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fufficient for the obtaining its end, is to be reputed an effential property of that means, and nothing else. Now, because the end we are speaking of is the conveyance of the knowledge of Chrift's doctrine to all those who are concerned to know it, in fuch a manner as they may be fufficiently certain and fecure, that it hath received no change or corruption from what it was when it was firft delivered; from hence it appears, that the means to this end must have these two properties: 1. It muft be fufficiently plain and intelligible; 2. It must be fufficiently certain to us; that is, fuch as we may be fully - fatisfied concerning it, that it hath received no corruption or alteration. If it have these two conditions, it is fufficient for its end: but if it want either of them, it must neceffarily fall fhort of its end: for if it be not plain and intelligible, it cannot convey this doctrine to our knowledge; if it be not certain, we cannot be affured, that the doctrine which it brings down to us for the doctrine of Chrift, is really fuch.

§3. I know he affigns more properties of this means, which he calls the rule of faith; but upon examination it will appear, that they either fall in with these two, or do not at all belong to it. As,

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ft, That" it mult be plain and felf-evident to all, as to its existence," p. 11. Nothing can be more frivolous than to make this a property of any thing; because whofoever inquires into the properties of a thing, is fuppofed to be already fatisfied that the thing is.

2dly, That it be "evidenceable as to its ruling "power," p. 11.; that is, as he explains himself, "that

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men be capable of knowing that it deferves to be re"lied on as a rule," p. 3. By which he must either understand the certainty of it; and then it falls in with the second property I mentioned, and is the fame with the fixth which he lays down or else he means more generally, that it is the property of a rule, that men be capable of knowing that it hath the properties of a rule; for I understand not how a man can know, that any thing deferves to be relied on as a rule, otherwise than by knowing it hath the properties of a rule, that is, that it is fufficient for its end. But at this rate a man may multiply the properties of things without end, if the eVOL. III. vidence

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vidence of a thing, as to its existence, be one property; and then, that we be capable of knowing that it is fuch a thing, be another.

4. 3dly, That it be " apt to fettle and justify un"doubting perfons," p. 12. What he means here by fettling undoubting perfons, I am not able, on the sudden, to comprehend; because I understand not what unsettles a man befides doubting: for if a man be but fo well fatisfied about any thing as to have no doubt concerning it, I do not eafily apprehend how he can be fettled better; that is, how his mind can be more at reft than not to doubt. But if by undoubting perfons he means those who do not doubt for the prefent, but afterwards may doubt, then I perceive what he means by apt to fettle undoubting perfons, viz. apt to fettle perfons when they do doubt, that is, when they are not undoubting perfons. As for juftifying undoubting perfons, if he means, that whofoever fecurely relies on this rule, ought of right to be acquitted, as acting rationally in fo doing; this is plainly confequent upon the two properties I have laid down for if the means of conveying Chrift's doctrine be fufficiently plain and certain, every man that relies upon it is juftified in fo doing, because he trusts a means which is fufficient for its end.

$5. 5. 4thly, That it be "apt to fatisfy fully the most "fceptical diffenters and rational doubters," p. 12. For its aptitude to fatisfy rational doubters, that plainly follows from the fufficient certainty of it; but why it fhould be a neceffary property of a rule of faith, to be apt to fatisfy the moft fceptical diffenter, I can no more divine, than I can why he' fhould call a diffenter fceptical, which are repugnant terms: for a fceptic is one who neither affents to any thing, nor diffents; but is in a perpetual fufpenfe, because he looks upon every opinion as balanced by a contrary opinion of equal probability, without any inclination of the fcales either way. But if by the most sceptical diffenter he means only a fceptic, one that doth not believe the doctrine of Chrift, nor any thing elfe, then I would fain know what that is which in reafon is apt fully to fatisfy fuch a perfon. If any thing will, fure a demonstration will: but there is no aptitude at all in a demonstration, to fatisfy him who doubts

doubts whether there be any fuch thing as a demonftration, and likewife questions the certainty of all thofe principles from whence any conclufion can be demon. ftrated. And those who are most sceptical, profess to

doubt of all this.

§6. 5thly, That it be " apt to convince the most ob"ftinate and acute adverfary," p. 11. 12. If the rule be plain and certain, the most acute adverfary may be convinced by it if he will; that is, if he be not obstinate: but if he be obstinate, that is, fuch a one as will not be convinced, but will perfift in his error, in despite of all evidence that can be offered him, then I must profess, that I do not know any kind of evidence that is apt to convince that man who will not be convinced by any reason that can be propounded to him. And that he ought not to have expected this from any rule of faith, though never fo felf evident, he might have learned from the fame author, in whom he may find his chief properties of the rule of faith, if he had but had the patience to have confidered his explication of them: I mean Dr Holden, who lays down the fecond property of the rule of faith, or, as he calls it, "the means whereby we come to the knowledge of revealed truth," in these words, (Analyf. fid. l. 1. c. 3.) " Another (viz. condition of this means, &c.) is, That it be apt of its own nature to "afford the greatest, true, and rational certainty, to all men without exception, to whom the knowledge of "it fhall come; provided they be furnished with the "faculty of reafon, and have their minds purified from "all paffion and luft, which do (as he tells us, cap. 6.) "often hinder the moft fagacious perfons from understanding the most evident and manifeft truth." Now, I fuppofe obftinacy to be the effect of paffion and luft.

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If Mr S. mean, that the rule of faith must be apt to conquer obftinacy, and make men lay it afide, I cannot understand this neither; unless he mean, that the rule of faith must be a cudgel, which the traditionary church have been good at, and may use it again when occafion ferves for none but they have a title to it upon a church account; as Mr S. tells us, corol. 10. But, fetting this afide, I do not know any thing elfe that is apt to con quer obftinacy; not the clearest reason, or the strongest

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demonstration; for that, I am fure, is no wife fitted to combat a wilful and unreasonable humour with any probability of fuccefs. And if any one doubt of this, if he will but make trial, he may eafily be convinced by experience, how unapt obftinate perfons are to be convinced by reafon. I do not know any thing that ever carried greater evidence than the doctrine of Chrift, preached by himself and his Apoftles to the obftinate Jews, and confirmed by multitudes of unquestionable miracles; and yet we do not find, by the fuccefs of it, that it was fo very apt to convince thofe that were obftinate. And no man can judge of the aptitude of a means to an end, otherwife than by the ufual and frequent fuccefs of it when it is applied. Nor do I think that the doctrine of the gofpel was ever intended for that purpose. God hath provided no remedy for the wilful and perverfe; but he hath done that which is fufficient for the fatisfying and winning over of thofe who are teachable, and willing to learn. And fuch a difpofition fuppofeth a man to have laid afide both fcepticifma and obftinacy.

§ 7. 6thly, That it be "certain itself," p. 12. 7thly, That it be " abfolutely afcertainable to us, p.

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These two are comprehended in the fecond property I laid down; fo that I have nothing to fay against them, but that the last looks like a contradiction, very folutely afcertainable to us;" which is to fay, " with "refpect to us, without refpect to us;" for abfolutely feems to exclude refpect, and to us implies it.

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Having thus fhewn, that the feven properties he mentions are either coincident with thofe two I have laid down, or confequent upon them, or abfurd and impertinent; it remains, that the true properties of a rule of faith are thofe two which I first named, and no more.

SECT. II. That the properties of a rule of faith belong to fcripture.

ET us now fee how he endeavours to fhew, that

§ 1. LEhefs poop fet els agree folely to oral tradition.

He tells us, there are but two pretenders to this title of

being the rule of faith, fcripture, and oral tradition : thefe properties do not belong to fcripture, and they do to oral tradition; therefore folely to it. A very good argument, if he can prove these two things: "That these two properties do not belong to fcripture, and that they do to oral tradition.”

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§ 2. In order to the proving of the first, that these properties do not belong to fcripture, he premifeth this note, p. 13. "That we cannot by the fcriptures mean "the fenfe of them; but the book, that is, fuch or fuch "characters not yet fenfed or interpreted." But why can we not by the fcriptures mean the fenfe of them? He gives this clear and admirable reafon, Because the sense of the fcripture is "the things to be known; and these we confefs are the very points of faith of which the rule "of faith is to afcertain us.' Which is just as if a man fhould reason thus: Those who say the statute-book can convey to them the knowledge of the statute-law, cannot by the ftatute-book mean the fense of it, but the book; that is, fuch or fuch characters not yet fenfed or interpreted; because the sense of the ftatute-book is the thing to be known, and these are the very laws, the knowledge whereof is to be conveyed to them by this book. Which is to fay, that a book cannot convey to a man the knowledge of any matter; because, if it did, it would convey to him the thing to be known. But that he may farther fee what excellent reafoning this is, I fhall apply this paragraph to oral tradition; for the argument holds every whit as well concerning that: "To

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fpeak to them in their own language, who fay that "oral tradition is the rule, we must premise this note, "that they cannot mean by oral tradition the sense of "it, that is, the things to be known: for those they "confefs are the very points of faith of which the rule of "faith is to afcertain to us. When they fay then, that "oral tradition is the rule of faith, they can only mean. by oral tradition the words wherein it is delivered, not yet fenfed or interpreted, but as yet to be fenfed; "that is, fuch or fuch founds, with their aptnefs to figni"fy to them affuredly God's mind, or afcertain them of "their faith: for, abtracting from the fenfe and actual "fignification of thofe words, there is nothing imagi

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