claims, be guilty of aggressions, to be settled only by an appeal to arms. And thus the peace of society will be disturbed, by the vindication of the plea that a violation of the social compact justifies its dissolution.

Rejecting therefore the fiction or fact of a social compact, as unfounded in principle, and dangerous in application; we assign, as the only ground for civil obedience, the will of God, as collected from expediency.

God wills the happiness of man.

Now, civil society conduces to that end.

But civil society requires that each member be bound to support the interest of the whole.

Hence, if the interest of the whole be supported by obeying the established form of government, it is the will of God that each person obey such established form, so long as the interest of the whole requires it; that is, so long as submission brings to the whole fewer evils than resistance would. On this principle, unresisting submission and unjustifiable resistance are equally excluded.

But it will be asked, who is to judge when the resistance is justifiable? We answer, every man for himself. For, in contentions between the rulers and ruled, the parties admit of no umpire; and the decision cannot be left to those, whose conduct has given rise to the question, and whose fate is too intimately concerned in the result. The danger of error and abuse is no objection to the rule of expediency; for, 1. Every rule is equally liable to similar danger; and, 2. The application of this, as of other rules which bind the conscience, must depend on private judgment. In the exercise of his judgment, however, it matters not whether a man be influenced by his own reasons, or freely adopts those of another.

The advantage of thus substituting expediency in the place

62 What effect would such a compact have upon the peace of society?

63 In what manner would it occasion that disturbance?

64 In advocating civil obedience, what ground for it, better than the social compact, do we assign for it?

65 What are the steps of argument by which we arrive at this conclusion?

66 How far does this obligation extend?

67 In this case who shall be the judge of duty? Why?

68 Is there no objection to this rule on account of error or abuse? 69 What reasons have you for this assertion?

of compact, as the ground of civil obedience, will be best seen by considering,

1. That it will be as much a duty to resist at one time, as to submit at another; for there are times, when the society will gain more by resistance than by submission.

2. That the right to resist does not depend on the grievance which is sustained or feared, but on the probable evils of resistance. Thus, at the revolution, because the probability of mischief was not so great as the likelihood of benefit, resistance was justifiable; but it would not have been, if the greatest probability had been on the side of mischief.

3. That when the government is once settled, no plea, founded on the injustice of its formation, can warrant resistance to it. Of all civil contests, few have been so futile, and none so furious, as those respecting a disputed succession. The allegiance of the subject is due, not to the person, but to the office of the ruler.

4. That not every stretch of prerogative, abuse of power, or neglect of duty on the part of the chief magistrate, or of one or both branches of the legislature, will justify resistance, unless the general consequences of the individual wrong are likely to be greater than the evils of disturbance. Still, all such acts, however trifling in appearance, must be opposed and punished even beyond their apparent insignificance; because such readiness on the part of the people to take alarm, is the best security for the preservation of liberty, which is most surely undermined by those encroachments that are made without opposition, or opposed without effect.

5. That no law or custom will be so binding, that it need be continued when public benefit shall demand its discontinuance. The prerogative of the chief magistrate, the powers of the legislature, and the rights of the people, are only parts of so many laws enacted for expediency; and may at any time be abrogated, if requisite for the public good. The falsely and foolishly called fundamental laws of the constitution, so far as perpetuity is concerned, have no 70 What is the first advantage obtained by adopting this rule? 71 What is the second advantage? Example.

72 What is the third advantage? Remarks.

73 What is the fourth advantage?

74 But should we let pass unnoticed trifling errors in our rulers? Why should we not?

75 What is the fifth advantage?

76 What follows from this?

place in our system. All the respect we hold due to such laws, is founded, not on their ancient institution, but present worth; and the unwillingness to alter them, can fairly rest only on the mischief which arises from frequent changes of government.

6. That, as all civil obligation is resolved into expediency, the same act, done under two different forms of government, is not to be viewed in the same light; and the act of oppression that would justify resistance in a free country, would not justify it in one that is not free. For as the expediency of resistance depends on the probability of success; and as the probability of success in the latter country is less than in the former, the expediency of submission becomes greater in one case than in the other. Again, as it is expediency which constitutes the moral obligation to obey, the rights connected correlatively with such obligation must vary with the difference of expediency. Now, as the expediency of submission is not the same, so the rights cannot be the same. In this way alone the subjects of different states possess different civil rights. The duty of obedience is defined by different boundaries; and the point of resistance is placed at different parts of the scale of suffering. Nor is there any need to apply the principle of the social compact, as some have done, to explain the ground of such difference in civil rights, or to enforce the duty of submission.

7. That, as the interest of the whole society is binding on every part of it, no individual can pursue his private advantage to the injury of the community; nor may any portion of the empire concert measures for their own benefit to the detriment of the sum of public prosperity. In the contest between England and the United States, an American, to justify resistance, ought to have satisfied himself, not only that the colonies would be benefited by their independence, but that America would gain more, than England could lose by the separation; or, at any rate, that the whole gain to both countries would be greater by the future freedom of the colo

77 What inference do we draw from it in the sixth place? What reasons for this?

78 What effect has the rule of expediency upon the rights of subjects? What follows from this?

79 What principle do we found upon it in the seventh place?

80 How does Dr. Paley think that Americans ought to have reasoned before they declared their independence of Great Britain?

nies, than the whole loss to both by their continued submission. The same principle of calculation, by which the balance of advantages and disadvantages is ascertained, may be applied to all similar cases. And the conclusion arrived at will be, that in a competition of interests between a small colony and the mother country, the less must be sacrificed to the greater. But in proportion as the dependency increases its power, it has a right, founded on expediency, to have its interests viewed differently; and to claim terms of confederation equal to its importance in the general scale, and, if refused, to assert its independence.

CHAP. IV.-DUTY OF CIVIL OBEDIENCE, AS STATED IN THE CHRISTIAN SCRIPTURES.

As regards the extent of our civil rights and obligations, Christianity leaves man where it found him; that is, it affords neither argument nor objection to any conclusions upon the subject, that may be deduced from the law of nature. The only passages of the New Testament connected with this subject are in the Epistles of St. Paul and St. Peter.

66

Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers: for there is no power but of God; the powers that be, are ordained of God. Whosoever, therefore, resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist, shall receive to themselves damnation. For, rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same; for he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain; for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience' sake. For, for this cause, pay ye tribute also: for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing. Render therefore to all their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due ; custom to whom custom, fear to whom fear, honor to whom honor." Rom. xxii. 1—7. "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man, for the

81 What is his general conclusion as regards the rights of colonies? 82 What effect has Christianity upon our civil rights and duties? 83 What are the only two passages that have any bearing upon this subject? Recite them.

Lord's sake; whether it be to the king, as supreme; or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of them that do well. For so is the will of God, that with well-doing ye may put to silence the ignorance of foolish men; as free, and not using your liberty for a cloak of maliciousness, but as the servants of God." 1 Pet. ii. 13-18.

These passages have usually been adduced as proofs of the language of Scripture in favor of unlimited passive obedience. But before such an interpretation can be admitted, it is necessary to examine the subject more at length.

Upon the subject of civil obedience, there are two questions; the first, whether we are morally bound to obey government at all; the second, to what extent ought obedience to be carried. This being the case, it is plain that if expressions which relate to one of these questions, be applied to the other, there is great danger of perverting their intentions. This distinction should be borne in mind, when interpreting the passages which we have quoted.

They will be found to inculcate rather the duty of obedience than to describe the extent of it: for while they enforce the obligation by the proper sanctions of Christianity, they neither enlarge nor contract the limits by which it is bounded. In like manner, the same apostles enjoin servants to be subject to their masters, children to obey their parents in all things, and wives to submit themselves unto their husbands; yet no one doubts that the commands of masters, parents, and husbands, are often so immoderate, unjust, and inconsistent with other obligations, that they both may and ought to be resisted.

Hence, we are at liberty to infer, that unlimited passive civil obedience may lead, in some cases, to the imposition of commands equally immoderate and inconsistent with other obligations; and that a resistance in like manner would be justifiable on the part of a people exposed to such commands.

84 What have these passages been said to favor?

85 What two questions must we examine in order to form an opinion on this subject?

86 What is the object in dividing the subject into these two divisions? 87 To which division should we suppose the Scriptures under consideration will apply?

88 What other duties are enjoined by Scripture in the same manner? 89 And what do we infer from that fact?