vote he shall give, the counsels he shall approve, the support he shall afford, or the opposition he shall make, to any system of public measures, -is as much a question of personal duty, as much concerns the conscience of the individual who deliberates, as the determination of any doubt which relates to the conduct of private life: that consequently political philosophy is, properly speaking, a continuation of moral philosophy, or rather indeed a part of it, supposing moral philosophy to have for its aim the information of the human conscience in every deliberation that is likely to come before it. I might avail myself of these excuses if I wanted them; but the vindication on which I rely is the following:-In stating the principle of morals, the reader will observe that I have employed some industry in explaining the theory, and showing the necessity of general rules; without the full and constant consideration of which I am persuaded that no system of moral philosophy can be satisfactory or consistent. This foundation being laid, or rather this habit being formed, the discussion of political subjects, to which, more than to almost any other, general rules are applicable, became clear and easy. Whereas, had these topics been assigned to a distinct work, it would have been necessary to have repeated the same rudiments, to have established over again the same principles, as those which we had already exemplified, and rendered familiar to the reader, in the former parts of this. In a word, if there appear to any one too great a diversity, or too wide a distance, between the subjects treated of in the course of the present volume, let him be reminded, that the doctrine of general rules pervades and connects the whole.

It may not be improper, however, to admonish the reader, that, under the name of politics, he is not to look for those occasional controversies which the occurrences of the present day, or any temporary situation of public affairs, may excite; and most of which, if not beneath the dignity, it is beside the purpose of a philosophical institution to advert to. He will perceive that the several disquisitions are framed with a reference to the condition of this country, and of this government: but it seemed to me to belong to the design of a work like the following, not so much to discuss each altercated point with the particularity of a political pamphlet on the subject, as to deliver those universal principles, and to exhibit that mode and train of reasoning in politics, by the due application of which every man might be enabled to attain to just conclusions of his own. I am not ignorant of an objection that has been advanced against all abstract speculations concerning the origin, principle, or limitation of civil authority; namely, that such speculations possess little or no influence on the conduct either of the state or of the subject, of the governors or the

governed; nor are attended with any useful consequences to either; that in times of tranquillity they are not wanted, in times of confusion they are never heard. This representation, however, in my opinion, is not just. Times of tumult, it is true, are not the times to learn; but the choice which men make of their side and party, in the most critical occasions of the commonwealth, may nevertheless depend on the lessons they have received, the books they have read, and the opinions they have imbibed, in seasons of leisure and quietness. Some judicious persons, who were present at Geneva during the troubles which lately convulsed that city, thought they perceived, in the contentions there carrying on, the operation of that political theory, which the writings of Rousseau, and the unbounded esteem in which these writings are holden by his countrymen, had diffused among the people. Throughout the political disputes that have within these few years taken place in Great Britain, in her sister-kingdom, and in her foreign dependencies, it was impossible not to observe, in the language of party, in the resolutions of public meetings, in debate, in conversation, in the general strain of those fugitive and diurnal addresses to the public which such occasions call forth, the prevalency of those ideas of civil authority which are displayed in the works of Mr. Locke. The credit of that great name, the courage and liberality of his principles, the skill and clearness with which his arguments are proposed, no less than the weight of the arguments themselves, have given a reputation and currency to his opinions, of which I am persuaded, in any unsettled state of public affairs, the influence would be felt. As this is not a place for examining the truth or tendency of these doctrines, I would not be understood by what I have said to express any judgment concerning either. I mean only to remark, that such doctrines are not without effect; and that it is of practical importance to have the principles from which the obligation of social union, and the extent of civil obedience, are derived, rightly explained and well understood. Indeed, as far as I have observed, in political, beyond all other subjects, where men are without some fundamental and scientific principles to resort to, they are liable to have their understandings played on by cant phrases and unmeaning terms, of which every party in every country possesses a vocabulary. We appear astonished when we see the multitude led away by sounds; but we should remember that, if sounds work miracles, it is always on ignorance. The influence of names is in exact proportion to the want of knowledge.

These are the observations with which I have judged it expedient to prepare the attention of my reader. Concerning the personal motives which engaged me in the following attempt, it is not necessary that I say

much; the nature of my academical situation, a great deal of leisure since my retirement from it, the recommendation of an honored and excellent friend, the authority of the venerable prelate* to whom these labours are inscribed, the not perceiving in what way I could employ my time or talents better, and my disapprobation in literary men of that fastidious indolence which sits still because it disdains to do little, were the considerations that directed my thoughts to this design. Nor have I repented of the undertaking. Whatever be the fate or reception of this work, it owes its author nothing; in sickness and in health I have found in it that which can alone alleviate the one, or give enjoyment to the other,occupation and engagement.

* Rt. Rev. Edmund Law, D. D. Lord Bishop of Carlisle.

MORAL AND POLITICAL

PHILOSOPHY.

BOOK I.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS.

CHAP. I.-DEFINITION AND USE OF THE SCIENCE.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY, or ETHICS, is the science which teaches men their duty, and the reasons for it.

Its use is, to guard against the errors that may arise, either from defects in the ordinary rules of life, or from ignorance in their application.

The ordinary rules of life are the Laws, 1. of Honor; 2. of the Land; 3. of God.

[Of these, the Laws of God, and the Laws of the Land, may be called essential rules of conduct. But the Laws of Honor cannot, with any propriety of language, receive that appellation. "The law of honor consists of a set of maxims, written or understood, by which persons of a certain class either agree to regulate, or are expected to regulate their conduct. It is evident that the obligation of the law of honor, as such, results exclusively from the agreement, tacit or expressed, of the parties concerned. It binds them, because they have agreed to be bound; and for no other reason. who does not choose to be ranked among the subjects of the law of honor, is under no obligation to obey its rules. These rules are precisely upon the same footing as the laws of free

1 What is Moral Philosophy, or Ethics?

2 What is the use of this science?

3 What are the ordinary rules of life?

4 May all these laws be called essential rules of conduct?

5 Of what does the law of honor consists ?

6 Why is any one bound by the laws of honor?

7 Is any one obliged to obey its rules?

He

masonry, or the regulations of a reading-room. He who does not choose to subscribe to the room, in the one case, or to promise conformity to masonic laws, in the other, is under no obligation to regard the rules of either."—Dymond's Essays on the Principles of Morality. Essay 1, Pt. 2, chap. 4.]

CHAP. II.-LAW OF HONOR.

The Law of Honor is constructed by people of fashion, and is calculated for their use.

Hence it regulates duties only betwixt equals in society, and omitting such as relate to inferiors in life, passes no censure on acts hurtful to society, unless they interfere with the concerns carried on between such equals. And hence unfeeling conduct to domestics and dependants, and the nonpayment of debts to tradesmen, are no offences in the code of Honor.

Again, the Law of Honor, being constructed by persons in the pursuit of pleasure, and for the mutual convenience of such, passes no censure on acts connected with that pursuit; and is, in most instances, favorable to the licentious indulgence of the natural passions, and, disregarding the law of God, even ordains, as in the case of duelling, a kind of murder.

CHAP. III.-LAW OF THE LAND.

They, whom the Law of Honor does not affect, make the Law of the Land their rule of life; and are content so long as they do or omit nothing for which some law can punish them.

But such a rule is defective, because the law itself is doubly so; for it omits many duties, and permits many

crimes.

8 By whom is the law of honor constituted?

9 What duties does it regulate?

10 What does it omit?

11 Does it censure all acts that are hurtful to society?

12 What kind of vices does it not consider as offences?

13 For whose convenience is the code of honor?

14 What follows from this fact?

15 Do its followers always hold it subordinate to the will of God? 16 With what are those content who make the law of the land their only rule of life?

17 Is that rule defective? Why?