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mistake of judgment, giving assent to what is not true; the causes whereof are these

First. Want of proofs, whether such as may be or as cannot be had.

Secondly. Want of ability to use them.

Thirdly. Want of will to use them.

Fourthly. Wrong measures of probability, which are these

four

1. Doubtful opinions taken for principles. 2. Received hypotheses.

3. Predominant passions.

4. Authority.

Chap. 18. Reason, that serves us to the discovery of both demonstration and probability, seems to me to have four parts-1st. The finding out of proofs. 2nd. The laying them in their due order for the discovery of truth. 3rd. In the perception of the more or less clear connection of the ideas in each part of the deduction. 4th, and last of all, The drawing a right judgment and conclusion from the whole. By which it will appear that syllogism is not the great instrument of reason, it serving but only to the third of these, and that only, too, to show another's wrong arguing; but it helps not reason at all in the search of new knowledge, nor the discovery of yet unknown truths, and the proofs of them, which is the chief use of that faculty, and not victory in dispute, or the silencing of wranglers.

Chap. 19. Faith is by some men so often made use of in opposition to reason, that he who knows not their distinct bounds will be at a loss in his inquiries concerning matters of religion.

Matters of reason are such propositions as may be known by the natural use of our faculties, and are deducible from ideas received from sensation or reflection. Matters of faith, such as are made known by supernatural revelation. The distinct principles and evidence of these two, being rightly considered, show where faith excludes or overrules reason, and where not.

1. Original revelation cannot be assented to contrary to the clear principles of our natural knowledge, because, though God cannot lie, yet it is impossible that any one, to whom a

revelation is made, should know it to be from God more certainly than he knows such truths.

2. But original revelation may silence reason in any proposition, whereof reason gives but a probable assurance, because the assurance that it is a revelation from God may be more clear than any probable truth can be.

3. If original revelation cannot, much less can traditional revelation be assented to, contrary to our natural clear and evident knowledge; because, though what God reveals cannot be doubted of, yet he to whom the revelation is not originally made, but has only received it by the delivery or tradition of other men, can never so certainly know that it was a revelation made by God, nor that he understands the words aright in which it is delivered to him. Nay, he cannot know that he ever heard or read that proposition which is supposed revealed to another, so certainly as he knows those truths. Though it be a revelation that the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised, yet it not being revealed anywhere that such a proposition, delivered by a certain man, is a revelation, the believing of such a proposition to be a revelation is not a matter of faith, but of reason; and so it is if the question be whether I understand it in the right sense.

According to these principles, I conclude all with a division of the sciences into three sorts-1st. Quoin, or the knowledge of things, whether bodies or spirits, or of any of their affections in their true natures; the end of this is bare speculation. 2nd. IpaкTun, or the rules of operation about things in our power, and principally those which concern our conduct; the end of this is action. 3rd. Enμwrin, or the knowledge of signs, i. e. ideas and words, as subservient to the other two, which, if well considered, would perhaps produce another kind of logic and critique than has yet been thought

on.

At the end of Le Clerc's* translation of the above Abstract, in Bibliothèque Universelle, is the following notifica*Stated to be translated by Le Clerc, on his own authority, as I find in Mr Locke's copy of that work these words, in Le Clerc's handwriting: "Tout ce qui est depuis le commencement jusqu'à là, p. 261, est de moi." Vol. viii.

tion, published evidently under Locke's immediate direction, and affording one amongst the many proofs of his sincerity in the search for truth.

"C'est là, l'extrait d'un ouvrage Anglois que l'auteur a bien voulu publier, pour satisfaire quelqu'uns de ses amis particuliers, et pour leur donner un abrégé de ses sentimens. Si quelqu'un de ceux qui prendront la peine de les examiner, croit y remarquer quelque endroit, où l'auteur se soit trompé, ou quelque chose d'obscur, et de défectueux dans ce systême, il n'a qu'à envoyer ses doutes, ou ses objections, à Amsterdam, aux Marchands Libraires, chez qui s'imprime la Bibliothèque Universelle. Encore que l'auteur n'ait pas une grande envie de voir son ouvrage imprimé, et qu'il croie qu'on doive avoir plus de respect pour le public que de lui offrir d'abord ce que l'on croit être veritable, avant que de savoir si les autres l'agréront, ou le jugeront utile; neanmoins il n'est pas si réservé, qu'on ne puisse esperer qu'il se disposera à donner au public son traité entier, lorsque la manière dont cet abrégé aura été reçu, lui donnera occasion de croire qu'il ne publiera pas mal à propos son ouvrage. Le lecteur pourra remarquer dans cet version quelques termes, dont on s'est servi dans un nouveau sens, ou qui n'avoient peut-être jamais paru dans aucun livre François. Mais il auroit été trop long de les exprimer par des periphrases; on a crut qu'en matière de philosophie il étoit bien permis de prendre en nôtre langue la même liberté que l'on prend en cet occasion dans toutes les autres, c'est de former des mots analogiques quand l'usage commun ne fournit pas ceux dont on a besoin. L'auteur l'a fait en son Anglois, et on le peut faire en cette langue, sans qu'il soit necessaire d'en demander permission au lecteur. Il seroit bien à souhaiter qu'on en pût autant faire en François, et que nous puissions égaler dans l'abondance des termes une langue, que la nôtre surpasse dans l'exactitude de l'expression."

APPENDIX.

"WORTHY SIR,

THOMAS BURNETT TO MR LOCKE.

"London.

I

"I was sorry I could not see you at my coming back from Tunbridge in September last, having called twice at your lodgings. was necessitated to go to the country immediately thereafter, and made a ramble from the Bath through the West of England to Salisbury, and at last to Oxford, where the good society and most kind treatment from all I made acquaintance with, did charm me for more than three months, and made me at last leave that place with regret.

I have lately received a letter from your worthy admirer, Monsieur Leibnitz. He hath been kept back from making his returns to his correspondents this long time, having more to do in the public affairs of that country, as I understand from the new title I find given him, of Conseiller intime de S. A. E. de Brunswick. In this letter he gives a new proof of the esteem he hath of your writings, having writ seven or eight pages of his observations concerning your dispute with the Bishop of Worcester, and seeming to hold the balance betwixt your learned antagonist and you with all the fairness of an honest man and the judgment of a philosopher; though the weight of what is thrown into the scales seems to make him incline sometimes to one side, sometimes to another. It appears he hath not yet seen the last letter of the Bishop's nor your two last to him, though I have sent him all that was come out, with several books of other authors, by three packets at several times.

There is a young gentleman who was here a long time to search for records relating to the House of Brunswick, for whom I did buy all the curious books that have come out these several years, with whom I have also sent all what he could not find himself out of my own library. He will open his pack at Hanover, and both the Électrix and Monsieur Leibnitz will see what books are for their service. In speaking to the certainty and clearness of ideas, he pleases himself with the difference he makes betwixt the two

terms of clear and distinct. That he calls clear, which can be differenced in our notion by a certain characteristic from all things besides itself. This knowledge he calls distinct, when we know a thing in its whole essence or nature with all its conditions and requisites, or when we can give its definition. So that the knowledge of substance, in so far as we know its certain differences and accidents, may be called clear, but cannot be termed distinct.

But if I may add my own thoughts, this distinct notion is not applicable to anything else we know, any more than it is to our ideas of substance; since no human knowledge reaches a complete understanding of the nature of the most minute subject, reasoning so as to exhaust its whole nature, essence, and all that is to be known about it, no more than the understanding of the nature of the least grain of the dust we trample upon this knowledge by comprehensive ideas is too wonderful for us, and can only belong to that infinite Being who is perfect in knowledge.

Monsieur Leibnitz desires the names of all your works, that he may have all sent him. Now you are best able to inform him of that particular. I thought fit to acquaint you (Sir) with this letter, and of two long articles in it relating to the metaphysical subject of ideas, and your discourses of the coin also. I was transcribing all that belongs to these two parts, and sending them to you; but I imagine you will be no less pleased to see the whole contexture of the letter itself, where there is an account of many other particulars that may be interesting.

I need not send you the news of the town; I only take the liberty to acquaint you of some particulars concerning Dr Bentley's book, which is at last come out. He read to me a great part of the preface long before it was published, and I then thought his narration of the matter-of-fact (if he be to be believed in verbo sacerdotis) did justify very much his behaviour to Mr Boyle at the beginning. And as to the controversy itself, if he like, many good judges think he is able to defend himself against the reason, if not against the authority, of his contrary party. He told me then the Bishop of Coventry and Litchfield was so far of his opinion, that he would publish something of his own at the same time upon the same subject, which he had kept by him many years; wherein, though there were some small things wherein they dissented, the Bishop said it was so much the better, since thereby was taken away all suspicion of combination; and that the Bishop himself would send the Doctor's book to Mons. Spanheim; so that Grevius, Mons. Spanheim, and that Bishop, a learned triumvirate, seemed to be engaged on the Doctor's side. But I doubt not that a greater number will be of another sentiment, who would not be thought to be of the unlearned tribe; and I heard yesterday morning from Mr Gasterell that the Bishop of Coventry and Litchfield hath thought fit to suppress his

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