The president is the only executive officer known to the constitution; and the only one responsible to the people. The duties, however, are obviously too numerous and various for one man; hence, the constitution contemplated the creation of inferior offices by congress, and the division of labor among subordinates.

The appointment of these inferior officers, is a power necessary to, and a part of, the executive power; for the

"The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for president and vice president, one of whom at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as president, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as vice president, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as president, and of all persons voted for as vice president, and of the number of votes for each; which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the president of the senate. The president of the senate shall, in the presence of the senate and house of representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted; the person having the greatest number of votes for president shall be the president, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers, not exceeding three, on the list of those voted for as president, the house of representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the president. But in choosing the president, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the house of representatives shall not choose a president, whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the vice president shall act as president, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the president. The person having the greatest number of votes as vice president shall be the vice president, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the senate shall choose the vice president; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of president, shall be eligible to that of vice president of the United States."

284 What is their method of voting?

285 What is the method of counting the votes?

286 Suppose that no one has a majority, how is the president chosen? 287 How is the vice president chosen if no one has a majority of electoral votes ?

288 Is the president to perform all the executive functions? 289 Why should the president appoint these inferior officers?

executive duties are necessarily to be performed by them. And it is evident that if they are not appointed by, and not responsible to, the executive, he cannot be accountable for the performance of their duties.

But, in order to check a spirit of favoritism in the president, and to prevent the appointment of unfit characters, from state prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity; the constitution declares that," He shall nominate, and by and with_the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all other officers of the United States whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but the congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the president alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of department. The president shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session."*

At different times, congress has created four executive departments; viz. the departments of state, of the treasury, of war, and of the navy. Over each of these there is a presiding officer, called "the secretary." Besides these departments, there is the general post-office, over which is the "general postmaster."

CHAP. X.-POWERS AND RESTRICTIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE.

Having finished our examination concerning the proper structure and organization of the law-making powers in a free government, we will now proceed to inquire what authorities should be vested in them, and what restrictions should be imposed upon them.

This inquiry will be conducted on the principle that "a government ought to contain in itself every power that is requisite to the full accomplishment of the object committed to its care, and to the complete execution of the trusts for 290 In this power of the president, what should be guarded against? 291 What is the provision of the constitution upon this subject? 292 What executive departments have been created by congress? 293 On what principle should we conduct our inquiry concerning the authority and the restraints of government?

* Art. ii. sect. 2. clause 1.

which it is responsible. Hence, to determine the necessary powers of the government, it will be necessary to ascertain the objects of it. And,

1. One of the primitive objects of civil society, is security against foreign danger. "The powers for this object ought to exist without limitation; because it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them."* These powers may be embraced under four heads; viz. 1. To declare wars, and grant letters of marque and reprisal: 2. To raise and support armies; and to provide and maintain a navy: 3. To provide for regulating and calling forth the militia: and, 4. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; and to borrow money.

1. "The right of using force or of making war, belongs to nations, so far as it is necessary for their defence, and the support of their rights." But as the evils of war are certain, and the results doubtful, both humanity and wisdom require that it should never be undertaken without the utmost precaution. This is not always the case in monarchies; for as the king generally possesses this power, it is as often exercised for his own aggrandizement as for the good of the nation. In republics, on the contrary, the right to declare war is given to the representatives of the people; who, wishing to act in conformity with public opinion, enter into war with more reluctance and deliberation.

In

But, it frequently happens, that subjects of one government commit depredation upon those of another; and yet not of so serious a nature as to justify a declaration of war. such cases, the government of the injured party are authorized by the law of nations, to issue to particular citizens letters of marque and reprisals; "the latter signifying a

294 What does this render necessary?

295 What is the first mentioned object of political associations? 296 What may we remark concerning the powers for this object? 297 How may these powers be classified?

298 How should the power of making war be exercised?

299 Is this always done in monarchies? Why?

300 How is it managed in republics?

301 What means are sometimes adopted when foreign depredation

has been slight?

* Federalist, No. 23,

Rawle, chap. ix.

taking in return; the former, passing a frontier, in order to such taking.' As such a commission is a species of war, (being an incomplete state of hostilities,) the power of granting it should be included with the power of declaring war.t

2. Involved in the power of declaring war, is the power of raising armies and equipping fleets. On this subject, the discretion of the national government should be unrestrained; for it is impossible to foresee what amount of force may become necessary for the defence of the nation. However, some, while they have allowed the propriety of this in time of war, have argued that the government ought not to be permitted to maintain standing armies in time of peace; alleging that it is putting an engine into the hands of the government that may be used for usurpation. But this objection loses its whole force when we recollect how easy it is to elude this provision by fabricating pretences of approaching danger; or even by provoking a foreign power to a threatening aspect which may be appeased by concession after forces may have been raised. On the other hand, we know that it is the practice of other nations to maintain standing armies; and accordingly a readiness for war on our own part, is not only necessary for self defence from any sudden attack, but may, by its anticipated preparations, actually deter an enemy from a hostile invasion. Still there should be some precaution against danger from standing armies; and the best is undoubtedly that of limiting the term for which revenue may be appropriated to their support. This precaution has been prudently inserted in our constitution; by which provision the legislature will be obliged, at short intervals of time, to come to a new resolution on the subject, and that in the face of their constituents.§

302 By whom should authority for such proceedings be given? 303 What follows from the power of declaring war?

304 How great should be the power of government on this subject? 305 What have been the opinions of some relative to standing armies?

306 Can this objection be applied so as to have any effect?

307 What argument in favor of standing armies?

308 How may we provide against any danger from them? 309 What provision is adopted in our constitution?

*Duer's Outlines, part ii. chap. 1. Federalist, No. 41.

+ Art, i, sect. 8. clause 11. Art. i. sect. 8. clause 12 and 13.

From the right of maintaining armies and navies, follows the power to make rules for the government and regulation of them.*

3. But, besides those who are regularly retained on stipulated compensations to serve in the army or navy, there is another class of military power, which is called the militia. This consists of armed citizens divided into military bands, and instructed, at least in part, in the use of arms for the purposes of war; and yet do not relinquish their civil occupations, except while they are actually in the field. Of course, they are greatly inferior in military estimate to armies regularly trained; but notwithstanding, as they embrace a great part of the able-bodied men in the nation, the militia may be said to constitute one of the great bulwarks of the nation; and nothing which tends to improve and support it, should be neglected.t

For the same reason that a government should have the power of providing and maintaining fleets and armies, it should also have full power to call forth the militia, when necessary to repel an invasion. Besides, in superintending the common defence, a government must not only provide for external attacks, but must also watch over the internal peace of the community. For, it cannot be denied that seditions and insurrections are maladies, as inseparable from the body politic, as tumors and irruptions from the natural body. For such emergencies, there can be no remedy but force; and hence we see that the government should have power to use the militia when necessary to execute its laws or to suppress insurrection, as well as to repel invasions.

If the militia are to be called into service, it is plain that, in order for them to discharge their duties with propriety, there should be a uniformity in organization and discipline. This desirable uniformity can be accomplished, only by con

310 What right must attend the power of maintaining armies? 311 Is there any other military power besides the army and navy? 312 Describe the militia. In what estimate should we hold it? 313 Should the government have any power over it?

314 For what internal purposes may it be necessary to employ the militia ?

315 Is such a requirement ever necessary?

316 What regulations are necessary for the militia?

* Art. i. sect. viii. clause 14.

† Rawle, chap. xii.