to things that are not in all refpects fimilar, we must have given another name than horfe to every other animal we fhould afterwards have met with of the fame fpecies: becaufe, not only is it abfurd to fuppofe that any two things are the fame, but that any two individuals of the fame fpecies fhould be exactly alike.

If objects differ but little, we give them the fame name in what we call a literal fenfe; as, to the heads, the mouths, the eyes, the hearts, &c. of men and other animals. To these the same names are fo conftantly applied, that it is impoffible to say to which they originally and properly belonged. In calling these, therefore, by the same names, we fay we use no figure; whereas the term figure begins to be applied when, however commonly a name may be applied to any thing, it is well known to have been applied to fomething else originally. For example; it is equally proper and literal to fay the foot of a man, or the foot of a beast, though they differ confiderably in form; but the moment we attend to it, we perceive that the foot of a chair, or the foot of a mountain, is a figurative expreffion, though it be as common as the other; and we use it a thousand times without being senfible of the figure. In this cafe the figure is faid to be evanefcent.

When any term is conftantly applied to a variety of objects, and it is impoffible to fay to which of them it belonged originally, though they be confiderably different, the definition of that term must be framed fo as to comprehend all thofe ideas. Thus if we define the terms head, mouth, eye, or foot, we must exprefs our definition in fuch a manner, as to be equally applicable to the heads, the mouths, the eyes, or the feet of brute or other animals, as well as to thofe of men; for the literal meaning of those terms extends to both. But the definition of the

words

words must not be extended to take in their figurative applications. Thus, it is not neceffary that the term foot fhould be defined fo as to be applicable to the lower part of a mountain, though the lower part of a mountain be univerfally called the foot of it.

In many cases, however, it will not be eafy to determine where the literal sense of a word ends, and where the figurative fense begins; as in the terms face, voice, cheeks, and many others, which have been applied to men and brute animals fo promiscuously, that fome perfons may be inclined to call the application of them to brute animals figurative, while others will contend that it is literal whereas, in other cafes, the analogy is so faint, that the fame term cannot, without a sensible harsh-nefs, be applied to the different objects; as when trees are called. the hair of mountains, or the walls of cities their cheeks.

:.

This harsh metaphor is by philofophers called catachrefis. Of this kind we may term that expreffion of Milton's denoting the paffage of Satan from hell to this world, fails between world and world..

From this it appears that there is a gradation in metaphors, proceeding from those in which the analogy between two objects is fo great, that the figure is evanefcent, through all the different: degrees of resemblance, till we come to those in which the analogy is fcarce perceptible, and confequently the metaphor is harsh and unnatural and all the rules concerning the use of metaphors must have respect to this gradation.

It is worth while, however, to take notice, how much it is in the power of custom to foften the harshness of metaphors. And in nothing, perhaps, is the authority of custom more arbitrary and capricious. In fome cafes the application of the fame name

to things is quite familiar, where the resemblance is very obfcure; and, in other cafes, where there is the ftrong eft refemblance between the two things, it would give the greatest offence to an ear formed by cuftom to hear them called by the fame name. Who would not make himself ridiculous by confounding the terms appropriated by ufe to the voices of different animals; as the lowing of the ox, the bleating of sheep, and the barking of the dog? And yet who ever calls a part of the fea running up into the land by any other name than that of an arm of the fea, though the resemblance it bears in shape, or use, to the human arm is extremely faint? In like manner, have we any other name for the two extremities of an army than the figurative one of wings, though they resemble wings no more than they do horns, by which, indeed, the Greeks and Romans most frequently expreffed them?

In arranging figures, therefore, according to their several degrees, between the extremes of what hath been termed evanefcence on the one hand, and what is called bold and harsh on the other, we must by no means be governed by a regard to the analogy of things only; but muft, along with this, consider the arbitrary decifions of custom, in the idioms of particular languages. Thus we muft, fay, that fuch expreffions as an arm of the fea, and the wings of an army, are nearly literal, and scarce deferve the name of figures, though the resemblance be very fmall; as well as the wings of the flying fif, and the horns of an altar, where the refemblance is very great; but that fuch phrases as the wings of the wind, and the bofom of the fea, are highly figurative, though they have a much better foundation in the analogy of nature. The cafe is, that the former are used fo frequently, that, whether the refemblance be greater or less, they

are

are little more than common names of things, and when we use them, we never think whence they were borrowed; whereas the latter are seldom used, and never without our perceiving whence they were borrowed. And it was observed before, that it is efsential to the pleasure we receive from a metaphor, that we, at the fame time, perceive diftinctly the two different applications of the same term...

LECTURE XXIII.

Rules for the Ufe of METAPHORS; and of ALLEGORIES.

AVING explained the nature of metaphors, and traced the

HAV

fources of the pleasure we receive from them, I proceed to lay down rules for the proper use of them. These will be easily deduced from the preceding account of their nature and end.

Since metaphors are used to give ftrength and colour, as it were, to ideas, we naturally use them when our own ideas are peculiarly vivid, and when, confequently, we wish to communicate the fame ideas, in the same ftrength, to the minds of others. They are, therefore, very properly put into the mouth of a perfon under any emotion of mind; and the stronger are his emotions, the bolder figures he naturally uses. The truth of this observation may be verified every day: for, if we take notice, we shall find that we never hear any man either speak with vehemence, or converfe when his mind is in a gay and lively humour, without ufing frequent metaphors. When our own ideas are very vivid, they naturally, by affociation, fuggeft ideas of objects in which they exift in greater strength; and these we instantly .transfer upon the objects we are describing, in order to give ideas of them to others more fimilar and adequate to our own. Thus fome kinds of pain will often fuggeft the fimilar idea of burning,

and