This being, as I suppose, the distinct bounds of Church and State, let us a little compare them together: THE PARALLEL. 1. The end of civil society is present enjoyment of what this world affords. 2. Another end of civil society is the preservation of the society or government itself for its own sake. 3. The terms of communion must be the same in all societies. 4. The laws of a commonwealth are mutable, being made within the society by an authority not distinct from it, nor exterior to it. 5. The proper means to procure obedience to the law of the civil society, and thereby attain the end, civil happiness, is force or punishment. 1st, It is effectual and adequate for the preservation of the society, and civil happiness is the immediate and natural consequence of the execution of the law. 2nd, It is just, for the breach of 1. The end of Church communion, future expectation of what is to be had in the other world. 2. The preservation of the society in religious communion, is only in order to the conveying and propagating those laws and truths which concern our well-being in another world. 4. The laws of religious society, bating those which are only subservient to the order necessary to their execution, are immutable, not subject to any authority of the society, but only proposed by and within the society, but made by a lawgiver without the society, and paramount to it. 5. The proper enforcement of obedience to the laws of religion, are the rewards and punishments of the other world; but civil punishment is not so. 1st, Because it is ineffectual to that purpose; for punishment is never sufficient to keep men to the obedience of any law, where the evil it brings is not certainly greater than the good which laws being mostly the prejudice and diminution of another man's right, and always tending to the dissolution of the society, in the continuance whereof every man's particular right is comprehended, it is just that he who has impaired another man's good, should suffer the diminution of his own. 3rd, It is within the power of the society, which can exert its own strength against offenders, the sword being put into the magistrate's hands to that purpose. But civil society has nothing to do without its own limits, which is civil happiness. is obtained or expected from the disobedience; and therefore no temporal worldly punishment can be sufficient to persuade a man to or from that way which he believes leads to everlasting happiness or misery. 2nd, Because it is unjust in reference both to Credenda and Cultus, that I should be despoiled of my good things of this world, where I disturb not in the least the enjoyment of others; for my faith or religious worship hurts not another man in any concernment of his; and in moral transgressions, the third and real part of religion, the religious society cannot punish, because it then invades the civil society, and wrests the magistrate's sword out of his hand. In civil society one man's good is involved and complicated with another's, but in religious societies every n's concerns are separate, and one man's transgressions hurt not another any further than he imitates him, and if he err, he errs at his own private cost; therefore I think no external punishment, i. e. deprivation or diminution of the goods of this life, belongs to the Church. Only because for the propagation of the truth (which every society believes 6. Church-membership is perfectly voluntary, and may. end whenever any one pleases without any prejudice to himself, but in civil society it is not so. to be its own religion), it is equity it should remove those two evils which will hinder its propagation; 1. disturbance within, which is contradiction or disobedience of any of its members to its doctrines and discipline; 2. infamy without, which is the scandalous lives or disallowed profession of any of its members; and the proper way to do this, which is in its power, is to exclude and disown such vicious members. But because religious societies are of two sorts, wherein their circumstances very much differ, the exercise of their power is also much different. It is to be considered that all mankind (very few or none excepted) are combined into civil societies in various forms, as force, chance, agreement, or other accidents have happened to constrain them: there are very few also that have not some religion and hence it comes to pass, that very few men but are members both of some Church and of some commonwealth; and hence it comes to pass : 1st, That in some places the civil and religious societies are coëxtended, i. e. both the magistrate and every subject of the same commonwealth is also member of the same Church; and thus it is in Muscovy, whereby they have all the same civil laws, and the same opinions and religious worship. 2nd, In some places the commonwealth, though all of one religion, is but a part of the Church or religious society which acts, and is acknowledged to be one entire society; and so it is in Spain and the principalities of Italy. 3rd. In some places the religion of the commonwealth, i. e. the public established religion, is not received by all the subjects of the commonwealth; and thus the Protestant religion in England, the Reformed in Brandenburgh, the Lutheran in Sweden. 4th. In some places the religion of part of the people is different from the governing part of the civil society; and thus the Presbyterian, Independent, Anabaptists, Quakers, and Jewish in England, the Lutheran and Popish in Cleve, &c.; and in these two last the religious society is part of the civil. There are also three things to be considered in each religion as the matter of their communion : 1. Opinions or speculations, Credenda. 2. Cultus religiosus. 3. Mores. Which are all to be considered in the exercise of church power, which I conceive does properly extend no further than excommunication, which is to remove a scandalous or turbulent member. In the first case there is no need of excommunication for immorality, because the civil law has provided, or may sufficiently, against that by penal laws, enough to suppress it; for the civil magistrate has moral actions under the dominion of his sword, and therefore it is not like he will turn away a subject out of his country for a fault which he can compel him to reform. But if any one differ from the Church in "fide aut cultu," I think first the civil magistrate may punish him for it where he is fully persuaded that it will disturb the civil peace, otherwise not; but the religious society may certainly excommunicate him, the peace whereof may by this means be preserved; but no other evil ought to follow him upon that excommunication as such, but only upon the consideration of the public peace. In the second case I think the church may excommunicate for faults in faith and worship, but not those faults in manners which the magistrate has annexed penalties to, for the preservation of civil society and happiness. The same also I think ought to be the rule in the third case. In the fourth case, I think the Church has power to excommunicate for matters of faith, worship, or manners, though the magistrate punish the same immorality with his sword, because the Church cannot otherwise remove the scandal which is necessary for its preservation and the propagation of its doctrines; and this power of being judges who are fit to be of their society, the magistrate cannot deny to any religious society which is permitted within his dominions. This was the state of the Church till Constantine. But in none of the former cases is excommunication capable to be denounced by any Church upon any one but the members of that Church, it being absurd to cut off that which is no part; neither ought the civil magistrate to inflict any punishment upon the score of excommunication, but to punish the fact or forbear, just as he finds it convenient for the preservation of the civil peace and prosperity of the commonwealth (within which his power is confined), without any regard to excommunication at all. THUS I THINK It is a man's proper business to seek happiness and avoid misery. Happiness consists in what delights and contents the mind; misery, in what disturbs, discomposes, or torments it. I will therefore make it my business to seek satisfaction and delight, and avoid uneasiness and disquiet; to have as much of the one, and as little of the other, as may be. But here I must have a care I mistake not; for if I prefer a short pleasure to a lasting one, it is plain I cross my own happiness. Let me then see wherein consists the most lasting pleasures of this life; and that, as far as I can observe, is in these things: 1st. Health, without which no sensual pleasure can have any relish. 2nd. Reputation,-for that I find everybody is pleased with, and the want of it is a constant torment. 3rd. Knowledge,―for the little knowledge I have, I find I would not sell at any rate, nor part with for any other plea sure. 4th. Doing good,-for I find the well-cooked meat I eat to-day does now no more delight me, nay, I am diseased after |