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O the general account of the pleasures we receive from the exercise of our perceptive and active powers, I shall subjoin a particular account of those properties of, objects which derive their power of pleafing from the fame fource..

To this, in the firft place, we must have recourse for the charms of NOVELTY. For the first perception of an object makes a much stronger impreffion than any fubfequent perception of it. This muft neceffarily be the case if perception depend upon any mechanical laws affecting the brain. Upon whatever principle we account for it, the oftener any sensations are repeated, the lefs we are affected by them. But the chief fource of the charms of novelty is the exercife of our active powers. Both previous to the perception of any new object, if we have any intimation of it, and immediately upon the perception of it, whether it be a new scene in nature, a new train of adventures, or a new system of principles, the mind is full of expectation, and is eagerly employed in furveying it; which keeps the attention ftrongly awake, and gives the object an opportunity of making a deep impreffion. Whereas when this first curiofity is gratified, and the object is become familiar, we view it in a more

curfory

curfory and fuperficial manner; there being then no reason for fo close an attention to it, as we expect no new knowledge or information.

This conftant appetite, as we may call it, for novelty, feems to be infeparable from beings indued with the faculty of reason and reflection, and whose happiness depends upon the use they make of the advantages attending their fituation. Being habitually in quest of happiness, we naturally examine every new object with peculiar attention; but when once we are acquainted with all the properties and powers of it, and know how much it is capable of contributing to our main purpose, our examination is finished, and the motive for our curiosity is at an end. Moreover, to apply a general observation made in a preceding lecture, as the mind conforms itself to the ideas which engage its attention, and it hath no other method of judging of itself but from its fituation, the perception of a new train of ideas is like its entering upon a new world, and enjoying a new being, and a new mode of existence.

So loud and inceffant is the call for novelty in the pleasures of the imagination, that the generality of readers feel little or no defire to re-perufe a performance which is calculated rather to please than to inftruct. If a second perufal do give pleasure, it is either by the discovery of new beauties, or a confiderable time after the first perufal, when the fubject, or the method of treating it, hath been almoft forgotten, and when, confequently, it is in a manner new: for no perfon, I believe, would throw away his time upon a performance which he was beforehand satisfied could prefent him with no new ideas, or new views of things. If the reason why we firft engage in any new ftudy, or undertake to read any work of genius, be not explicitly the prospect

of being entertained with new objects, and new reflections, as is: often the cafe, we, notwithstanding, never ceafe to be under the influence of that principle during the whole time that we are employed about it. The profpect of advantage in general, or the expectation of receiving inftruction and improvement, may have been our first and leading motive to thofe purfuits; but the ultimate ends of our conduct are not of a nature to be attended to conftantly, and to influence particular actions. Whatever motive it was that first put our faculties in motion, it is generally, in: these cases, the charms of novelty that keep up the vigour of their exertion. And a happy provifion it is in our constitution,. that when great and important motives, from the neceffary nature of things, intermit their influence, there are a variety of other fubfidiary Springs of action at hand, which are fufficient to carry on the work with vigour, by the help of only occafional reinforcements from the original and first-moving power. Thus a perfon undertakes a journey with a view to fome advantage he expects to derive from it, yet he may foon lofe fight of this,. and, notwithstanding, continue to travel with pleasure;, not pro-pelled by his original impulfe, but entertained with a variety of fcenes which his change of place continually prefents him with.

This craving appetite for novelty hath produced many very whimsical and extravagant effects in works of taste and genius. To this many new schemes of philofophy, new fpecies of compofition, and new peculiarities of style, owe their birth.. Novelty is the fureft and the readieft road to fame, for all the numerous, competitors for that exquifite species of fatisfaction; the first inquiry concerning any performance in literature always being, Is there any thing new in it?

Nor

Nor is the defire of novelty lefs confpicuous in other objects of taste. What other recommendation have the Chinese taste, and the revival of the Gothic, in architecture, the pantomime entertainments, with all their varieties, on the theatre, and the new forms in which musical entertainments are daily exhibited? Doth not a regard to novelty influence our choice of the furniture of our houses, interfere in the difpofition of a garden, and fuggeft alterations in the fashion of our cloaths? Why else doth a lady of taste in dress, discover more conscious fatisfaction the first time she makes her appearance at an affembly, among the firft in a fashionable drefs, than fhe would have done if she had not been seen in the fame dress till a month afterwards, when the convenience, and other properties of the habit, remain the fame?

Even the mere unexpectedness of objects is often had recourse to, as a substitute for abfolute novelty. A well-known object, occuring in a fituation in which it was wholly unlooked for, makes a stronger impreffion upon the mind than it would have done if it had been expected. In the latter cafe, the mind is occupied with the idea, at least, of the object, before the actual perception of it; and therefore the difference in the previous and subsequent state of mind, is only the difference between an idea and a sensation, a difference in degree only. In the former cafe, the fenfation is made at once, without any previous idea, which makes a difference more than in degree only. Besides, in this case, the relations and circumstances, if not the object itself, are new to us. Alfo the fenfible contrast which hence arifes between the two states of mind, before and after the perception of an unexpected object, contributes to heighten the fenfation..

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By means of this contraft, familiar ideas, occurring in unexpected fituations, may occafion a greater agitation of mind, than new ideas of a fimilar nature. The reafon is, that every idea which is become familiar to us, must have acquired a variety of affociations. These affociated circumftances, occurring to the mind at the fame inftant with the ideas to which they are connected, immediately ftrike the mind with the sense of any feeming inconfiftency there may be, between them and the new and unexpected fituations in which we meet with them. Thus the fudden appearance of a friend, whom we thought to have been in a diftant place, affects us more fenfibly, than seeing any face that is quite new to us, in the fame place and circumstances. With the latter we have connected no ideas of any circumstances which have the least seeming inconfiftency with the circumstances in which we find them: with the other, we have connected fuch ideas.

The fenfation which we feel upon the unexpected appearance of a well-known object, is termed furprize; whereas an object perfectly new is faid to excite our wonder.

The gratification which the mind is fure to receive from furprize, may add fomething to the influence of those other motives which carry fome people with fo much eagerness to the gamingtable. There the continual expectation of events, on which a great deal is depending, and of which we can, with no degree of certainty, form the leaft conjecture, keeps the attention awake to an extreme degree; which always prepares the mind for receiving a frong impreffion. If we be interested in the event, our paffions of hope and fear, being gratified in their turn, greatly augment the internal agitation, fo as often to carry it beyond the limits of pleasure, and make it terminate in the most painful and tormenting anxiety. LECTURE