knowledge the articles contained in the Apostles creed to be fufficiently delivered in fcripture and if any profeffions differ about the meaning of plain texts, that is not an argument that plain texts are obfcure, but that fome men are perverfe. And if thofe profeffions damn and perfecute one another about the meaning of obfcure texts, the fcripture is not in fault, but thofe that do fo.

§2.. And whereas he pretends, p. 25. 26. 27. that "the fcripture is not able to fatisfy fceptical diffenters "and rational doubters, because nothing under a de"monftration can fatisfy fuch perfons fo well concern"ing the incorruptedness of originals, the faithfulness "of translations, &c; but that fearching and fincere "wits may ftill maintain their ground of fufpenfe with: a Might it not be otherwife?" This hath been anfwered already, partly by fhewing, that the fcripture was not intended to fatisfy sceptics, and that a demonftration is not fufficient to give fatisfaction to them; and partly by fhewing, that rational doubters may have as much fatisfaction concerning thofe matters, as the nature of the thing will bear: and he is not a rational doubter that defires more.

But, that he may fee the unreasonableness of this difcourse, I fhall briefly fhew him, that all mankind do, in matters of this nature, accept of fuch evidence as falls short of demonftration? and that his great friends and masters, from whom he hath taken the main grounds of his book, though he manageth them to lefs advantage, do frequently acknowledge, that it is reasonable for men to acquiefce in fuch affurance as falls fhort of infallibility, and fuch evidence as is lefs than demonftration. Do not mankind think themselves fufficiently affured of the antiquity and authors of feveral books, for which they have not demonstrative evidence? Doth not Aristotle fay, that things of a moral and civil nature, and matters of fact done long ago, are incapable of demonftration; and that it is madness to expect it for things of this nature? Are there no paffages in books fo plain, that a man may be sufficiently fatisfied, that this, and no other, is the certain fense of them? If there be none, can any thing be spoken in plainer words than it may be written? If it cannot, how can we be fatisfied of the certain fenfe

of

of any doctrine orally delivered? And if we cannot be fo fatisfied, where is the certainty of oral tradition? But if books may be written fo plainly as that we may be abundantly fatisfied, that this is the certain fenfe of fuch and fuch paffages, then we may reasonably reft fai tisfied in evidence for thefe matters fhort of demonftration. For was ever the fenfe of any words fo plain as that there did not remain this ground of fufpenfe, that those words might be capable of another fenfe? Mr Rushworth (Dialog. 2. 7.) fays, that "difputative "fcholars do find means daily to explicate the plaincft "words of an author to a quite different fenfe." And that the world might be furnifhed with an advantageous inftance of the poffibility of this, Raynaudus, (De bonis et malis libris), a writer of their own, hath made a wanton experiment upon the Apoftles creed; and, by a fini fter, but poffible interpretation, hath made every article of it herefy and blafphemy, on purpose to fhew, that the plaineft words are not free from ambiguity. But may. be Mr S. can outdo the Apostles, and can deliver the Christian doctrine fo clearly, that he can demonstrate it impoffible for any man to put any other fenfe upon any of his words than that which he intended. I do not know what may be done: but, if Mr S. doth this, he must both amend his ftyle, and his way of demonftration.

Is Mr S. fufficiently affured, that there is fuch a part of the world as America? and can he demonftrate this to any man without carrying him thither? Can he fhew, by any neceffary argument, that it is naturally impoffible that all the relations concerning that place fhould be falfe? When his demonftrations have done their utmost, cannot a fearching and fincere wit at least maintain "his ground of fufpenfe with a Might it not be other"wife?" p. 27.; and with an Is it not poffible, that all men may be liars, or that a company of travellers may have made ufe of their privilege, to abuse the world by falfe reports, and to put a trick upon mankind? or that all those who pretend to go thither, and bring their commodities from thence, may go to fome other parts of the world, and taking pleafure in abufing others, in the fame manner as they have been impofed upon themselves,

themselves, may fay they have been at America? Who can tell but all this may be fo? And yet I fuppofe, notwithstanding the poffibility of this, no man in his wits is now poffeffed with fo incredible a folly as to doubt whether there be fuch a place. The cafe is the very fame as to the certainty of an ancient book, and of the fenfe of plain expreffions. We have no demonftration for these things; and we expect none, because we know the things are not capable of it. We are not infallibly certain, that any book is so ancient as it pretends to be, or that it was written by him whofe name it bears, or that this is the fenfe of fuch and fuch paffages in it. It is poffible all this may be otherwife; that is, it implies no contradiction but we are very well affured that it is not; nor hath any prudent man any just caufe to make the least doubt of it. For a bare poffibility, that a thing may be, or not be, is no juft caufe of doubting whether a thing be or not. It is poffible all the people of France may die this night; but I hope the poffibility of this doth not incline any man in the leaft to think it will be fo. It is poffible the fun may not rife to-morrow morning; and yet, for all this, I suppose that no man hath the leaft doubt but that it will.

§3. But because this principle, viz. "That in matters of religion a man cannot be reasonably fatisfied "with any thing less than that infallible affurance which "is wrought by demonftration," is the main pillar of Mr S.'s book; therefore, befide what hath been already faid, to fhew the unreasonablenefs of this principle, I shall take a little pains to manifeft to him, how much he is contradicted in this by the chief of his brethren of the tradition, viz. Mr Rufhworth, Dr Holden, Mr Creffy, and Mr White; who, befides Mr S. and one I. B. are, fo far as I can learn, all the public patrons that ever this hypothefis of oral tradition hath had in thre world and if Mr White, as I have reason to believe, was the author of thofe dialogues which pass under Rushworth's name, the number of them is yet lefs. Now, if I can fhew, that this principle, efteemed by Mr S. fo. fundamental to this hypothefis, is plainly contradicted by the principal afferters of oral tradition, I fhall hereby gain one of thefe two things; either that these great pa

trons.

trons of oral traditions were ignorant of the true foundation of their own hypothefis, or that this principle is not neceffary for the fupport of it. Not that I would be fo understood as if I did deny, that thefe very perfons do fometimes fpeak very big words of the neceffity of infallibility. But if it be their pleasure to contradict themselves, as I have no reafon to be difpleafed, fo neither to be concerned for it; but fhall leave it to Mr S. to reconcile them firft to themselves and then, if it pleases, afterwards to himself.

:

§ 4. I begin with Mr Rushworth, of immortal memory, for that noble attempt of his, to perfuade the world, that, notwithstanding he was the first inventor of this hypothefis of oral tradition, yet he could prove, that the church had in all ages owned it, and proceeded upon it. as her only rule of faith. He, in his third dialogue, § 3. and 4. when his nephew objects to him, "That perhaps a Proteftant would fay, that all his foregoing difcourfe "was but probability and likelihood; and therefore, "to hazard a man's eftate upon peradventures, were

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fomething hard, and not very rationally done," replies thus to him: "What fecurity do your merchants, your statesmen, your foldiers, thofe that go to law, nay, even thofe that till your grounds, and work for "their livings; what fecurity, I fay, do all these go upon? Is it greater than the fecurity which thefe "grounds afford? Surely no; and yet no man esteems "them foolish. All human affairs are hazardous, and "have fome adventure in them: and therefore he who "requires evident certainty only in matters of religion, "difcovers in himfelf a lefs mind to the goods promised "in the next life, than to thefe which he feeks here in "this world upon weaker affurance. Howfoever, the

greatest evidence that can be to him that is not ca"pable of convincing demonftrations, which the great"eft part of mankind fall fhort of, is but conjectural." So that, according to Mr Rufhworth, it is not reafon and discretion, but want of love to God and religion, which makes men require greater evidence for matters of religion than for human affairs; which yet, he tells us, 66 are hazardous, and have fome adventure in them," and confequently are not capable of demonftration.

Besides,

Befides, if demonftrative evidence be an effential pro perty of the rule of faith, as Mr S. affirms, then this rule cannot, according to Mr Rushworth, be of any use to the greatest part of mankind, because they are not "do capable of convincing demonftrations. Again, "but confider (fays he, ibid. § 6.) how unequal and unjuft a condition it is, that the claim of the pre"fent church fhall not be heard, unless fhe can con"fute all the peradventures that wit may invent, and "folve all the arguments which the infinite variety of "time, place, and occafions, may have given way unto; and then you will fee how unreasonable an adverfary he is, who will not be content with any fa"tisfaction but fuch as man's nature fcarcely affords." And is it not equally unjust in Mr S. not to let fcripture's claim be heard, unless we can confute every peradven ture, and Might it not be otherwife, that wit may invent? See, then, how unreasonable an adverfary Mr S. is, who will not be content with any fatisfaction but fuch as, according to Mr Rushworth, man's nature scarcely affords.

Dr Holden (I confefs) ftates the matter fomewhat cautiously, when he tells us, /. I. c. 1. that "it fhall "fuffice for the prefent to determine, that the wisdom

of the Creator hath afforded us fuch an affurance, e"fpecially of truths neceflary to falvation, as is fuita"ble to our nature, and beft fitted for the fafe conduct "of our lives in moral and religious affairs." But if we interpret thefe general expreffions by the paffages I before cited out of Mr Rushworth, (as in reafon we may, fince the Doctor is beholden to him for the best part of his book) then nothing can make more against Mr S.'s principle.

§ 5. Mr Creffy, in his Exomologefis, c. 19. § 5. fays, that" fuch teachers as approached nearest to the foun "tain of truth, Chrift and his Apoftles, had means of

informing themselves in apoftolical tradition incomparably beyond us." Mr S. may do well to fhew what thofe means were, which are fo incomparably beyond his infallibility and demonftration. The fame author (c. 32. § 4.) does very much applaud Stapleton's determination of the question concerning the church's infallibility;