Page images
PDF
EPUB

trary monarch; because from his injustice the greatest part of his subjects are sheltered by their obscurity.

Europe exhibits more than one example, where the people, provoked by the exactions of the nobles, have joined with the prince in the overthrow of the aristocracy, deliberately preferring the despotism of one to that of many. About the middle of the 17th century, the commons of Denmark, weary of the continued oppressions, and exasperated by the recent insults of the nobility, formally offered unlimited power to the king. The revolution in Sweden was brought about with the acquiescence, if not assistance, of the people; from the prospect it afforded of deliverance from the old tyranny of their nobles. In England, the people beheld the depression of the barons, under the house of Tudor, with satisfaction, although they saw the crown acquired thereby a power which the constitution as established at that time was not likely to limit. The lesson taught by such events is, that a mixed government, which admits of a patrician order, ought to circumscribe the privileges of the nobility if it wishes its own preservation: for nothing so alienates the minds of the people, or prepares them for the practices of an enterprising prince or a factious demagogue, as the perception of abuses resulting from the existence of separate immunities.

Amongst the inferior, but not inconsiderable advantages of a democracy, or of a constitution where the people share in the legislation, the following should be reckoned :

[ocr errors]

1. The direction which it gives to the education and pursuits of the superior orders of the community. The share which this has in forming the national character is very important. In countries where the gentry are excluded from all concern in the government, the only road to advancement is the profession of arms. But miserable as that country must be, which constantly employs in military service a great proportion of any order of its subjects; the individuals of the profession are not less so: for, from the want of higher objects, they fall into habits of animal gratification, or devote themselves to the futile business and decorations of a court. But, where the effective portion of civil power

156 What political convulsions have been common in Europe? 157 Mention some instances.

158 What are we taught by these examples? Why?

159 Among the inferior advantages of democracy, what is the first?

is possessed by a popular assembly, more serious pursuits, with purer morals and a more intellectual character, will engage the public esteem; and faculties which qualify men for deliberation, and are the fruits of sober habits and continued application, will be excited by the most spirit-stirring of inducements, the desire of political importance.

2. Popular elections procure to the common people courtesy from their superiors. The contemptuous and overbearing insolence of the higher orders is greatly mitigated, where the people have something to give; and the assiduity with which their favor is then sought, generates habits of condescension and respect. And as life is more embittered by affronts than by injuries, whatever tends to procure civility and to lessen the evils of inequality, deserves to be accounted among the most generous institutions of social life.

sures.

3. The satisfaction which the people in free governments derive from the knowledge and discussion of public meaSuch subjects excite just enough of interest to afford a moderate engagement to the thoughts, without rising to any painful degree of anxiety; and thus reach the end and aim of all those amusements, which compose so much of the business of life and as these topics excite universal curiosity, and are such as almost every man wishes to deliver his opinion about, they greatly promote, and even improve conversation, by supplying a substitute for amusements less innocent. Now, though the jealousy of despotic governments excludes all this, the loss, you say, is trifling, except to village politicians but nothing is a trifle, which ministers to the harmless gratification of the multitude.

It has been said that a republic is suited only to a small state; for unless all the people of a large empire share in the representation, the government is not to them a republic; that elections, where the constituents are numerous and widely dispersed, are managed by a few situated near the place of election; because each voter considering his single

160 What beneficial effect upon national character results from this advantage?

161 What is the second advantage?

162 Why is this advantage of any importance?

163 What is the third advantage?

164 Why has this a beneficial influence?

165 What has been said by some concerning an extensive republic? 166 What five reasons have they given for these opinions?

suffrage as unimportant, cares not to oppose the influence of such few; that if the representation be contracted enough to admit of orderly debate, the interest of the constituent becomes too little, of the representative too great; that it is difficult to maintain any connection between them; that he who represents 20,000 is necessarily a stranger to the great body of his electors; and that when a representative, so unknown to his constituents, finds the treasures and honors of the state at the disposal of a few, and himself one of the few, he will scarcely prefer his public duty to personal aggrandisement, which the value of his vote will always purchase; and, lastly, as all appeal to the people is precluded by their own want of unanimity, the divisions and combinations of the representatives will be equally dangerous. But much of the weight of these objections is taken off by the contrivance of a federal republic; which, leaving to each smaller state its internal legislation, reserves to a convention of all the united states the adjustment of individual claims, together with the possession of the plenary powers usually granted to other governments, on points connected with the welfare of the whole community in their domestic and foreign relations. How far such a constitution is able to unite the liberty of a small commonwealth with the safety of a large empire; or whether amongst co-ordinate powers, dissensions are not likely to arise, which, for want of a common superior, will proceed to fatal extremities; are questions on which the records of the past are silent; but are to be decided by the history of this country, where the experiment is now under trial on a large scale.

CHAP. VII.FIRST PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONS.

This and five succeeding chapters are inserted instead of Paley's chapter on the British Constitution.

[The principles on which a government is formed and conducted, compose what is called its constitution.*

167 What is an answer to these objections?

168 What is the genius of that form of government?
169 Can we judge of its effects from former governments?

170 How are they to be decided?

171 What is the constitution of a government?

*Rawle on the Constitution.

This may be made up of governmental acts, judicial decisions, and immemorial usages, as in the countries of the old world; or it may be a written code, agreed upon and adopted by those who are to be affected by it, as is the case in this country.t

"It is not necessary that a constitution should be in writing; but the superior advantages of one reduced to writing, over those which rest on traditionary information, or which are to be collected from the acts and proceedings of the government it self, are great and manifest. A dependance on the latter is indeed destructive of one main object of a constitution, which is to check and restrain the governors. If the people can only refer to the acts and proceedings of the government, to ascertain their own rights, it is obvious, that as every such act may introduce a new principle, there can be no stability in the government. The order of things is inverted. What ought to be the inferior is placed above that which should be the superior; and the legislature is enabled to alter the constitution at its pleasure.

"This is admitted by English jurists to be the case in respect to their own constitution, which in all its vital parts may be changed by an act of parliament; that is the king, lords, and commons, may, if they think proper, abrogate and repeal any existing laws, and pass any new laws in direct opposition to that which the people contemplate and revere as their ancient constitution. No such laws can be resisted or disobeyed by the subject, nor declared void by their courts of justice as unconstitutional. A written constitution which may be enforced by the judges and appealed to by the people, is therefore most conducive to the happiness and safety of the community."‡

As

governments purely despotic, are conducted by no settled principles, but by the mere will of the sovereign, they are not said to have a constitution.§

172 Of what is it composed?

173 Is it necessary that it should be in writing?

174 Would a written one be preferable?

175 What would be consequent to a dependance upon the latter? Why is that the fact?

176 Is this the case in any government?

177 To what extent is the power of the British legislature?

178 Have despotic governments any constitution?

* Paley.

Sullivan's Pol. Class-book.

+ Rawle.

§ Ibid.

The constitution of the United States, is probably the first code of governmental principles, that has received, previous to its force, the sanction of those who were to be ruled by it. And, in comparison with all others, as has been said by Mr. Rawle, "The history of man does not present a more illustrious monument of human invention, sound political principles, and judicious combinations."

We are therefore well authorized to make it the foundation of what remarks we have to offer upon the principles of government. And accordingly we shall endeavor to exemplify our political views, by referring to that constitution so wisely adapted to the promotion of the common welfare and happiness of its subjects.

But on this account our description of the organization and duties of a government must be preceded by a few preliminary remarks.

And,

1. All government should hold its existence only by consent of the main body of the people. In the declaration of our independence, it is asserted that "" governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed;" and "it is the right of the people to alter or abolish" them, whenever they suppose that their own safety or happiness depends upon such operations. Mr. Hamilton, in the Federalist,* says, "It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the existing federal system, [the old confederation,] that it never had a ratification by the people.-The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of the consent of the people. The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure original fountain of all legitimate authority." In accordance with this principle, the preamble of our constitution begins with, "We the people of the United States ;" and agreeably to the recommendation of the convention by which it was formed, it was ratified by "conventions of delegates, chosen in each state by the people 179 What is said of the constitution of the United States? 180 How does it compare with others as respects its merits? 181 What advantage will be taken from that in this treatise ? 182 What will be necessary on this account?

183 What is our first preliminary remark?

184 Has this been declared by our own country ?

185 What other authority have we for this principle?

186 Does the constitution of the United States recognize it?

* No. 22.

« PreviousContinue »