12. Why is it difficult to determine the nature of the Grecian finances? 13. What evil resulted when taxation became necessary? 14. Are there any laws that prove the pressure of taxation to have been unequal at Athens ? 15. Did the bad system of Grecian finance prove injurious to public liberty? CHAPTER VI. THE ARMY AND NAVY. NOTWITHSTANDING the frequency of wars in Greece, the military art does not appear to have made much progress. The weapons used in the age of Alexander seem to have been very little improved since the time of Homer, and the art of manoeuvring an army appears to have been neglected until the war between the Thebans and Spartans.* The principal reason of this was, that the soldiers of the different Grecian states were chiefly a militia, called out on any sudden emergency, serving gratuitously during the campaign, and then returning to their ordinary occupations. 2. Every citizen was liable to be called on to serve in war, unless the state made some particular exceptions. The military age in Athens began at the eighteenth, and ended at the fifty-eighth year, and it seems probable that the same regulation existed in the other Grecian states. 3. From the nature of a militia, it is manifest that it would be impossible to assemble large armies; not more than ten thousand Athenians fought at Marathon;† and though the union of all the states enabled them to bring a larger army into the field at Platææ, that was probably the first occasion, before the introduction of mercenary troops, on which an army of thirty thousand Greeks were assembled in one place. 4. After the battle of Platææ, the war with the Persians continued to be carried on principally by sea, and therefore no opportunity was afforded for the improvement of milltary science; the art of besieging was, however, cultivated by Ci'mon, though no important improvement appears to have been effected. 5. The two Peloponne'sian wars between Ath'ens and Sparta would seem at first to have afforded opportunities for See History, chap. XI. + Ibid. chap. IV. + Ibid. chap. VI. advancing the art of war; but on looking to the history, we shall find that sieges constituted the principal military operations, and that all the battles of importance were fought at sea. Besides, the two principal states engaged in the war were not likely to advance the military art; Sparta was fettered down by being compelled to adhere undeviatingly to ancient maxims: and Ath'ens, whose wealth depended on her commerce, and whose strength consisted in her naval auxiliaries, was naturally disinclined to attempt any military enterprise. 6. There were other obstacles, arising from the republican constitution of the Grecian states; the command was shared by several generals, and the unpaid citizens were so much on an equality with their leaders, that it was always difficult to enforce obedience. 7. To this must be added, the deficiency of cavalry; Attica and the Peloponne'sus were unfavourable for pasture; Athens had only about a thousand horse, and Sparta before the age of Agesilaus scarcely any. Thessaly, indeed, was always celebrated for its horsemen, but that country soon ceased to possess any political importance. 8. A native militia, fighting for their hearths and altars, presents a formidable obstacle to an invader, but ceases to be of value beyond the limits of its own country. When the Persians were driven from Greece, no attempt was made to follow them into Asia and anticipate the exploits of Alexander. 9. In commercial countries, military service is most sensibly felt as a hardship: the rich merchant, unwilling to leave his gains, hires a substitute; his example is soon followed by others, and in a short time, the army of the state is entirely made up of the poorer order of citizens. It soon becomes necessary to grant them a small allowance for their support, and thus the militia is converted into a mercenary army. This change took place in Athens during the administration of Pericles, and in Corinth at a still earlier period. 10. Foreign troops were occasionally hired in the first Peloponnesian war, but their use became general in the second and third; hence arose a new and numerous class, whose profession was war, and who sold their services to the highest bidder. The facility with which the younger Cyrus collected an army of ten thousand Greeks to aid him in his * Scc chapter X. iniquitous expedition against his brother, shows us how numerous these mercenary bands had become, and how little they regarded the justice of a cause, in comparison with the goodness of their pay. 11. We have already said, that little regard was paid to military evolutions, before the time of Epam'inondas. The Greeks drew out their armies in line, and fought man to man thus numbers, or personal courage decided the day, leaving little opportunity for the exercise of skill. Epaminondas saw clearly that an adherence to these old customs would be his ruin; the Spartans were more numerous and better soldiers than the Thebans, and if they fought in line the fate of the day could not be doubtful. He therefore adopted a new plan; concentrating his forces, he suddenly pushed forward against one wing of the Spartan army, which was irretrievably ruined, before the other divisions could come to its assistance. 12. At Leuc'tra the Theban cavalry in a great measure decided the fate of the day, bu Mantinei'a was won entirely by the generalship of Epami nondas. He pushed forward the best of his troops in a solid mass against the long files of the Spartans, broke their line at once, and overwhelmed them in detail. Philip of Macedon was the prisoner and pupil of the The'ban general; he transmitted his lessons to Alexander, and by judiciously availing himself of these instructions, the Macedonian hero overthrew the ancient empire of Persia. 13. From a very early period, the navy was looked upon by the Greeks as of greater importance than the army; but there were many circumstances which prevented them from making any great improvement either in the arts of navigation, or naval warfare. Their expeditions were confined to the Æge'ian and Io'nian seas, where the numerous islands afforded so many ports and landing-places, that there was not much need of skill: the materials for ship-building did not abound in Greece, but were obliged to be brought at a great expense from abroad; finally, the manning of the fleet was a matter of very great difficulty. 14. Two descriptions of men, marines and sailors, were employed the former were originally part of the unpaid militia, the latter were slaves or foreigners. The same causes that led to a change in the constitution of the army, produced the same effect in the navy, and the pay of the See History, chap. XI. fleet became soon one of the most difficult parts of Grecian finance. The Spartans were utterly unable to maintain a fleet until they were aided by subsidies from Persia. The Greeks early made a distinction between merchant-vessels and ships of war. The former were built wide and deep, the latter usually called long, were sharp and narrow, with the rowers sitting in one line. The shape of the vessels and the number of rowers, which soon rose from twenty to fifty, made the ships of war very swift sailers. The invention of tri'remes, by the Corinthians, was the first great improvement made by the Greeks in the art of shipbuilding; these vessels having three tiers of oars, rising one above the other, required more strength in their construction than the long galleys; but the additional expense prevented them for a long time from coming into general use. In the Persian war, no states but the Syracu'sans and Corinthians had entire fleets consisting of tri'remes. In naval tactics, the Greeks seem to have improved very slowly.* The battles of Artemisi'um and Sal'amis were won more by the advantageous position of the Grecian fleet, than by any skilful evolutions; in the other sea-fights, the Persians were beaten so easily, that no opportunity was afforded for exhibiting the prudence or adroitness of the commanders. The victory obtained at Arginu'sæt by the Athenians, in the second Peloponnesian war, was, however, entirely owing to the skill of the admirals; they had their vessels drawn up in double lines, and were thus enabled to break through the long single line of the Spartans. The bravery of Callicrat'idas for a time kept the fortune of the day in doubt, but skill eventually triumphed over valour. 17. It was not until the wars between the Romans and Carthaginians, that the naval tactics of the ancients assumed a regular form; but in judging of them, we must bear in mind two important particulars, in which they differ from those of modern times. First, as the triremes and long vessels were principally impelled by oars, less depended on the wind than in recent sea-fights; and secondly, as the weapons of the combatants were only fit for close action, the vessels soon ran alongside each other without affording any opportunity for complicated manœuvres. But hough the naval tactics of the moderns are more difficult intricate, we must not suppose, that the ancient sea fights were trivial or insignificant. They decided the event of a war frequently by one engagement, and if the loss of life be taken into account, we shall find that in ancient times, a battle by sea was three times more destructive than any that has taken place since the invention of gunpowder. 1. What was the usual composition of a Grecian army? 2. How long did liability to military service continue? 3. Why was the ancient form of armies a hinderance to the improvement of military science? 4. Did the Persian war make any change? 5. Why were no improvements introduced in the two Peloponnesian wars? 6. Did the republic constitution offer any impediment? 7. In what species of force were the Greeks deficient? 8. When is a militia formidable? 9. Where does a militia first disappear? 10. What evil arose in Greece from the use of mercenary troops? 11. Did Epaminondas introduce any improvement in tactics? 12. Where was the efficacy of this change proved? 13. Why did the Greeks make but little improvement in the art of navigation? 14. How was the Grecian navy manned? 15. What description of vessels did the Greeks use? 16. Were any victories won by the superior tactics of the Greeks? 17. How did ancient naval battles differ from those of modern times? Finis and |