ful, we cannot argue as though the contrary were certain, and we were sure that space was only a property of the self-existent substance. But now, if space be not absolutely independent, I do not see what we can conclude is so for it is manifestly necessary itself, as well as antecedently needful to the existence of all other things, not excepting (as I think) even the self-existent substance.

All your consequences I see follow demonstrably from your supposition; and, were that evident, I believe it would serve to prove several other things as well as what you bring it for. Upon which account, I should be extremely pleased to see it proved by any one. For, as I design the search after truth as the business of my life, I shall not be ashamed to learn from any person; though, at the same time, I cannot but be sensible, that instruction from some men is like the gift of a prince, it reflects an honor on the person on whom it lays an obligation.

I am,

Reverend Sir,

December 16, 1713.

Your obliged Servant,

THE

ANSWER

то

THE FOURTH LETTER.

SIR,

My being out of town most part of the month of January, and some other accidental avocations, hindered me from answering your letter sooner. The sum of the difficulties it contains, is (I think) this: that it is difficult to determine, what relation the self-existent substance has to space: that to say it is the substratum of space, in the common sense of the word, is scarce intelligible, or at least is not evident that space seems to be as absolutely self-existent, as it is possible any thing can be: and that, its being a property of the self-existent substance, is supposing the thing that was to be proved.-This is entering indeed into the very bottom of the matter; and I will endeavor to give you as brief and clear an answer as I can.

:

That the self-existent substance is the substratum of space, or space a property of the self-existent substance, are not perhaps very proper expressions; nor is it easy to find such. But what I mean is this: the idea of space, (as also of time or duration,) is an abstract or partial idea; an idea of a certain quality or relation, which we evidently see to be necessarily existing; and yet which (not being itself a substance) at the same time necessarily presupposes a substance, without which it could not exist; which

substance consequently must be itself (much more, if possible,) necessarily existing. I know not how to explain this so well, as by the following similitude: A blind man, when he tries to frame to himself the idea of body, his idea is nothing but that of hardness. A man that had eyes, but no power of motion, or sense of feeling at all, when he tried to frame to himself the idea of body, his idea would be nothing but that of color. Now as, in these cases, hardness is not body; and color is not body; but yet, to the understanding of these persons, those properties necessarily infer the being of a substance, of which substance itself the persons have no idea: so space, to us, is not itself substance, but it necessarily infers the being of a substance, which effects none of our present senses; and being itself necessary, it follows that the substance, which it infers, is (much more) necessary.

I am, Sir,

January 29, 1714.

Your affectionate Friend and Servant.

THE

FIFTH LETTER.

REVEREND SIR,

You have very comprehensively expressed, in six or seven lines, all the difficulties of my letter, which I should have endeavored to have made shorter, had I not been afraid an improper impression might possibly occasion a mistake of my meaning. I am very glad the debate is come into so narrow a compass; for I think now it entirely turns upon this, whether our ideas of space and duration are partial, so as to presuppose the existence of some other thing. Your similitude of the blind man is very apt to explain your meaning (which I think I fully understand,) but does not seem to come entirely up to the matter. For, what is the reason that the blind man concludes there must be somewhat external, to give him that idea of hardness? It is because he supposes it impossible for him to be thus affected, unless there were some cause of it; which cause, should it be removed, the effect would immediately cease too; and he would no more have the idea of hardness, but by remembrance. Now, to apply this to the instance of space and duration : Since a man, from his having these ideas, very justly concludes that there must be somewhat external, which is the cause of them; consequently, should this cause (whatever it is) be taken away, his

ideas would be so too: therefore, if what is supposed to be the cause be removed, and yet the idea remains, that supposed cause cannot be the real one. Now, granting the self-existent substance to be the substratum of these ideas, could we make the supposition of its ceasing to be, yet space and duration would still remain unaltered: which seems to show, that the self-existent substance is not the substratum of space and duration. Nor would it be an answer to the difficulty, to say, that every property of the self-existent substance is as necessary as the substance itself; since that will only hold, while the substance itself exists for there is implied in the idea of a property, an impossibility of subsisting without its substratum. I grant, the supposition is absurd: but how otherwise can we know whether any thing be a property of such a substance, but by examining whether it would cease to be, if its supposed substance should do so? Notwithstanding what I have now said, I cannot say that I believe your argument not conclusive; for I must own my ignorance, that I am really at a loss about the nature of space and duration. But did it plainly appear that they were properties of a substance, we should have an easy way with the atheists: for it would at once prove demonstrably an eternal necessary self-existent Being; that there is but one such; and that he is needful in order to the existence of all other things. Which makes me think, that though it may true, yet it is not obvious to every capacity; otherwise it would have been generally used, as a fundamental argument, to prove the being of God.

I must add one thing more: that your argument for the omnipresence of God seemed always to me very probable. But being very desirous to have it appear demonstrably conclusive, I was sometimes forced to say what was not altogether my opinion. Not that I did this for the sake of disputing, (for, besides the particular disagreeableness of this to my own temper, I should surely have chosen another person to have trifled with ;)