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de mon Exode, qu'il m'avoit faites demander par M. Cappel et par M. Limbourg, à qui il avoit écrit exprès pour cela. Il y en a à present environ le double d'imprimées, et j'espère que nous commençerons bientôt le Levitique. Je ne comprends pas qui avoit fait courir le bruit d'Oxford, dont M. Cappel m'avoit aussi averti. Il n'en est venu aucun vent à mes oreilles que par ce que vous et lui m'avez mandé. Mylord de Salisbury* pourroit beaucoup faire pour moi, s'il vouloit, mais je ne sais s'il le veut. Il a un Chanoine François auprès de lui, qui, feignant de m'estimer, sème par tout que je me suis perdu par ce livre, parce que je n'ai pas donné dans les étranges visions qu'il a debitée sur le Mistic, dans ses réflections sur les livres de l'Ecriture. Je tenterai néanmoins de ce côté là, et je ne crois pas qu'il me nuira s'il ne veut pas m'aider. Enfin il en arrivera ce qu'il pourra, et pourvu que personne de nos gens sache rien de ma tentative si elle ne reüssit pas, il n'y aura rien de perdu. Mais vos boutiquiers qui sont ici les souverains, et qui regardent leurs ministres comme leurs servantes, me regarderoient de haut en bas plus que jamais, s'ils savoient que je n'eusse pas reüssi. Au contraire, si je pouvois me passer d'eux et me retirer d'ici, je me mettrois peu en peine de ce qu'ils diroient. Cependant il n'est pas bon que des personnes mal-intentionnées sachent rien de mes desseins. Il ne se passe rien ici de nouveau. Je vous prie de me mander la voie par laquelle vous m'envoyerez ou vous m'avez envoyé le Pentateuque de M. l'Evêque de Bath. Je suis de tout mon cœur, Monsieur, votre très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,

J. LE CLERC."

MR LOCKE'S ANSWER TO M. LE CLERC.

LIBERTY.

As to the determination of the will, we may take it under three considerations.

1st. The ordinary and successive uneasinesses which take their turns in the common course of our lives, and these are what, for the most part, determine the will, but with a power still of suspending.

2nd. Violent uneasiness which the mind cannot resist nor away with these constantly determine the will without any *Bishop Burnet.

manner of suspension, where there is any view of a possibility of their removal.

3rd. A great number of little and very indifferent actions which mix themselves with those of greater moment, and fill up, as it were, the little empty spaces of our time. In these the will may be said to determine itself without the preponderancy of good or evil, or the motive of uneasiness on either side; as whether a man should put on his right or left shoe first, whether he should fold a margeant in the paper wherein he is going to write a letter to his friend, whether he should sit still or walk, or scratch his head whilst he is in a deep meditation; there are a thousand such actions as these which we do every day, which are certainly voluntary, and may be ascribed to the will determining itself. But there is so little thought precedes them, because of the little consequences that attend them, that they are but as it were appendices to the more weighty and more voluntary actions to which the mind is determined by some sensible uneasiness, and therefore in these the mind is determined to one or the other side, not by the preferable or greater good it sees in either, but by the desire and necessity of despatch, that it may not be hindered in the pursuit of what is judged of more moment by a lingering suspense between equal and indifferent things, and a deliberation about trifles; in these, the uneasiness of delay is sufficient to determine and give the preference to one, it matters not which side.-Mem. This writ to Mr Le Clerc, 9th Oct., 1694, in answer to his of 12th Aug.

The following articles properly belong to the Journal. Their date will show when each was written.

1677.-SPECIES.

The species of things are distinguished and made by chance, in order to naming and names imposed on those things which either the conveniences of life or common observation bring into discourse. The greatest part of the rest, sine nomine herbæ, lie neglected, neither differenced by names, nor distinguished into species; viz. how many flies and worms are there which, though they are about us in great plenty, we

have not yet named nor ranked into species, but come under the general names of flies or worms, which yet are as distinct as a horse and a sheep, though we never have had so great occasion to take notice of them.

So that our ideas of species are almost voluntary, or at least different from the idea of Nature by which she forms and distinguishes them, which in animals she seems to me to keep to with more constancy and exactness than in other bodies and species of things: those being curious engines do perhaps require a greater accurateness for their propagation and continuation of their race; for in vegetables we find that several sorts come from the seeds of one and the same individual, as much different species as those that are allowed to be so by philosophers.

This is very familiar in apples, and perhaps other sorts of fruits, whereof some have distinct names and others only the general, though they begin every day to have more and more given them as they come into use. So that species, in respect of us, are but things ranked into order, because of their agreement in some ideas which we have made essential in order to our naming them, though what it is essentially to belong to any species in reference to Nature be hard to determine; for if a woman should bring forth a creature perfectly of the shape of a man, that never showed any more appearance of reason than a horse, and had no articular language, and another woman should produce another with nothing of the shape, but with the language and reason of a man, I ask which of these you would call by the name man? -both or neither ?

UNDERSTANDING.-ARGUMENTS POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE.

1677.

In questions where there are arguments on both sides, one positive proof is to preponderate to a great many negatives, because a positive proof is always founded upon some real existence, which we know and apprehend; whereas the negative arguments terminate generally in nothing, in our not being able to conceive, and so may be nothing but conclusions from our ignorance or incapacity, and not from the truth of things which may, and we have experience do, really exist,

though they exceed our comprehension. This amongst the things we know and lie obvious to our senses is very evident; for though we are very well acquainted with matter, motion, and distance, yet there are many things in them which we can by no means comprehend; for, even in the things most obvious and familiar to us, our understanding is nonplussed, and presently discovers its weakness; whenever it enters upon the consideration of anything that is unlimited, or would penetrate into the modes or manner of being or operation, it presently meets with unconquerable difficulties. Matter, and figure, and motion, and the degrees of both, we have clear notions of; but when we begin to think of the extension or divisibility of the one, or the beginning of either, our understanding sticks and boggles, and knows not which way to turn. We also have no other notion of operation but of matter by motion,—at least I must confess I have not, and should be glad to have any one explain to me intelligibly any other; and yet we shall find it hard to make out any phenomenon by those causes. We know very well that we think, and at pleasure move ourselves, and yet, if we will think a negative argument sufficient to build on, we shall have reason to doubt whether we can do one or other; it being to me inconceivable how matter should think, and as incomprehensible how an immaterial thinking thing should be able to move material, or be affected by it. We having therefore positive experience of our thinking and motion, the negative arguments against them, and the impossibility of understanding them, never shake our assent to these truths, which perhaps will prove a considerable rule to determine us in very material questions.

AN ESSAY CONCERNING RECREATION, IN ANSWER TO
D. G.'S DESIRE.-1677.

As for recreation, thus I think; that recreation being a thing ordained, not for itself, but for a certain end, that end is to be the rule and measure of it.

Recreation then seeming to me to be the doing of some easy or at least delightful thing to restore the mind or body, tired with labour, to its former strength and vigour, and thereby fit it for new labour, it seems to me,—

1st. That there can be no general rule set to different persons concerning the time, manner, duration, or sort of recreation that is to be used, but only that it be such as their experience tells them is suited to them, and proper to refresh the part tired.

2nd. That if it be applied to the mind, it ought certainly to be delightful, because it being to restore and enliven that, which is done by relaxing and composing the agitation of the spirits, that which delights it without employing it much, is not only the fittest to do so, but also the contrary, i. e. what is ungrateful doth certainly most discompose and tire it.

3rd. That it is impossible to set a standing rule of recreation to one's self; because not only the unsteady fleeting condition of our bodies and spirits requires more at one time than another, which is plain in other more fixed refreshments, as food and sleep, and likewise requires very different according to the employment that hath preceded the present temper of our bodies and inclination of our minds; but also because variety in most constitutions is so necessary to delight, and the mind is so naturally tender of its freedom, that the most pleasant diversions become nauseous and troublesome to us when we are forced to repeat them in a continued fixed round.

It is further to be considered :-
:-

1st. That in things not absolutely commanded nor forbidden by the law of God, such as is the material part of recreation, he in his mercy considering our ignorance and frail constitution, hath not tied us to an indivisible point, nor confined us to a way so narrow that allows no latitude at all in things in their own nature indifferent; there is the liberty of great choice, great variety, within the bounds of innocence.

2nd. That God delights not to have us miserable either in this or the other world, but having given us all things richly to enjoy, we cannot imagine that in our recreations we should be denied delight, which is the only necessary and useful part of it.

This supposed, I imagine :

1st. That recreation supposes labour and weariness, and therefore that he that labours not hath no title to it.

2nd. That it very seldom happens that our constitutions

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