gives no colour for maintaining that in another place he made such an unwonted and mystical use of a word, as that we ought to translate it by another word. Every body I believe agrees that he saw literal beasts which were emblematical of other things, and stated to be so. Nobody, as far as I know, has suggested that he spoke of a certain 1260 days which were to symbolize a certain 1260 years. In short we are here called upon to substitute the word year in the text for day; is there any other part of the book of Daniel in which we could take the liberty to substitute the name of the thing symbolized, for the word which the prophet uses,, without falsifying his meaning ?-when Daniel says "four great beasts came up from the sea" it would be absurd, and would not convey his meaning, if we were to read "four great empires arose on the earth," although those beasts were symbolical of four Empires; and this is just because his language is literal, while he speaks of things that were emblematical.

Mr. Irving however goes on to say, "And why require it in one part and not in another? "The word time, rather than year; and times "rather than two years; and the dividing of "time rather than half a year; were evidence "to me that there was a mystery under it: but

b The reader may find some remarks on this point in the reply to the Review in the Christian Observer.

" when I find it in the midst of an emblematical "vision" [allow me to add-in the midst of plain language, the words of which are by the common consent of interpreters taken in their obvious and literal sense] "I can have no doubt "thereof, according to all rules and canons of interpretation."

With regard to the question, "Why require "it in one part and not in another?" I think I have answered it for myself, by shewing that I do require words to be taken according to their obvious meaning as it regards the beasts, as much as I do with regard to the periods; but the inconsistency seems to me to lie on the other side; for as far as I know, except on the one point of the periods, Mr. Irving himself would agree with me in taking the words of Daniel according to their obvious meaning.-If he considered the word "time" instead of " year" in Chap. V. as " evidence that there was a mys

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tery under it," why did he not view it in the same light in Chap. IV.; and maintain that the years of Nebuchadnezzar's banishment were mystical? To be sure there would have been some difficulty in persuading his readers that the King of Babylon was exiled for 2520 years; and yet I think Mr. Irving would hardly have liked to explain the matter as some have done. I cannot help wishing however that, instead of confining his reference to two writers whose

arguments I had not quoted, and whose works the greater part of his readers have probably neyer seen, he had taken some notice of the writer whose arguments I did give at full length, and whose works are much more popular, and accessible to general readers.

It is needless to say that on this occasion I think Mr. Faber the advocate of a bad cause; but that he is an able, and intrepid advocate, the world needs not be told. It is pretty certain that he was not ignorant of what Mede, and Henry More, and his other predecessors had said upon the subject; and I really thought that in taking the argument as stated by him, I was meeting it in it's strongest form; and that by printing it at full length in his own words, I was doing it all the justice in my power. It was natural to suppose that a person of Mr. Faber's ability and practice, as a controversial writer, would state the argument to the best advantage, and indeed I think he has done so ; but as the name of MEDE stands so high, and he has been mentioned by others beside Mr. Irving, I shall be obliged to any reader who will go with me through his arguments, and a few remarks upon them. As to the arguments of Henry More, I must say that I do not think them worth a particular examination. It appears to me that whatever they contain, which is not found in the argument as stated

by Mede, or Faber, is so plainly irrelevant, or false, or absurd, as to require no confutation.

I will therefore lay before the reader the argument of Mede, with some observations in reply to it, and will adopt the method which I before pursued with regard to the argument of Mr. Faber-that is, I will set down the whole, replying to each part separately.

"FIVE REASONS,

Clearly demonstrating that the anti-christian or apos"tatical times are more than three single years and a "half."

"I. Because impossible so many things, and of such "quality, as are to be performed in this time, should "be done in three single years and an half—as

"1. Ten kingdoms, founded at the same hour with "the beast. (Ch. xvii.)

"2. Peoples and multitudes of nations and tongues "to serve and obey him. (Ch. xiii.)

"3. To make war with the saints, and overcome "them. (Ibid.)

4. To cause all that dwell upon the earth to worship him.

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5. Babylon to ride the beast so long, that all "nations shall drink the wine of her fornication, "all kings of the earth commit fornication with "her. (Ch. xvii. and xviii.)

"6. The merchants and all those that had ships in "the sea to grow rich by trading with her. (Ch.

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'xviii.) These things should ask more than three 'years work, or four either.”

In this first reason there are six things mentioned; and the whole objection rests upon the IMPOSSIBILITY of their being performed in three years and a half.

To speak of each separately.

"1. Ten kingdoms founded at the same hour with the beast." Why is it IMPOSSIBLE that ten kingdoms should be founded in three years and a half? Surely it is not unreasonable to ask for something more than dogmatical assertion. If it be said that it is very improbable, I reply, that this has nothing to do with the question; and that those who use great words should be prepared to stand by them. It does indeed make all the difference in the world, whether the thing can be shewn to be impossible, or whether it is only, in the judgment of mankind, improbable. But I am perfectly ready to meet the objection with this qualification; which, I suppose, it absolutely requires. Is it more improbable than events which have already occurred in fulfilment of prophecy? And are we to make our judgment of probability the test by which prophecy is to be tried, and the rule by which it is to be interpreted? It will be remembered, that this argument rests entirely on the impossibility (I am willing to qualify it into improbability) of performance; and I ask, is it more improbable that ten kingdoms should be founded in three years and a half, than that a