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health of the body, destroys the vigor of the mind, breaks in upon its peace and harmony, puts the faculties in disorder, creates tumult and confusion, anarchy and uproar, distress and misgivings of heart; brings on various diseases, and sometimes sudden and premature death. Is it virtue or vice that commonly ruins men's estates, disturbs the comfort of families, renders men useless and contemptible in themselves, and the scorn and detestation of the sober and thinking part of mankind, whose esteem and approbation every wise man will above all things court? Who are the grand disturbers of neighborhoods towns or kingdoms? the plagues and terrors of human society? the virtuous or the vicious? And it ought to be added that wicked men, in common calamities, are as liable to suffer as the good. In war, famine, pestilence, sickness and death, and the like, and that they want those supports and refreshments, under their calamities, which religion affords the virtuous and good man. But, if they were to escape more frequently than they do, it has been known that worldly success has been some men's utter ruin, even as to the possessions and enjoyments of this present transitory life.'

'But, continues the Dr. on the other hand,' Between virtue and happiness, there is, in the wise constitution of God, the most close and strict connexion. The pleasures of a man are of two sorts, sensible and rational. The sensible pleasures of this life may be enjoyed by a good man, provided he indulges them no further than reason allows. The checks of conscience which restrain him, and direct him to keep within proper bounds, are so far from being his misery, that they are his honor and singular felicity. They either keep him in the paths of righteousness, or lead him back to virtue's ways, when he has wandered from her amiable paths. But besides sensible enjoyments, the good man has the pleasure of acquiring useful knowledge; and the high delight which flows from virtuous practice of which last the wicked man is wholly incapable, as long as he continues wicked. The good man therefore, is so far from being of all men the most miserable, that he is of all men the most happy. His piety doth not lead him to any monkish austerities, or ridiculous mortification and abstinence,

but conduces to the health of his body, the peace, order, and harmony of his mind, the good of his estate, and the welfare of his family and friends. He has deservedly more reputa tion than his wicked neighbor; is more valued by thinking and good men; is in reality a better member of civil society, as well as an ornament to the church of God. Whether his life be longer or shorter, it is formed upon the rules of wisdom, that is, of virtue and true religion. He can look all round him, and take satisfaction that all is well on every side. If he considers his relation to God, or man; if he looks backward or forward, considers his present existence, or that which is to come, all, all yield him satisfaction and delight. He considers himself as raised from nothing to the rank and dignity of a rational creature; that he is acting according to his rank by imitating the most perfect being; that he stands well with him; and that as he is like him now, he hopes to be happy with him forever. Blessed is the person that is in such a case; yea thrice happy that man, whose God is the Lord.

'One would think that as piety and virtue conduce to men's present happiness, this argument might have some weight with the voluptuous, ambitious and worldly minded man, and put them upon trying virtue's ways, which are all ways of pleasantness, and all whose paths are paths of peace. There is not, indeed, perfect felicity in this world; but the good man comes the nearest to it of any man upon the face of the earth. And virtue and true religion tend to a man's most solid and durable felicity.'

ESSAY II.

State of Souls after Death.

AGREEABLE to the foregoing abstract or plan of the Christian Religion, let us now consider the state of souls after death, as discovered to us by revelation.

Mankind are agreed that the ideas of goodness and justice are inseparably connected with the idea of God; but our custom of settling these attributes in opposition to each other, is a proof that we are strangers to their nature.

We usually say, that justice gives way to goodness, or goodness gives place to justice; and hence imagine, that they are so far from being one and the same, that there is even a considerable distance between them. If we survey them in another light, and trace them up to their origin, we shall find that goodness is, as it were, the centre of justice, the latter losing itself in the former.

Let us then represent to ourselves the infinite being in the eternity, prior to the existence of time, before any creatures came out of his hands. Let us represent to ourselves this being self-sufficient designing to form intelligent beings; let us suppose ourselves acquainted with this purpose, before it was

put in execution: what can we presume concerning the state of these new beings, that are to come from the hands of a perfectly happy being, but they will be rendered as happy as their finite capacities will admit of ?

For the perfectly happy being, wanting nothing for himself, cannot create beings with a view of making addition to his own felicity; it must be then to make them happy as he himself is, in proportion to finite and infinite. Hence it follows that the idea of infinite goodness is inseparable from that of an infinitely happy being; the pure and perfect good cannot do, or confer, anything but what is good, and, did it communicate anything else, it would be inconsistent with itself.

This idea of goodness in the Deity is a positive one, which justice is not; equity therefore constituting without dispute the essence of justice, I would ask whether infinite goodness and perfect equity do not harmoniously agree? and whether they can be set in opposition?

Hence it follows that the effects of sovereign goodness are never suspended, but that we even share of them when under punishment; some resemblance we see of it in the chastisements that parental affection inflicts. Thus the Deity, by the small portion of benevolence we feel in ourselves, invites us to judge how far his own immense goodness may reach.

Now let us suppose that a man who has this idea of infinite goodness, but has never heard talk of a

miserable eternity; how do we imagine such a man would relish the first proposal of it? what horror would not such an image give him? He would conclude that those who admit of such a state, have a God different from his; that they were never acquainted with the immense goodness of the supremely happy being. He would even conjecture, that those, who espouse this opinion, feel not within themselves those characters of beneficence which are inseparable from human nature.

In reality, this strange opinion degrades the Divine Goodness, and places it below human goodness. For it supposes that God could not foresee what would befall the work of his own hands; that he ventured to give being to an infinite number of creatures, without any certainty of being able to make them happy.

It will be granted, that this plan is worthy of God, and its end above all fully satisfactory; but still it may be objected, that, in order to arrive at this happy end, there is a terrible interval; the unavoidable miseries of the present life are light, and will soon have an end; but the additional prospect of future sufferings, the end of which we know not, is terrible; would it not be more worthy of immense goodness to exempt men from all manner of punishment after this life, since they were formed and infallibly destined for bliss? Why does not that now happen, which one day will certainly be brought about?

This question amounts to the same as that concerning the fall of the first man: Why did not God

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