reason? The second?

205 What does he think occasioned this prohibition?

206 What is the third reason?

The prohibition, then, was meant to apply not to judicial oaths, but to the practice of vain, wanton, and unauthorized swearing in common discourse.

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[To this Mr. Dymond replies, "From an investigation of the passage, it appears manifest that all swearing upon all occasions is prohibited. Yet the ordinary opinion, or rather perhaps the ordinary defence is, that the passage has no re ference to judicial oaths.-Dr. Paley explains "our Saviour's words to relate, not to judicial oaths, but to the practice of vain, wanton, and unauthorized swearing in common dis course.' To this there is one conclusive answer. Our Saviour distinctly and specifically mentions, as the subject of his instructions, solemn oaths; the whole prohibition sets out with a reference, not to conversational language but to solemn declarations on solemn occasions. Oaths" to the Lord," are placed at the head of the passage; and it is too manifest to be insisted upon, that solemn declarations, and not every-day talk, were the subject of the prohibition.

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It hath been said of old time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself." Why refer to what was said of old time? For this reason assuredly; to point out that the present requisitions were different from the former; that what was prohibited now was different from what was prohibited before. And what was prohibited before? Swearing falsely,swearing and not performing. What then could be prohibited now? Swearing truly,-even, swearing and performing: that is, swearing at all; for it is manifest that if truth may not be attested by an oath, no oath may be taken. In acknowledging that this prefatory reference to the former law is, in my view, absolutely conclusive of our Christian duty, I would remark, as an extraordinary circumstance, that Dr. Paley, in citing the passage, omits this introduction and takes no notice of it in his argument.

"Dr. Paley says that the high-priest examined our Saviour upon oath, by the living God,' which oath he took. But what imaginable reason could there be for examining

207 What is his concluding remark on this subject? 208 How does Mr. Dymond reply to this remark?

209 What does he say is manifest by the subject of the prohibition? 210 What inference does he draw from the commencement of the passage?

211 What is his reply to Dr. Paley's opinion of our Saviour's examination upon oath?

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him upon oath? Who ever heard of calling upon a prisoner to swear that he was guilty? Nothing was wanted but a simple declaration that he was the Son of God. With this view the proceeding was extremely natural. Finding that to the less urgent solicitation he made no reply, the highpriest proceeded to the more urgent. Schleusner expressly remarks upon the passage, that the works I adjure,' do not here mean ‘I make to swear, or put upon oath,' but ‘I solemnly and in the name of God exhort and enjoin.' This is evidently the natural and the only natural meaning; just as it was the natural meaning when the evil spirit said, 'I adjure thee by the living God that thou torment me not.' The evil spirit surely did not administer an oath.

"Paul says, God is my witness that without ceasing I make mention of you always in my prayers." 米 That the AImighty was witness to the subject of his prayers is most true; but to state this truth is not to swear. Neither this language nor that which is indicated below contains the characteristics of an oath, according to Paley's definition, i. e. an ‘invocation of God's vengeance.' Similar language, but in a more emphatic form, is employed in writing to the Corinthian converts. It appears from 2 Cor. ii., that Paul had resolved not again to go to Corinth in heaviness, lest he should make them sorry. And to assure them why he had made this resolution, he says, 'I call God for a record upon my soul that to spare you I came not as yet unto Corinth.'† The

expression appears to me to be only an emphatical mode of saying, God is witness; or, as the expression is sometimes employed in the present day, God knows that such was my endeavor or desire.

"The next and last argument is founded upon silence. Will it then be contended that whatever an apostle mentions without reprobating he approves? The same apostle speaks just in the same manner of the pagan games; of running a race for prizes, and of striving for the mastery.' Yet who

212 With what other text does he compare it?

213 What does he say concerning the supposed oaths taken by Paul?

214 What does he say concerning 2 Cor. i. 23?
215 What are his remarks concerning Heb. vi. 16?

* Rom. i 9 See also 1 Thess. ii. 5, and Gal. i. 20.

† 2 Cor. i. 23.

would admit the argument that because Paul did not then censure the games, he thought them right? The existing customs both of swearing and of the games are adduced merely by way of illustration of the writer's subject."]

IV. Oaths are nugatory, unless we believe that God will punish false swearing more severely than he will a common falsehood. And that he will do so, is probable, from considering that,

1. Perjury is a more deliberate sin. The juror confesses to his belief in God and in the sanctions of religion; and therefore his perjury implies his contempt of God's knowledge, power, and justice. But with a common falsehood, is connected neither the belief of God's existence, nor contempt of his power. Hence its less culpability.

2. Perjury violates a greater confidence. Men must trust one another; and the highest security for veracity is an oath. Now, as the security of reputation, property, and even of life itself, is connected with dependence on oaths, the consequence of continued perjuries would be the loss or destruction of the greatest interests on this side of the grave. A simple lie cannot do the same injury, because the same credit is not given to it. But it may be well to state that the affirmation of one who is unwilling to swear, is held equal to the oath of another person; and in that case a lie partakes of the nature and guilt of perjury.

v. Promissory oaths are not binding, when the promise itself without the oath would not be binding.

VI. As oaths are intended for the security of the imposer, they must be interpreted and performed in the sense which the imposer intended; for, otherwise, they would be no security to him. Hence the meaning and reason of the rule, "jurare in animum imponentis."

216 When are oaths nugatory?

217 What may be said of the sin of perjury?

218 Is this the case with a common falsehood?

219 What degree of confidence does perjury violate?

220 What may be the consequence of perjury? Why?

221 Has a lie the same effect?

222 When does a simple declaration become equal to an oath?

223 When are promissory oaths not binding?

224 What must be the interpretation of an oath?

CHAP. XVII.-OATHS IN EVIDENCE.

The witness swears "to speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.”

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To conceal designedly a part of the truth which relates to the matter in question, is as much a violation of the oath, as to testify to a positive falsehood. For as there are two kinds of oaths relating to evidence, by one of which the witness is required to answer truly to all questions asked; and by the othert to tell the whole truth;" it is evident that in the latter case, where there is no restraining to the question that shall be asked, the law intended the witness to tell the whole truth, even though he is not questioned to the extent of his knowledge. So that it is no excuse for not giving the court full information, to say, "Because it was never asked me."

The only exception to this rule is, when the witness, by such full disclosure, would criminate himself; for, as the law compels no man to be his own accuser, the oath is imposed with this tacit reservation. But such reservation extends only to cases where the law of the land permits such concealment of the truth. Hence, a delicacy with reference to the subject matter, or tenderness towards the person accused, are no pleas for concealment; for justice would thus be made to depend on the personal feelings of witnesses, rather than on the administration of the laws.

A full disclosure is also required from a person admitted to give evidence against his accomplices; because his immunity from punishment depends on the tacit engagement to tell the whole truth.

If answers be required to questions, respecting which the witness has doubts, as likely to affect himself or others, he ought to refer his doubts to the court. And as it is the bu

225 What does a witness swear that he will do?

226 What effect has this upon designed concealment? Why? 227 What is the only exception to this rule?

228 Why is that an exception?

229 To what cases does this exception extend?

230 What in particular will it not excuse? Why?

231 What is its bearing in the case of evidence against accomplices? 232 What if a witness thinks a question irrelevant?

233 Why is the answer of the court any authority?

* Called technically voir dire. † Used in examinations in chief.

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