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question. Or if it happened that either of the disputants, failing in his proper artillery, was brought to a nonplus, this, indeed, placed the laurels on his adversary's head, victory was his, and with it the name of learning and renown of a scholar he has his reward, and therein his end; but truth gets nothing by it: every one says he is the better disputant and carried the day, but nobody finds or judges of the truth by that: the question is a question still, and after it has been the matter of many a combat, and by being carried sometimes on one side and sometimes on the other, has afforded a triumph to many a combatant, is still as far from decision as ever. Truth and knowledge have nothing to do in all this bustle; nobody thinks them concerned, it is all for victory and triumph: so that this way of contesting for truth may be, and often is, nothing but the abuse of words for victory, a trial of skill, without any appearance of a true consideration of the matter in question, or troubling their heads to find out where the truth lies. This is not the fault of mode and figure, the rules whereof are of great use in the regulating of argumentation, and trying the coherence and force of men's discourses. But the mischief has been brought in by placing too high a value and credit on the art of disputing, and giving that the reputation and reward of learning and knowledge, which is in truth one of the greatest hindrances of it.

Book iii. c. 10, § 13.-To do so.

We cannot but think that angels of all kinds much exceed us in knowledge, and possibly we are apt sometimes to envy them that advantage, or at least to repine that we do not partake with them in a greater share of it. Whoever thinks of the elevation of their knowledge above ours, cannot imagine it lies in a playing with words, but in the contemplation of things, and having true notions about them, a perception of their habitudes and relations one to another. If this be so, methinks we should be ambitious to come, in this part, which is a great deal in our power, as near them as we can; we should cast off all the artifice and fallacy of words, which makes so great a part of the business and skill of the disputers of this world, and is contemptible even to rational men,

and therefore must needs render us ridiculous to those higher orders of spirits. Whilst we, pretending to the knowledge of things, hinder as much as we can the discovery of truth by perplexing one another all we can by a perverse use of those signs which we make use of to convey it to one another, must it not be matter of contempt to them to see us make the studied and improved abuse of those signs have the name and credit of learning? Should not we ourselves think the Chinese very ridiculous, if they should set those destined to knowledge out of the way to it by praising and rewarding their proficiency in that which leads them quite from it?

The study of such arts as these is an unaccountable wasting of our time; they serve only to continue or spread ignorance and error, and should be exploded by all lovers of truth and professors of science; at least, ought not to be supported by the name and rewards of learning given to them. Those who are set apart to learning and knowledge, should not, one would think, have that made the chief, or any part of their study, which is a hindrance to their main end-knowledge. The forms of argumentation should be learned and made use of; but to teach an apprentice to measure well, would you commend and reward him for cheating by putting off false and sophisticated wares? It is no wonder men never come to seek and to value truth sincerely, when they have been entered in sophistry, and questions are proposed and argued, not at all for the resolving of doubts nor settling the mind upon good grounds on the right side, but to make a sport of truth, which is set up only to be thrown at, and to be battled as falsehood, and he has most applause who can most effectually do it. What, then, shall not scholars dispute? how else will they be able to defend the truth, unless they understand the ways and management of arguments? To this I

answer,

1st. This way of managing arguments is nothing but the forms of syllogism, and may quickly be learned.

2nd. If disputing be necessary to make any one master of those forms, it must be allowed to be absurd for beginners to dispute in any science till they have well studied that science; if they be accustomed and required to dispute before they know, will it not teach them to take words for things,to prefer terms to truth,—and take disputing for knowledge?

3rd. If disputing be necessary, every one should dispute in earnest for the opinion he is really of; that truth and falsehood might not appear indifferent to him, nor was it matter which he held, victory was all, truth nothing in the

case.

4th. But that can never teach a man to defend truth which teaches him not the love of it, and when he gets commendation not by holding the truth, but for well maintaining falsehood. Besides, if it find approbation never to come to an end of his syllogisms or distinctions till he has got the last word, what is this but to persuade a man it is a fine worthy thing never to have done talking,—to take no answer as long as he can find any terms of opposing,--nor ever to yield to any arguments? than which there can be nothing more odious to those who have a regard to truth, to say nothing of civil conversation and good breeding.

In Locke's fourth Letter for Toleration there is an hiatus, where the Editor informs the reader that "[the two following leaves of the copy are either lost or mislaid]." That deficiency is now supplied from the original rough draft.

[But since, perhaps, it would have laid the matter a little too open, if you had given the reason why you say I was concerned to make out that there are as clear and solid arguments for the belief of false religion as there are for belief of the true; or that men may both as firmly and rationally believe and embrace false religions as they can the true, I shall endeavour here to do it for you.

Knowledge, properly so called, or knowledge of the true religion, upon strict demonstration, as you are pleased to call it, not being to be had, his knowledge could not point out to him that religion which he is by force to promote. The magistrate being thus visibly destitute of knowledge to guide him in the right exercise of his duty, you will not allow his belief or persuasion, but it must be firmness of persuasion, or full assurance; and this you think sufficient to point out to him that religion which by force he is to promote. And hereupon you think your cause gained, unless I could prove that which I think utterly false, viz. that there are as clear

and solid grounds for the belief of false religions as there are for belief of the true, and that men may both as firmly and as rationally believe and embrace false religions as true. All which is bottomed upon this very false supposition, that in the want of knowledge nothing is sufficient to set the magistrate upon doing his duty in using of force to promote the true religion, but the firmest belief of its truth; whereas his own persuasion of the truth of his own religion, in what degree soever it be . . . he believes it to be true, will, if he think it his duty, be sufficient to set him to work.

This, as well as several other things in my former letters, stick with some readers, who want to have them clear; but such poor spirits deserve not to be regarded by a master of fencing, who answers by specimen, and relates by wholesale, and whose word is to be taken for sufficient guarantee of truth-the most commodious way that hath been yet found out for silencing objections, and putting an end to controversy.]

ABSTRACT OF THE ESSAY.

/where?

ON opening the MS. copy of the Essay on Human Understanding, dated 1671, I found the following paper without title or date: it is an Epitome or Abstract of the Essay, drawn up by Locke himself;—the same which was translated by Le Clerc, and published in the Bibliothèque Universelle of 1688, before the Essay was given to the world.

Lib. I. In the thoughts I have had concerning the Understanding, I have endeavoured to prove that the mind is at first rasa tabula. But that being only to remove the prejudice that lies in some men's minds, I think it best in this short view I design here of my principles, to pass by all that preliminary debate which makes the first book, since I pretend to show in what follows the original from whence, and the

ways whereby, we receive all the ideas our understandings are employed about in thinking.

Lib. II. Chap. 1. The mind having been supposed void of all innate characters, comes to receive them by degrees as experience and observation lets them in; and we shall, upon consideration, find they all come from two originals, and are conveyed into the mind by two ways, viz. sensation and reflection.

1st. It is evident that outward objects, by affecting our senses, cause in our minds several ideas which were not there before thus we come by the idea of red and blue, sweet and bitter, and whatever other perceptions are produced in us by sensation.

2nd. The mind, taking notice of its own operation about these ideas received by sensation, comes to have ideas of those very operations that pass within itself: this is another source of ideas, and this I call reflection; and from hence it is we have the ideas of thinking, willing, reasoning, doubting, purposing, &c.

From these two originals it is that we have all the ideas we have; and I think I may confidently say that, besides what our senses convey into the mind, or the ideas of its own operations about those received from sensation, we have no ideas at all. From whence it follows-first, that where a man has always wanted any one of his senses, there he will always want the ideas belonging to that sense; men born deaf or blind are sufficient proof of this. Secondly, it follows that if a man could be supposed void of all senses, he would also be void of all ideas; because, wanting all sensation, he would have nothing to excite any operation in him, and so would have neither ideas of sensation, external objects having no way by any sense to excite them, nor ideas of reflection, his mind having no ideas to be employed about. Chap. 2. To understand me right, when I say that we have not, nor can have, any ideas but of sensation, or of the operation of our mind about them, it must be considered that there are two sorts of ideas, simple and complex. It is of simple ideas that I here speak; such as are the white colour of this paper, the sweet taste of sugar, &c., wherein the mind perceives no variety nor composition, but one uniform per