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by no means clear to my mind that it does not in different cases denote different acts. And though I do not regard it as an integral part of the argument which I propose to construct, yet for the sake of completeness, I think it best to state what seems to be the truth on this point.
1. I freely admit that in numerous cases it clearly denotes to immerse-in which case an agent submerges partially or totally some person or thing. Indeed, this is so notoriously true, that I need attempt no proof. Innumerable examples are at hand, and enough may be found, in all the most common discussions of the subject.
2. It is also applied to cases where a fluid is poured copiously over any thing so as to flood it, though not completely or permanently to submerge it. Of this usage I shall adduce but one example :-Origen, referring to the copious pouring of water by Elijah on the wood and on the sacrifice, represents him as baptizing them. For the passage, and remarks on it, see Wall's History of Infant Baptism.
3. It is also applied to cases where a fluid without an agent rolls over or floods, and covers any thing—as in the oft quoted passage in Diodorus Siculus, Vol. VII. p. 191, as translated by Prof. Stuart: “ The river, borne along by a' more violent current, overwhelmed many" (épartisa). So, Vol. I. p. 107, he speaks of land animals intercepted by the Nile, as Bartısquéva, overwhelmed, and perishing. The same mode of speaking is also applied to the sea shore, which is spoken of by Aristotle as baptized or overwhelmed by the tide.
4. It is also applied in cases where some person or thing sinks passively into the flood. Thus Josephus, in narrating his shipwreck on the Adriatic, uses this word to describe the sinking of the ship.
I am aware that by some writers rigorous efforts are made to reduce all these senses to the original idea to immerse or dip. But it seems to me that they are rather led by their zeal to support a theory, than by a careful induction from facts; and that they wrest facts to suit their principles, rather than derive their principles from facts.
To me it seems plain that in all these cases there is a material difference, as to the external act, nor am I prepared to admit that either, in preference to the other, is the original and primitive meaning of the word. If it were an object of much importance to decide what this is, inasmuch as they
all agree in one common idea of a state or condition, though variously caused, I should incline to give to the word the meaning to cause to come into that state, and this idea is favored by the termination, ifw. The state is, a state of being enveloped or surrounded by a fluid, or any thing else adapted to produce such a result. And a general meaning of Bantisw would thus be to cause to come into this state—whether it be done by pouring the fluid copiously over an object, or by the flowing of a fluid over an object, without the intervention of any agent, or by the passive sinking of an object into it. In all these cases the state of the object becomes the same, but the external act, by which it comes into this state, is not the same in either case.
To all this, however, I attach no great importance in the discussion of the present question ; unless it be of use in exposing the fallacy of all efforts to reduce this word to such a perfect simplicity of meaning, even as it regards an external act, as is claimed for it by some.
On the other hand, even if I were to admit that its original and primitive idea was to immerse, and that when it denotes an external act, it never departs from this sense; still the question would arise, is there not another meaning derived from the effects of this act, and in which the mind contemplates the effect alone, entirely irrespective of the mode in which it is produced.
I contend that there is and that as thorough purification or cleansing is often the result of submersion in water, so the word Batti&w has come to signify to purify or cleanse thoroughly, without any reference to the mode in which it is done.
$ 4. There is not a priori the least improbability of such a change of meaning, from the laws of the mind, or of language.
It may at first sight seem an improbable position to some, that if a word originally signifies “to immerse," it can assume a meaning so remote from its primitive sense as " to purify," and entirely drop all reference to the mode.
Yet the slightest attention to the laws of the mind, and to well-known facts, will show that not the least improbability of such a result exists.
No principle is more universally admitted by all sound
philologists, than that to establish the original and primitive meaning of a word, is not at all decisive as it regards its subsequent usages. It often aids only as giving a clue by which we can trace the progress of the imagination, or the association of ideas in leading the mind from meaning to meaning, on some ground of relative similitude, or connexion of cause and effect.
So the verb to spring, denotes an act, and gives rise to a noun denoting an act. A perception of similitude transfers the word to the issuing of water from a fountain - to the motion of a watch-spring-and to the springing of plants in the spring of the year. Yet who does not feel that to be able to trace such a process of thought, is far from proving that, when a man in one case says, I made a spring over the ditch, in another, I broke the spring of my watch, in another, I drank from the spring, in another, I prefer spring to win. ter, he means in each case the same thing by the word spring? And who in using these words, always resorts to the original idea of the verb? Indeed, so far is it from being true that this is commonly done, that most persons are pleased when the track of the mind is uncovered, and the path is pointed out by which it passed from meaning to meaning, as if a new idea had been acquired-s0 conversa. tion, prevent, charity, as now used, have obviously departed widely from the sense in which they were used in the days of the translators of the Bible.
But to multiply words on a point so plain, would be need, less, had not so much stress been laid on the supposed ori. ginal meaning of this word. It is therefore too plain to be denied, that words do often so far depart from their primi. tive meaning, as entirely to leave out the original idea —and that the secondary senses of a word are often by far the most numerous and important.
Moreover, to establish such secondary meanings, it is not necessary that we should be able to trace the course of the mind, though it is pleasant to be able to do it. A secondary meaning, however unlike it may seem to the primitive, may yet be established like any other fact in the usage of language, that is by appropriate testimony.
But whilst such transitions are common in all words, they are particularly common in words of the class of Barriţw denoting action by, or with reference to, a fluid. This is owing
SECOND SERIES, VOL. III. NO. I.
to the fact that the effects produced by the action, depend not on the action alone, but on the action and the fluid combined-and of course may be varied as the fluid or its application varies.
Let us now take the general idea of enveloping or immersing in a fluid, and see how unlike the effects to which it may give rise.
If the envelopment is produced by a flood, a torrent or waves, the effect may be to overwhelm, to oppress, to destroy.
If, by taking up the object and immersing it into a coloring fluid, it is to impart a new color, or to dye. · If by taking up an object and immersing it into a cleansing fluid-or by going into a fluid-or by pouring the fluid copiously over the object, the effect is to purify or cleanse.
And on these natural or material senses, may be founded the same number of spiritual or moral senses, by transferring the ideas to the mind.
Now as a matter of fact such transfers have taken place in cognate and similar words.
I shall out of many select a few cases from Greek, Latin, English, and Hebrew words, fully to illustrate, and clearly to confirm these principles, and to show that they are peculiar to no language, but rest on universal laws of the mind.
In Greek all admit that the most common sense of Bártw is to dip, to immerse. I am willing to admit that it is the primitive sense.
But it is beyond all dispute that the same word has passed to the meaning to dye, without any reference to mode. Great efforts were once made to deny this. But the most intelligent Baptists now entirely abandon this ground, and that with the best reason. And indeed, so far has the word passed from its original sense that it is applied to coloring the surface of an object by gold, i. e. to gilding. A few examples out of many in so plain a case must suffice. In the battle of the frogs and mice, a mouse is represented as dying or coloring the lake with his blood-βάπτετο αιμασι λιμνή. On this there was once a battle royal to prove that it could be proper to speak of dipping a lake into the blood of a mouse ; and all the powers of rhetoric were put in requisition to justify the usage. Hear now Mr. Carson, inferior in learning and research to none of the Baptists: “To suppose that there is here any extravagant allusion to the literal immersion or dipping of a lake, is a monstrous perversion of taste. The lake is said to be dyed, not to be dipped, or poured, or sprinkled. There is in the word no reference to mode. Had Baptists entrenched themselves here, they would have saved themselves much useless toil, and much false criticism, without straining to the impeachment of their candor or their taste. What a monstrous paradox in rhetoric is the figuring of the dipping of a lake in the blood of a mouse! Yet Dr. Gale supposes that the lake was dipped by hyperbole. The literal sense he says is, the lake was dipped in blood. Never was there such a figure. The lake is not said to be dipped in blood, but to be dyed with blood.” P. 67, Am. edition, N. York, 1832. This is well said, and is the more to our purpose on account of its author. Indeed his whole discussion of this point is able, lucid, and decisive. Of the examples adduced by him I shall quote one or two more.
“ Hippocrates employs it to denote dying, by dropping the dying liquid on the thing dyed: επειδαν επισταξη επι τα irária Bártetat : When it drops upon the garments they are dyed. This surely is not dying by dipping." Carson, p. 60.
“ Again. In Arrian-Expedition of Alexander : Tous dè wywvas Néya. Neapxos oro BATTÁVTO Ivdos: Nearchus relates that the Indians dye their beards. It will not be contended that they dyed their beards by immersion.” P. 61.
He quotes cases in which it is used to describe the coloring of the hair ; the staining of a garment by blood; the staining of the hand by crushing a coloring substance in it; for which, and others of a like kind, I refer to him, and to Prof. Stuart.
In the compounds and derivations of this word the sense to dye is very extensive ; to be fully satisfied of which, let any one examine the Thesaurus of H. Stephens, or the ab. breviation of it by Scapula on this word.
It is compounded with colors of all kinds, as Toppupeo ßaons úax.vdvoßapnis, of a purple, or hyacinthine dye. It denotes a dyer, a dying vat, a dye-house, etc., Bapsus Bapsīov, etc., and it even passes, as before stated, to cases in which a new color is produced by the external application of a solid, as xpuoo. buons, colored with gold, or gilded.
But it is needless to quote at large all the examples which