good and holy, and so thrust him further and further from salvation? And what is there spontaneous in this case? Here are the commands of the divine law presented to the sinner's mind; and before he is prepared to exercise any act of the will in respect to them, a spontaneous hatred and enmity decide the question what is to be done. He does not continue to be a sinner, merely or principally because he wills or chooses to be so, but he remains such from the spontaneity of his very nature, over which, as Dr. Woods declares, the will has no power. What can preaching the divine law ever do, then, but simply aggravate the awful doom of sinners?

If in asking these questions, I have wandered away from Dr. W.'s meaning, then he can easily recall my wandering steps, by telling us how the divine law, according to his statement of the subject, is adapted to make sinners any better, and how it is, or can be, "a schoolmaster to bring them to Christ." I do not see my way clear, on his ground; and I shall be truly thankful for more light.

(4) On p. 188 Dr. Woods says: "It is a common sentiment, that the sinfulness of men is great, in proportion as their passions and desires are awakened suddenly and uncontrollably in view of forbidden objects."

At first view, one can not, perhaps, see any good reason to controvert this sentiment, provided it be taken with certain limitations, and in some qualified sense. For example, the word uncontrollably here might denote, that the passions awakened are not in reality controlled, but suffered to develope themselves in action. Then, there can be no doubt of the wickedness of them. Nor does there seem to be much reason for doubt of their sinfulness, when a peculiar state of excitability as to bad passions is the result of the previous gratification of them. But these limitations, or any other, are not made by the writer. He goes on immediately to state a case, in which revenge, envy, covetousness, and pride, are awakened by their appropriate exciting causes, and so awakened that the subject of these passions "finds it exceedingly difficult to check them;" and then he asks: "Whether we do not look upon him [the man in whom these passions are] as uncommonly depraved and wicked?" To all this now I could assent, provided he had conjoined

some limitations and modifications. But unlimited as his views now stand, I have some difficulties in my mind respecting them; and he will permit me to state them.

Suppose both the parents of some particular child are, and have long been, habitually intemperate; and that this child has inherited the curse of a rabid appetite for intoxicating drinks-an occurrence not unusual. We will further suppose, what sometimes also happens, that violent, and sudden, and "exceedingly difficult to check," as this appetite has been, the child still has checked it, and has an actual abhorrence of indulging it, because he sees the consequences. Is that child guilty of intemperance? Or rather (to use Dr. W.'s own language), is he "uncommonly depraved and wicked," because he has such an appetite? To say sowhat is it but to contradict the spontaneous moral judgment of the whole world? I should even be inclined to ask another question: Who is most truly worthy of the laurels to be bestowed on account of real temperance, as a practical and active virtue, the man who never had the least appetite for strong drink, nay even had a disgust of it, and therefore has refrained from it, or the man who has refrained although beset and attacked with a rabid appetite to indulge in it?

Take another case of a different tenor. A man has for many years been a debauchee. He repents and becomes a Christian, and abhors his former sins, and breaks off entirely from them. Yet he is often and violently assailed with desires and passions like those of former days. The presence of appropriate objects never fails "spontaneously" to call forth these desires; although, on his part, he never fails to combat and subdue them. Does now the mere rise or existence of these feelings determine, that such a man "is uncommonly depraved and wicked," in his present state? Or are we to regard his triumphs as some of the highest achievements of the principle of virtuous purity?

Have I any ground for asking such questions, or of doubting whether the unlimited statements of Dr. W., now under consideration, are true propositions in casuistry? If so, then Dr, Woods, as a philosopher and casuist, certainly needs more caution in such statements. If not, then it is in his power to show wherein I err.

He appeals to the consciousness of Christians for proof, that "desires burning unawares within them," are evidences

of desperate wickedness. They may, I concede, be evidences of having been very wicked, or of having inherited a constitution greatly vitiated. But how they can be proof of present wickedness, provided they are in all cases immediately resisted and never fostered or indulged, I am not at present aware. I need more light to see this point as he does; perhaps he can impart it. If so, I will cheerfully receive it.

But inasmuch as the whole tenor of what he says in relation to this subject, assumes the ground that all desires and affections which would lead to the doing of things forbidden, are as really sinful as voluntary actions; and assumes that they are so, even when they are spontaneously and uncontrollably excited by the presence of appropriate objects, without any act of the will or choice; I have still further questions to ask, and need still more light.

We read that our blessed Saviour "was tempted IN ALL POINTS as we are." Had he then any susceptibility of being impressed or moved by the presence of exciting objects, e.g. such as were proffered him by Satan, during his temptation? If he had no susceptibility of being impressed-if he had no rising desires or emotions, like our own on such occasions, then how was he tempted in all points as we are? If he had such emotions, and these emotions are, as Dr. Woods says, sins of the deepest dye, then how was he tempted--and yet remained without sin? It would afford serious relief to my mind, in any way to be delivered from this dilemma.

In a word; all our involuntary emotions and impressions appear to be put, by Dr. Woods, into the same scale, and are to be proved by the same weights, as our emotions and impressions that would lead us to sin, but which are excited by our own fault, or our own criminal negligence. How can this be vindicated from the charge of mixing and confounding together things that widely differ? For what the Maker of heaven and earth himself made us to be, we are not accountable; for what we do, in the enlarged sense of that word, we are.

(5) Dr. Woods says (p. 189), that "affections and desires are mental actions of as high an order as volitions." In connection with this he also says, that "free agency makes the mind a producing cause of its own emotions, affections, and desires, equally as it makes it the cause of volition."

What then are we to think of the argument at length, on p. 186 seq., to shew that the mere presence of appropriate objects spontaneously awakens these desires, and that even the power of the will can do nothing to prevent this? Good beings, he says, invariably have right feelings in view of moral objects; and bad men invariably have bad ones. Does it then actually belong to the nature of free agency, in a state of probation, to produce uniformly and invariably one, and only one, set of emotions? Is there any example of such a uniformity, in heaven or on earth?

Besides; what is free agency? THE POWER OF CHOICE IN RESPECT TO MORAL ACTIONS, has been generally supposed to constitute the essence of free agency in a moral being. But what is the power of choice, in respect to desires and impressions spontaneously produced by the presence of appropriate objects, and invariably produced, and produced beyond the power of the will to control them? For all of this he asserts of the passions and desires-and now what has free agency to do with these? It must be that I have formed no idea of what he can mean by free agency. I beg him, therefore, to be more explicit, for the sake of learners, like me.,

Yet more; what is meant when he tells us that " affections and desires are of as high an order as volitions?" High in what respect? In respect to intrinsic value, or accountability, or freedom, or what? The intellect and reason of men are of a pretty high order; but I do not know well how to compare their height with that of volition, or with that of the affections and desires. I want more light, in order to determine what the height in question is.

(6) On p. 190 Dr. Woods labours to shew, that our volitions are as much controlled by God, as our desires and affections.

Now there is a sense, in which all things are controlled by God. He is Lord of all. But how can I accede to the statement, that because motives of some kind are necessary to volition, therefore volition is just as much the subject of active and efficient control, as the emotions and desires are, according to his statement? Dr. Woods himself represents the latter as spontaneously arising from the presence of appropriate objects; as invariably doing so; and as being beyond all control of the will in this respect. In a word, he

makes man a simple passive recipient in all these; while volition is an executive power of the soul, put forth by a free agent. But,' says he, volition depends as much on motives, as the passions and feelings on their appropriate exciting objects.' Still I have to ask: On motives drawn from things ab extra only? He himself concedes that this is not so. Suppose then, that from its own nature, state, or condition, the soul chooses, i. e. wills, this or that; is this a case to be put on a par with the desires necessarily and involuntarily excited in us by objects without the soul?

If it be said: "God has arranged both," will this satisfy an inquiring mind? God made both men and brutes; does it follow that both are alike free and moral agents? If God has made free-agents, has he not given the soul a power of choice, after all the motives are placed before it which the nature of any case admits? But if the case of the passions and of volition are indeed upon a par, can there be any such power? There is no choice at all to the passions, according to Dr. Woods' statement; how then, if this be true, can an ultimate choice, when motive has done its utmost, be in the power of a free agent in his volitions?

Dr. Woods will see, in looking over p. 191, that he has made a singularly incorrect statement of the orthodox doctrine respecting the influence of Adam's sin. As his words now stand, they represent the orthodox doctrine as maintaining, that "native depravity, and all our sinful actions. and volitions, which are the invariable consequence of Adam's sin, are Fatalism, entirely precluding free, accountable agency." I trust he does not mean to make such accusations against the orthodoxy of the Schools. If I have misunderstood his declaration, he will pardon me. I have no design or wish to misconstrue it; and the fact that I can make neither more nor less out of it, than what I have just stated, shews that his words need some correction.

I have done; although at least half as many more questions have started up, in reading the Critique referred to, as I have now stated; questions of about the same difficulty, and for which I should be glad to obtain some satisfactory

answer.

Dr. Woods himself will concede, that I have approached him with the spirit of kindness and respect, although I have freely indulged in asking questions. I will not suppose,

for