swer, that this supposition affects not the point at all; for God plainly could have created every moral agent with exactly the same attributes, and placed them in exactly the same circumstances, with those several virtuous beings, who persist in holiness. Whatever we suppose to be the means, by which they are preserved from sin; those very means he certainly could have used, to preserve in the same effectual manner all others.

Beyond this, he has not only continued holiness in the minds of many of his creatures; but has restored it to vast multitudes, who had fallen into a state of hopeless guilt and pollution. This fact is a proof, that he could have continued it in the minds of these creatures, if he had judged this conduct to be, upon the whole, wise and good for him to pursue.

That God by an immediate agency of his own, creates the sinful volitions of mankind, is a doctrine, not warranted, in my view, either by Reason, or Revelation. There are, I know, many respectable men in modern times, and particularly in our own country, as there have been at other times, and in other countries, who have thought this the easiest way of arriving at satisfaction concerning this abstruse subject. I cannot, as some persons have thought it proper to do, attribute to these men evil designs. In many instances, at least, they appear to give as unquestionable proofs of piety and virtue, as are given by any others; and to devote their labours as cheerfully, and faithfully, to the promotion of truth and righteousness, in the world. Still, I cannot accord with this doctrine; nor hesitate to believe, that they have in several instances darkened counsel by words without knowledge. There is a bound, as I have remarked before, beyond which the mind cannot pass; and it is as easily found in investigating this subject, as in any course of human inquiry. The metaphysical nature of Moral Agency, both in God and his creatures, is a subject, perhaps as tenuous, as difficult to be fastened upon, and as easily evanescent from the mind, as any, which we attempt to examine. This, I think, is unanswerably evident from the fact, that no attempt thoroughly to explain it, has given extensive satisfaction, even to philosophical men, for any length of time.

The Theology of a part of this country appears to me to be verging, insensibly, perhaps, to those who are chiefly concerned, but with no very gradual step, towards a Pantheism, differing, materially, in one particular only, from that of Spinosa. He held, that the Universe, which he supposed to be matter, and which he divided into cogitative or intelligent, and incogitative, was God; and that the several parts of it were no other than separate parts of the same great and Universal Being. Thus he excluded the existence of all creatures; and of any work of creation, as well as all that, which is usually meant by the providence and government of the Creator. The Theology, to which I have referred, teaches, that God is immaterial, intelligent and infinite; but denies, with Spinosa,

the existence of finite, intelligent beings, as well as of those, which we call bodies; declaring, that what men usually call minds, or spirits, are no other than continued chains, or successions, of ideas and exercises, created immediately, and successively, by the Infinite Mind. The same reason is alleged by this system for the exclusion of finite agents from existence, which was alleged by Spinosa for excluding the existence of such agents, as well as an Infinite, Immaterial One, from his system; viz. that mankind cannot conceive of such things, nor comprehend their nature: a reason, which, if admitted, will indeed exclude from our belief, and reception, almost every doctrine. Particularly, on this ground we ought certainly to deny the existence of the Infinite Agent.

As I propose to consider the principal subject of these remarks in a discourse, devoted to it, it will be improper to anticipate, here, the things which I design to include in that discourse. It will be sufficient, for the present purpose, to observe, that the Scriptures directly inform us, that God is the Author of holiness, and this in many forms, and with great emphasis; that they no where assert, that he is the Author of sin, in the sense now under consideration; and that they every where attribute blame to man, as the guilty, and, in my view, the efficient, cause, of his own sins. A plain man, reading the Scriptures, never, I presume, derived from them the doctrine, that God creates the sins of men. Nor can he, without great pains-taking, and previous perplexity, be induced to admit it as a part of his creed. And let it be remembered, as a very just and very important remark of Doddridge, that the plain sense of the Scriptures, or that which naturally strikes the minds of plain men as the real meaning, is almost of course the true sense.

The existence of finite agents is at least as conceivable, and admissible, as that of an infinite Agent; and certainly involves no greater difficulties. Accordingly, this has been the universal doctrine of the human mind, as well as the only obvious exhibition of the Scriptures, concerning this subject. The common objection concerning this doctrine, is certainly trifling and groundless; viz. that it makes creatures independent of their Creator. Can he be independent, whose existence, attributes, and consequently actions, depend absolutely on the will of another; and who can be, and do, nothing, but what that other is pleased to permit?

Satisfied with this view of the subject, on which, however, I mean to dwell more particularly hereafter, I adopt without hesitation the second of these methods of explaining the introduction of Sin into the world; and unite with those, who assert, that God permitted the existence of Sin; or in the Scriptural language, that he has in times past suffered all nations to walk in their own ways. It has not ever been proved, that these ways are not their own, in the most abso lute sense; nor in the strictest metaphysical language, that God has not suffered all nations to walk in them; nor that this, connected with such a superintendence and control, as invariably directs

their conduct to ultimate good, and prevents it from terminating in ultimate evil, is not the whole of the immediate agency of God, so far as sin is concerned. That this scheme does not in any degree exhibit God as the Author of Sin, in either of the two first senses, must, I think, be acknowledged by every man, who believes in the perfections and government of God. That he has permitted Sin, and has not prevented its existence, are facts so evident, that they cannot become the subject of serious debate. At the same time, I cannot but observe, that those, who, when they speak of God as the Author of Sin, mean to indicate these facts as the import of this phrase, use language in an unwarrantable, and, in my view, dangerous and mischievous manner.

3dly. It is objected, that this doctrine destroys the Free Agency of rational creatures.

It will be easily perceived, that many of the observations, made under the last head, materially affect this also. Indeed these two objections are so connected in their nature, that it is impossible to consider one of them, to any extent, without anticipating, in some degree, the consideration of the other. To the observations, which I have already made, I shall, however, add several others, peculiarly referring to this objection.

There are but two ways, in which the agency of God can be supposed by the objectors to lessen, or destroy, the free agency of his creatures. One is by compelling, or constraining, their actions: the other, by rendering the existence of their actions certain, before they take place. That God compels, or constrains, the actions of his creatures; of men for example; certainly cannot be shown, nor even pretended; unless the compulsion exists in his decrees. Nor can it be shown to exist in his decrees, unless it is involved in the nature of his decrees, as such; or, in other words, unless the doctrine of this discourse is inconsistent with the nature of free agency in creatures. This, I presume, is the real opinion of those, who bring the objection, now under consideration. They regard the supposition, that God has planned a certain system of things according to his own pleasure, and that he has made, and placed, men in such a manner, as that they will certainly do those things, and those only, which will accord with that pleasure, as inconsistent with the doctrine, that they are free agents.

To this objection, to which I have intended to give its true import, and full force, it is commonly answered, that the doctrine, which I have attempted to support, is capable of being clearly proved, both from Reason and Revelation; and that men are intuitively conscious of their own free agency, being irresistibly sensible, that they act spontaneously, and without any coercion, or constraint. Both doctrines being, therefore, true, and certain, it is justly alleged, that they ure of course consistent with each other.

It would seem, that this answer might as well satisfy the mind in the present case, as in numerous others, in which we perceive pro

positions to be true, but are unable to discern the nature of their mutual connexion. But, as the objection is still insisted on, and seems to have no small weight in the minds of many persons, it will not be improper for me to offer some further considerations on the subject.

All those, who make the objection, agree as well as others, that it is possible for a finite agent, possessed of certain supposable attri butes, and placed in certain supposable circumstances, to be free in the absolute sense. I shall take this for granted; because, otherwise, the objection itself, and the debate founded on it, can have neither place, nor meaning. We will suppose, then, such an agent to exist; and to act, while he lived, in a manner perfectly free: while, at the same time, no being knew at all, in what manner he would act in any case whatever, until his actions had existed. In this case, he would undoubtedly be allowed to possess all possible advantages for acting with perfect freedom. Lest I should not be thought to be sufficiently particular, I will suppose his actions to be all absolutely contingent; because some Philosophers suppose contingency to be an indispensable and inseparable attribute of a free action. We will, now, in the second place, suppose this agent, without any change in his powers, or his circumstances, in any other respect, to have all his actions, which, according to the former supposition are the freest possible, foreknown by God, or some other being.

I ask, whether they would be at all the less free, in consequence of being thus foreknown? The powers, the circumstances, and the actions, of this agent, remain exactly the same as before: the agent himself (for that is included in the supposition) being perfectly ignorant, that his actions are thus foreknown. Can it be perceived, that this foreknowledge affects the nature of the actions in any manner, or the freedom of the agent? To me it is clear, that it cannot; because, in the case supposed, the foreknowledge has not the remotest influence on the agent, nor on his actions: both he and they continuing to be exactly the same, in every respect whatever. On the contrary, all the possible influence of this foreknowledge is confined to the bosom of him, by whom it is possessed.

But if this agent would thus continue free, and his actions would still be perfectly free, notwithstanding they were foreknown; then it is clear, that a preceding certainty, that the actions of a voluntary agent will exist, does not at all, of itself, lessen, or affect, their free dom. Foreknowledge renders the future existence of that, which is foreknown, certain: therefore the actions of the agent supposed are all rendered certain, and will of course exist: yet it is, I think, unquestionably clear from this statement, that their freedom will not be affected. Lest I should be thought guilty of an absurdity in supposing events absolutely contingent to be capable of being foreknown; I shall justify myself by observing, that Dr. Gregory has asserted, that the voluntary actions of mankind are foreknown VOL. I.

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us mere contingencies; and is declared by a writer of respectability to have merited the thanks of the learned world for this discovery. For myself, I confess, that I not only discern no indispensable connexion between contingency and freedom of action; but no connexion at all; nor any possibility, that human actions, or any thing else, should be contingent. So far as I can see, the admission of casual, or contingent, existence, must, if we would make our principles consistent, be by consequence the admission of it in all cases whatever.

Again; we will suppose, that the actions of the agent already specified, which are thus foreknown by God, are perceived by him, also, to be exactly agreeable to his pleasure. Will this circumstance af fect the freedom of agency? Surely it will not be asserted, nor believed, that actions, in order to be free, must contravene the pleasure of God. As I presume this proposition was never advanced by any man; and as it is an obvious absurdity in itself; I shall take the liberty to consider it as being an absurdity. It is therefore clear, that the actions of a voluntary agent may be certainly foreknown by God to be exactly agreeable to his pleasure, and yet be attended with the highest possible freedom.

That God knows all things, the knowledge of which involves not a contradiction; and that the foreknowledge of human actions does not involve a contradiction; I here consider as undisputed.

I have, I flatter myself, made it sufficiently evident, that God's foreknowledge of voluntary actions does in no respect lessen, or affect, their freedom; although it renders their future existence absolutely certain. But it will be said, by some persons at least, that the difficulty does not lie here; but in the fact, that God has willed the existence of human agents, and their actions; and that it is his formation of them in such a manner, as to accomplish certain purposes of his own, which prevents, or destroys, the freedom in ques

tion.

To remove the difficulty, presented by this observation, I will suppose once more a voluntary agent either self-existent, or exist ing casually, possessing powers of understanding, similar in their extent to those of angels, or of men; and at the same time free in the highest sense, annexed to that term. Let him be also supposed to be known, and comprehended, by God in the same perfect manner, in which any angel, or man, is known by him; so that God can foresee with an omniscient survey, and absolute certainty, all his future actions. At the same time, let it be supposed, that God exercises over him no government, or influence, whatever. This being will undoubtedly be acknowledged to be free, even by those, who make this objection; because he was neither brought into existence by the will of God; nor is controlled, nor influenced, in any manner whatever, by any will, beside his own. Let me further

suppose, what, as it must be granted, cannot lessen, nor affect, his freedom; that all his actions, thus foreseen, are agreeable to the