of two things, which are in themselves very diverse; viz., terms which are unintelligible, and things which are undefinable. You believe in the fact, that the divine existence is without cause; you understand the fact that God exists uncaused, but you cannot define underived existence. I believe, on the authority of the Scriptures, that there is a real distinction in the Godhead; but I cannot define it. Still the proposition that there is a real distinction, is just as intelligible, as the one that God is self existent. A multitude of propositions, respecting diverse subjects, resemble these. We affirm, that gravitation brings a body thrown into the air, down to the earth. The fact is perfectly intelligible. The terms are perfectly understood, so far as they are the means of deseribing this fact. But then, what is gravitation? An affirmative definition cannot be given, which is not a mere exchange of synonymes. Nor can any comparison define it; for to what shall we liken it?

The mind of every man, who is accustomed to think, will supply him with a multitude of propositions of this nature; in all of which, the fact designed to be described is clear; the terms so far as they describe this fact are clear; but the subject of the proposition, that is the thing itself, or agent, concerning which the fact is asserted, is undefinable; and, excepting in regard to the fact in question, perhaps wholly unknown to us.

How easy now to perplex common minds, by calling a proposition unintelligible, the subject of which is undefinable. In confounding things so very different, consists as I apprehend, the whole ingenuity of the piece in question; an ingenuity, which may excite the admiration of those who love the subtilties of dispute, but cannot contribute much to illuminate the path of theological science.

I have been thus particular, in my statement of this very difficult part of the subject, in order to prevent misapprehension. I certainly do not hold myself bound to vindicate any of the definitions of person, or of distinction in the Godhead, which I have seen; because I do not adopt them. I do not, and cannot understand them; and to a definition L cannot with propriety assent, (still less, undertake to defend it,) until I do understand what it signifies. It is truly matter of regret, that some great and good men, have carried their speculations on this subject to such a length, that they

have bewildered themselves and their readers. I would always speak with respect and tenderness of such men. Still I have no hesitation in saying, that my mind is absolutely unable to elicit any distinct and certain ideas, from any of the definitions of person in the Godhead, which I have ever examined. A few examples of attempts at definition or illustration, will vindicate the correctness of what I have just said.

Let me begin wtth Tertullian, who flourished about A. D. 200. In his book against Praxeas, before quoted, in page 26, he says; "This perversity, (viz. of Praxeas,) thinks itself to be in possession of pure truth, while it supposes that we are to believe in one God, not otherwise than if we make the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the self same; as if all were not one, while all are of one, viz. by a unity of substance; and still, the mysterious economy which distributes unity into a Trinity is observed, marking out [distinguishing] Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. There are three, not in condition, but rank; not in essence, but form; not in power, but in kind; but of one substance, one condition, and one power; for there is one God, from whom all those ranks, and forms, and kinds by the name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are reckoned."

A little farther on, he says; "Whatever, therefore, the substance of the word (Logos) is, I call him a PERSON, and pay him reverence; and acknowledging the Son, I maintain that he is second from the Father.

"The third is the Spirit from God and the Son, as the fruit from the stalk is the third from the root; a stream from the river [the third] from the fountain; the sharp point from a ray [the third] from the sun. So the Trinity proceeds, by interlinked and connected grades, from the Father." (c. 2.)

In Cap. 9, he says; "They (the Trinity) are not separate from each other, although the Father is said to be diverse from the Son, and the Spirit."

And again; "We are baptized into the persons (of the Trinity) severally, by the use of their several names.'

It is proper to observe here, how plainly and definitely the words person and Trinity, are at this very early age, applied by Tertullian to the Godhead; which contradicts the confident affirmations of some writers, that these terms,

were an invention of later ages and of scholastic divinity, I may add, that the familiar and habitual use which Tertullian makes of these terms, proves that they were commonly understood, or at least used in the church, at a period so early, and in reference to the very distinction in the Godhead, which is the subject of the present discussion.

The object, which Tertullian aims at, in predicating person of the Godhead, is, as has been already remarked, to oppose the sentiment of Praxeas, who denied that there existed any distinction in the divine nature. But to explain Tertullian's similitudes, designed to illustrate the nature of this distinction, and so frequently copied in after ages, is more than I shall undertake. Who does not see, that all similitudes drawn from created, limited, dependent beings or things, must be utterly inadequate to illustrate the mode in which an uncreated, infinite and omnipresent Being exists? What is the attempt at explanation, but darkening counsel by words without knowledge? I believe, with Tertullian, in a threefold distinction of the Godhead: but I believe simply the fact of a Trinity, and do not venture to make any attempt at explanation.

The venerable council of Nice, held A. D. 325, have made an attempt, similar to that of the Father just named, at definition or description. Their words are; "We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, the maker of all things visible and invisible; and in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the Son of God the only begotten of the Father, that is, of the subtance of the Father; God of God, light of light, very God of very God, begotten, not made, of the same substance with the Father, by whom all things were made."

The true occasion, however, why the Nicene Fathers accumulated so many terms, in their Creed, must be found in their intention to oppose every form and species of Arianism, although they meant to strike, as has before been observed, at other opinions, which they disapproved. A slight consideration of the Nicene Creed might lead one perhaps to suppose, that undefinable or objectionable terms of illustration had been, almost intentionally, accumulated in it. The history of the introduction of these terms, however, may be found in the manner in which the Arians disputed with the Nicene Fathers. "Being asked, whether they acknowledged the Son, as begotten of the Father? They

assented; meaning that they acknowledged the derived existence of the Son from God, as well as that of all other beings. Did they acknowledge the Son, as God? Altogether so. Did they acknowledge him, as the true God? Undoubtedly: he must be the true God, who is constituted God. Was the Son of God a creature? By no means; (meaning, not a creature in the sense that other things were; these being mediately created by the Logos, but the Logos immediately by the Father.) But when the word

was proposed, and it was decided that Christ was consubstantial with the Father, they never assented to this, as it excluded all hope of evasion." (Athan. Epis. ad Afric.) A sober inquirer may therefore find, perhaps, more reason to vindicate this term, (so much agitated in the churches,) as used by the Nicene Fathers, than he might at first suspect.

The Council of Constantinople [A. D. 381] in their Synodic Epistle to the Western Bishops, (See Appendix,) have shown the manner, in which the doctrine of the Trinity was stated and defended, in their day. They adopted and enlarged the Nicene Symbol, so as to strike at the opinions of Macedonius; and then, in their Synodic Letter, gave the sum of what they had done, or what they believed. My objection to their language is, that it is too affirmative. "Three most perfect hypostases, or three perfect persons," though aimed to contradict Sabellius, Paul of Samosata, and others of like sentiments, is an attempt to define too far. Hypostases, or persons, in the sense of distinction in the Godhead, may be admissible, through the penury of language. But most perfect hypostases, perfect persons, is attempting to make the distinction more a matter of definition, than it can be made. I believe that what they designed to assert, is substantially true; but I cannot adopt, because I cannot regard as intelligible, all their language.

Let us leave antiquity now, and glance, for a moment, at some of the similar attempts at definition, or illustration, in modern times. The celebrated Leibnitz, was requested by Loefler, who had undertaken to refute the writings of a certain English Antitrinitarian, to give him an affirmative definition of the persons in the Godhead. He sent for answer the following; "Several persons in an absolute substance numerically the same, signify several, particular, in

telligent substances essentially related." On further consideration, he abandoned this, and sent a second; which was, "Several persons, in an absolute substance numerically the same, mean relative, incommunicable modes of subsisting." If Leibnitz actually understood this, I believe he must have been a better master of metaphysics, than any person who has ever read his definition. In fact, he does not him. self appear to have been satisfied with it: for not long after, he wrote as follows; "We must say, that there are relations in the divine substance, which distinguish the persons, since these persons cannot be absolute substances. But we must aver, too, that these relations are substantial. At least, we must say, that the Divine Persons are not the same Concrete, under different denominations or relations; as a man may be, at the same time, both a poet and an orator. We must say, moreover; that they three persons are not as absolute substances as the whole."*

This is somewhat better than either of his former attempts, in as much as it is confined principally to description of a negative kind. Yet after all, I obtain by it no additional light upon the subject, which is important.

With quite as little success, did that original genius and masterly reasoner, the celebrated Toellner of Frankfort, labour to define the subject in question. "It is certain," says he, "that we must conceive, as coexisting in God, three eternal and really different actions, the action of activity, of idea, and of the desire of all possible good within and without him.

Three really different actions, coexisting from eternity, necessarily presuppose three really different and operative substrata. It is thus, through the aid of reason illuminated by the Scriptures, we come to know, that the Power, the Understanding, and the Will of God are not merely three faculties, but three distinct energies, that is, three substances." (Vermisch. Aufsätze. B. I. p. 81.)

Tertullian's explication, or the Nicene Creed is, at least, as intelligible to me as this.

I have not produced these instances, in order to satisfy you, that all attempts of this nature are and must be fruit

* Remarques sur le livre d' un Antitrinitaire Anglois, p. 26.