HARTLEY ON UNIVERSALISM. OF THE FINAL HAPPINESS OF ALL MANKIND IN SOME DISTANT FUTURE STATE. I. Ir is probable from reason that all mankind will be made happy ultimately. For, first, it has been observed all along in the course of this work, that all the evils that befal either body or mind in this state, have a tendency to improve one or both. If they fail of producing a peculiar, appropriated intermediate good effect, they must, however, necessarily contribute to the annihilation of that self, carnal or spiritual, gross or refined, which is an insuperable bar to our happiness in the pure love of God, and of his works. Now, if we reason at all concerning a future state, it must be from analogies taken from this; and that we are allowed to reason, that we are able to do it with some justness, concerning a future state, will appear from the great coincidence of the foregoing natural arguments for a future state, and for the rewards and punishments of it, with what the scriptures have delivered upon the same heads; also because a similar kind of reasonings in respect of the future states, which succeed in order from infancy to old age, is found to be just, and to afford many useful directions and predictions. We ought therefore to judge, that the evils of a future state will have the same tendency, and final cause, as those of this life, viz. to meliorate and perfect our natures, and to prepare them for ultimate unlimited happiness in the love of God, and of his works. Secondly, the generation of benevolence, by the natural and necessary tendency of our frames, is a strong argument for the ultimate happiness of all mankind. It is inconsistent to suppose, that God should thus compel us to learn universal unlimited benevolence; and then not provide food for it. And both this and the foregoing argument seem conclusive, though we should not take in the divine benevolence. They are both supported by the analogy and uniformity apparent in the creation, by the mutual adaptations and correspondencies of things existing at different times, and in different places: but they receive much additional force from the consideration of the goodness of God, if that be first proved by other evidences; as they are themselves the strongest evidences for it, when taken in a contrary order of reasoning. And as the benevolence of one part of the creation is thus an argument for the happiness of the other; so, since benevolence is itself happiness, a tendency to learn it in any being is also an argument for his own happiness. And, upon the whole, since God has commanded his beloved sons, the good, to love and compassionate every being, that comes within their cognizance, by the voice of their natures speaking within them, we cannot suppose, that these his favorites (to speak according to present appearances, and our necessary conceptions, which with this caution is justifiable) will fail of their proper reward in the gratification of this their benevolence. Thirdly, the infinite goodness of God is an argument for the ultimate happiness of all mankind. This appears without any particular discussion of this attribute. But it may not be amiss for the reader just to review the evidences for it above exhibited, and their tendency to prove the ultimate happiness of all God's creatures. Fourthly, The infinite happiness and perfection of God is an argument for, and, as it were, a pledge of, the ultimate happiness and perfection of all his creatures. For these attributes, being infinite, must bear down all opposition from the quarters of misery and imperfection. And this argument will be much stronger, if we suppose (with reverence be it spoken!) any intimate union between God and his creatures; and that, as the happiness of the creatures arises from their love and worship of God, so the happiness of God consists, shows itself, &c. (for one does not know how to express this properly) in love and beneficence to the creatures. As God is present every where, knows and perceives every thing, he may also, in a way infinitely superior to our comprehension, feel every where for all his creatures. Now, according to this, it would seem to us, that all must be brought to ultimate infinite happiness, which is, in his eye, present infinite happiness. Fifthly, The impartiality of God, in respect of all his creatures, seems to argue, that, if one be made infinitely happy upon the balance, all will be made So. That benevolence, which is infinite, must be impartial also; must look upon all individuals, and all degrees of happiness, with an equal eye; must stand in a relation of indifference to them all. Now this is really so, if we admit the third of the foregoing suppositions concerning the divine benevolence. If all individuals be at last infinitely happy upon the balance, they are so at present in the eye of God, i. e. he is perfectly impartial to all his creatures. And thus every intermediate finite degree of misery, how great soever, may be consistent with the impartiality of God. But to suppose, before the creatures A and B existed, that A was made by God to be eternally happy, and B made to be eternally miserable, seems as irreconcileable to God's impartiality, as to his benevolence. That both should be made for eternal and infinite happiness, one to enjoy it in one way, the other in another; one by passing through much pain, the other by passing through little or perhaps none; one by an acceleration in one period of his existence, the other. |