personal civilities, which will not become me to repeat. He added, "That this province was in the hands of several persons, among whom some were too busy, and others too idle, to pursue it ;" and concluded, "That it should be his particular care to establish me here in England, and represent me to the queen as a person they could not be without." I promised to do my endeavours in that way for some few months. To which he replied, "He expected no more. and that he had other and greater occasions for me." Upon the rise of this ministry, the principal persons in power thought it necessary that some weekly paper should be published, with just reflections upon former proceedings, and defending the present measures of her majesty. This was begun about the time of the lord Godolphin's removal, under the name of The Examiner. About a dozen of these papers, written with much spirit and sharpness, some by Mr. secretary St. John, since lord Bolingbroke; others by Dr. Atterbury, since bishop of Rochester; and others again by Mr. Prior, Dr. Freind, &c., were published with great applause. But these gentlemen being grown weary of the work, or otherwise employed, the determination was that I should continue it, which I did accordingly about eight months. But my style being soon discovered, and having contracted a great number of enemies, I let it fall into other hands, who held it up in some manner until her majesty's death. It was Mr. Harley's custom every Saturday that four or five of his most intimate friends among those he had taken in upon the great change made at court should dine at his house, and after about two months' acquaintance I had the honour always to be one of the number. This company, at first, consisted only of the lord-keeper Harcourt, the earl Rivers, the earl of Peterborough, Mr. secretary St. John, and myself; and here, after dinner, they used to discourse and settle matters of great importance. Several other lords were afterward, by degrees, admitted; as the dukes of Ormond, Shrewsbury, and Argyle; the earls of Anglesey, Dartmouth, and Poulett; the lord Berkeley, &c. These meetings were always continued, except when the queen was at Windsor; but, as they grew more numerous, became of less consequence, and ended only in drinking and general conversation, of which I may perhaps have occasion to speak hereafter. My early appearance at these meetings, which many thought to be of greater consequence than really they were, could not be concealed, although I used all my endeavours to that purpose. This gave the occasion to some great men, who thought me already in the secret, to complain to me of the suspicions entertained by many of our friends in relation to Mr. Harley, even before he was lord-treasurer; so early were sown those seeds of discontent which afterwards grew up so high! The cause of complaint was, that so great a number of the adverse party continued in employment, and some, particularly the duke of Somerset and earl Cholmondeley, in great stations at court.-They could not believe Mr. Harley was in earnest; but that he designed to constitute a motley comprehensive administration, which, they said, the kingdom would never endure. I was once invited to a meeting of some lords and gentlemen, where these grievances were at large related to me, with an earnest desire that I would represent them in the most respectful manner to Mr. Harley, upon a supposition that I was in high credit with him. I excused myself from such an office, upon the newness of my acquaintance with Mr. Harley. However, I represented the matter fairly to him, against which he argued a good deal from the general reasons of politicians, the necessity of keeping men in hopes, the danger of disobliging those who must remain unprovided for, and the like usual topics among statesmen. But there was a secret in this matter which neither I, nor indeed any of his most intimate friends, were then apprised of; neither did he, at that time, enter with me further than to assure me very solemnly "that no person should have the smallest employment, either civil or military, whose principles were not firm for the church and monarchy." However, these over-moderate proceedings in the court gave rise to a party in the house of commons, which appeared under the name of the October Club; a fantastic appellation, found out to distinguish a number of country gentlemen and their adherents, who professed, in the greatest degree, what was called the high church principle. They grew in number to almost a third part of the house, held their meetings at certain times and places, and there concerted what measures they were to take in parliament. They professed their jealousy of the court and ministry; declared, upon all occasions, their desire of a more general change, as well as of a strict inquiry into former mismanagement, and seemed to expect that those in power should openly avow the old principles in church and state. I was then of opinion, and still continue so, that if this body of men could have remained some time united, they would have put the crown under a necessity of acting in a more steady and strenuous manner. Mr. Harley, who best knew the disposition of the queen, was forced to break their measures, which he did by that very obvious contrivance of dividing them among themselves and rendering them jealous of each other. The ministers gave everywhere out that the October Club were their friends, and acted by their directions; to confirm which, Mr. secretary St. John, and Mr. Bromley, afterwards chancellor of the exchequer, publicly dined with them at one of their meetings. Thus were eluded all the consequences of that assembly, although a remnant of them, who conceived themselves betrayed by the rest, did afterward meet under the denomination of the March Club, but without any effect. But The parliament which then rose had been chosen without any endeavours from the court to secure elections; neither, as I remember, were any of the lieutenancies changed throughout the kingdom, for the trial of Dr. Sacheverel had raised or discovered such a spirit in all parts, that the ministers could very safely leave the electors to themselves, and thereby gain a reputation of acting by a free parliament. Yet this proceeding was, by some refiners of both parties, numbered among the strains of Mr. Harley's politics, who was said to avoid an over-great majority, which is apt to be unruly, and not enough under the management of a ministry. But, from the small experience I have of courts, I have ever found refinements to be the worst sort of all conjectures; and, from this one occasion, I take leave to observe, that of some hundreds of facts, for the real truth of which I can account, I never yet knew any refiner to be once in the right. I have already told that the true reason why the court did not interpose in the matter of election was, because they thought themselves sure of a majority, and therefore could acquire reputation at a cheap rate. Besides, it afterwards appeared, upon some exigencies which the court had much at heart, that they were more than once likely to fail for want of numbers. Mr. Harley, in order to give credit to his administration, resolved upon two very important points: first, to secure the unprovided debts of the nation; and secondly, to put an end to the war. Of the methods he took to compass both those ends I have treated at large in another work. I shall only observe that, while he was preparing to open to the house of commons his scheme for securing the public debts, he was stabbed by the marquis de Guiscard, while he was sitting in the council-chamber at the Cockpit, with a committee of nine or ten lords of the cabinet, met on purpose to examine the marquis, upon a discovery of a treasonable correspondence he held with France. This fact was so uncommon in the manner and circumstances of it, that, although it be pretty well known at the time I am now writing, by a printed account, toward which I furnished the author with some materials, yet I thought it would not be proper wholly to omit it here. The assassin was seized, by Mr. Harley's order, upon the 8th of March, 1710-11; and, brought before the committee of lords, was examined about his corresponding with France. Upon his denial, Mr. Harley produced a letter, which he could not deny to be his own hand. The marquis, prepared for mischief, had conveyed a penknife into his pocket while the messenger kept him attending in one of the offices below. Upon the surprise of his letter appearing against him, he came suddenly behind Mr. Harley, and, reaching his arm round, stabbed that minister into the middle of the breast, about a quarter of an inch above the cartilago ensiformis; the penknife, striking upon the bone, and otherwise obstructed by a thick embroidered waistcoat, broke short at the handle, which Guiscard still grasped, and redoubled his blow. The confusion upon this accident is easier conceived than described. The result was, that the marquis, whether by the wounds given him by some of the lords, or the bruises he received from the messengers while they were seizing him, or the neglect of his surgeon, or that, being unwilling to live, he industriously concealed one of his wounds, died in a few days after. But Mr. Harley, after a long illness and frequent ill symptoms, had the good fortune to recover. Guiscard was the younger brother of the count of that name, a very honourable and worthy person, formerly governor of Namur. But this marquis was a reproach to his family, prostitute in his morals, a History of the Four Last Years, &c. impious in religion, and a traitor to his prince; as to the rest, of a very poor understanding, and the most tedious trifling talker I ever conversed with. He was grown needy by squandering upon his vices, was become contemptible both here and in Holland, his regiment taken from him, and his pension retrenched; the despair of which first put him upon his French correspondence; and the discovery of that drove him into madness. I had known him some years; and, meeting him upon the Mall a few hours before his examination, I observed to a friend then with me, "That I wondered to see Guiscard pass so often by without taking notice of me." But although, in the latter part of his life, his countenance grew cloudy enough, yet I confess I never suspected him to be a man of resolution or courage sufficient to bear him out in so desperate an attempt. I have some very good reasons to know that the first misunderstanding between Mr. Harley and Mr St. John, which afterward had such unhappy consequences upon the public affairs, took its rise during the time that the former lay ill of his wounds, and his recovery doubtful. Mr. St. John affected to say in several companies, "That Guiscard intended th blow against him;" which, if it were true, the con sequence must be, that Mr. St. John had all the merit, while Mr. Harley remained with nothing but the danger and the pain. But I am apt to think Mr. St. John was either mistaken or misinformed. However, the matter was thus represented in the weekly paper called The Examiner; which Mr. St. John perused before it was printed, but made no alteration in that passage. This management was looked upon, at least, as a piece of youthful indiscretion in Mr. St. John; and, perhaps, was represented in a worse view to Mr. Harley. Neither am I altogether sure that Mr. St. John did not entertain some prospect of succeeding as first minister, in case of Mr. Harley's death; which, during his illness, was frequently apprehended. And I remember very well, that, upon visiting Mr. Harley as soon as he was in a condition to be seen, I found several of his nearest relations talk very freely of some proceedings of Mr. St. John; enough to make me apprehend that their friendship would not be of any long continuance. Mr. Harley, soon after his recovery, was made an earl, and lord-treasurer; and the lord-keeper a baron. A DISCOURSE OF THE CONTESTS AND DISSENSIONS BETWEEN THE NOBLES AND THE COMMONS IN ATHENS AND ROME. WITH THE CONSEQUENCES THEY HAD UPON BOTH THOSE STATES. THIS whole treatise is full of historical knowledge and excellent reflections. It is not mixed with any improper sallies of wit, or any light aim at humour; and in point of style and learning is equal, if not superior, to any of Swift's political works.-ORRERY. The following discourse is a kind of remonstrance in behalf of king William and his friends, against the proceedings of the house of commons; and was published during the recess of parliament in the summer of 1701, with a view to engage them in milder measures, when they should meet again. At this time Lewis XIV. was making large strides toward universal monarchy; plots were carrying on at St. Germains; the Dutch had acknowledged the duke of Anjou as king of Spain; and king William was made extremely uneasy by the violence with which many of his ministers and chief favourites were pursued by the commons. The king, to appease their resent ment, had made several changes in his ministry, and removeð some of his most faithful servants from places of the highest trust and dignity; this expedient, however, had proved inef fectual, and the commons persisted in their opposition. They began by impeaching William Bentinck, earl of Portland, groom of the stole; and proceeded to the impeachment of John Somers, baron Somers of Evesham, first lord-keeper, afterwards lordchancellor Edward Russell, earl of Orford, lord-treasurer of the navy, and one of the lords commissioners of the Admiralty; and Charles Montague, earl of Halifax, one of the commissioners of the treasury and afterward chancellor of the exchequer. Its general purport is to damp the warmth of the commons, by showing that the measures they pursued had a direct tendency to bring on the tyranny which they professed to oppose; and the particular cases of the impeached lords are paralleled in Athenian characters. CHAPTER I. IT is agreed that in all government there is an absolute unlimited power which naturally and originally seems to be placed in the whole body, wherever the executive part of it lies. This holds in the body natural; for wherever we place the beginning of motion, whether from the head, or the heart, or the animal spirits in general, the body moves and acts by a consent of all its parts. This unlimited power, placed fundamentally in the body of a people, is what the best legislators of all ages have endeavoured, in their several schemes or institutions of government, to deposit in such hands as would preserve the people from rapine and oppression within, as well as violence from without. Most of them seem to agree in this, that it was a trust too great to be committed to any one man or assembly, and, therefore, they left the right still in the whole body; but the administration or executive part, in the hands of the one, the few, or the many; into which three powers all independent bodies of men seem naturally to divide; for, by all I have read of those innumerable and petty commonwealths in Italy, Greece, and Sicily, as well as the great ones of Carthage and Rome, it seems to me that a free people met together, whether by compact or family government, as soon as they fall into any acts of civil society, do of themselves divide into three powers. The first is that of some one eminent spirit, who, having signalised his valour and fortune in defence of his country, or by the practice of popular arts at home, comes to have great influence on the people, to grow their leader in warlike expeditions, and to preside, after a sort, in their civil assemblies; and this is grounded upon the principles of nature and common reason, which, in all difficulties or dangers, where prudence or courage is required, rather incite us to fly for counsel or assistance to a single person than a multitude. The second natural division of power is, of such men who have acquired large possessions, and consequently dependencies, or descend from ancestors who have left them great inheritances, together with an hereditary authority. These, easily uniting in thoughts and opinions, and acting in concert, begin to enter upon measures for securing their properties, which are best upheld by preparing against invasions from abroad, and maintaining peace at home; this commences a great council, or senate of nobles, for the weighty affairs of the nation. The last division is, of the mass or body of the people, whose part of power is great and indisputable, whenever they can unite, either collectively or by deputation, to exert it. Now the three forms of government, so generally known in the schools, differ only by the civil administration being placed in the hands of one, or sometimes two (as in Sparta), who were called kings; or in a senate, who were called the nobles; or in the people collective or representative, who may be called the commons. Each of these had frequently the executive power in Greece, and sometimes in Rome; but the power in the last resort was always meant by legislators to be held in balance among all three. And it will be an eternal rule in politics among every free people, that there is a balance of power to be carefully held by every state within itself, as well as among several states with each other. The true meaning of a balance of power, either without or within a state, is best conceived by considering what the nature of a balance is. It supposes three things: first, the part which is held, together with the hand that holds it; and then the two scales with whatever is weighed therein. Now, consider several states in a neighbourhood; in order to preserve peace between these states, it is necessary they should be formed into a balance, whereof one or more are to be directors, who are to divide the rest into equal scales, and, upon occasion, remove | from one into the other, or else fall with their own weight into the lightest; so in a state within itself, the balance must be held by a third hand, who is to deal the remaining power with the utmost exactness into the several scales. Now, it is not necessary that the power should be equally divided between these three; for the balance may be held by the weakest, who, by his address and conduct, removing from either scale, and adding of his own, may keep the scales duly poised. Such was that of the two kings of Sparta, the consular power in Rome, that of the kings of Media before the reign of Cyrus, as represented by Xenophon; and that of the several limited states in the Gothic institution. When the balance is broken, whether by the negligence, folly, or weakness of the hand that held it, or by mighty weights fallen into either scale, the power will never continue long in equal division between the two remaining parties, but, till the balance is fixed anew, will run entirely into one. This gives the truest account of what is understood in the most ancient and approved Greek authors by the word Tyranny; which is not meant for the seizing of the uncontrolled or absolute power into the hands of a single person (as many superficial men have grossly mistaken), but for the breaking of the balance by whatever hand, and leaving the power wholly in one scale: for, tyranny and usurpation in a state are by no means confined to any number, as might easily appear from examples enough; and, because the point is material, I shall cite a few to prove it. The Romans [Dionys. Hal. lib. 10], having sent to Athens and the Greek cities of Italy for the copies of the best laws, chose ten legislators to put them into form, and during the exercise of their office suspended the consular power, leaving the administration of affairs in their hands. These very men, though chosen for such a work as the digesting a body of laws for the government of a free state, did immediately usurp arbitrary power, ran into all the forms of it, had their guards and spies after the practice of the tyrants of those ages, affected kingly state, destroyed the nobles, and oppressed the people; one of them proceeding so far as to endeavour to force a lady of great virtue: the very crime which gave occasion to the expulsion of the regal power but sixty years before, as this attempt did to that of the Decemviri. The Ephori in Sparta were at first only certain persons deputed by the kings to judge in civil matters, while they were employed in the wars. These men, at several times, usurped the absolute authority, and were as cruel tyrants as any in their age. Soon after the unfortunate expedition into Sicily [Thucyd. lib. 8] the Athenians chose four hundred men for administration of affairs, who became a body of tyrants, and were called, in the language of those ages, an oligarchy, or tyranny of the few; under which hateful denomination they were soon after deposed in great rage by the people When Athens was subdued by Lysander [Xenoph. de Rebus Græc. 1. 2] he appointed thirty men for the administration of that city, who immediately fell into the rankest tyranny; but this was not all; for, conceiving their power not founded on a basis large enough, they admitted three thousand into a share of the government; and, thus fortified, became the cruellest tyranny upon record. They mur dered in cold blood great numbers of the best men, without any provocation, from the mere lust of cruelty, like Nero or Caligula. This was such a number of tyrants together as amounted to near a third part of the whole city; for Xenophon tells us [Memorab. lib. 3] that the city contained about ten thousand houses; and allowing one man to every house who could have any share in the government (the rest consisting of women, children, and servants), and making other obvious abatements, these tyrants, if they had been careful to adhere together, might have been a majority even of the people collective. In the time of the second Punic war [Polyb. Frag. lib. 6] the balance of power in Carthage was got on the side of the people; and this to a degree, that some authors reckon the government to have been then among them a dominatio plebis, or tyranny of the commons; which it seems they were at all times apt to fall into, and was at last among the causes that ruined their state: and the frequent murders of their generals, which Diodorus [lib. 20] tells us was grown to an established custom among them, may be another instance that tyranny is not confined to numbers. I shall mention but one example more among a great number that might be produced; it is related by the author last cited [Polyb. Frag. lib. 15]. The orators of the people at Argos (whether you will style them, in modern phrase, great speakers of the house, or only, in general, representatives of the people collective) stirred up the commons against the nobles, of whom 1600 were murdered at once; and at last, the orators themselves, because they left off their accusations, or, to speak intelligibly, because they withdrew their impeachments, having, it seems, raised a spirit they were not able to lay. And this last circumstance, as cases have lately stood, may perhaps be worth nothing. From what has been already advanced several conclusions may be drawn : First, that a mixed government, partaking of the known forms received in the schools, is by no means of Gothic invention, but has place in nature and reason, seems very well to agree with the sentiments of most legislators, and to have been followed in most states, whether they have appeared under the name of monarchies, aristocracies, or democracies; for, not to mention the several republics of this composition in Gaul and Germany, described by Cæsar and Tacitus, Polybius tells us the best government is that which consists of three forms, regis, optimatium, et populi imperio [Frag. lib. 6], which may be fairly translated, the king, lords, and commons. Such was that of Sparta, in its primitive institution by Lycurgus, who, observing the corruptions and depravations to which every of these was subject, compounded his scheme out of all, so that it was made up of reges, seniores, et populus. Such also was the state of Rome under its consuls; and the author tells us that the Romans fell upon this model purely by chance (which I take to have been nature and common reason), but the Spartans by thought and design. And such at Carthage was the summa reipublicæ [ibid.], or power in the last resort; for they had their kings, called suffetes, and a senate, which had the power of nobles, and the people had a share established too. Secondly, it will follow that those reasoners who employ so much of their zeal, their wit, and their leisure, for the upholding the balance of power in Christendom, at the same time that by their practices they are endeavouring to destroy it at home, are not such mighty patriots, or so much in the true interest of their country, as they would affect to be thought; but seem to be employed like a man who pulls down with his right hand what he has been building with his left. Thirdly, this makes appear the error of those who think it an uncontrollable maxim that power is always safer lodged in many hands than in one : for, if these many hands be made up only from one of the three divisions before mentioned, it is plain from those examples already produced, and easy to be paralleled in other ages and countries, that they are capable of enslaving the nation, and of acting all manner of tyranny and oppression, as it is possible for a single person to be, though we should suppose their number not only to be of four or five hundred, but above three thousand. Again, it is manifest, from what has been said, that, in order to preserve the balance in a mixed state, the limits of power deposited with each party ought to be ascertained and generally known. The defect of this is the cause that introduces those strugglings in a state about prerogative and liberty; about encroachments of the few upon the rights of the many, and of the many upon the privileges of the few, which ever did, and ever will, conclude in a tyranny; first, either of the few or the many; but at last, infallibly of a single person: for, whichever of the three divisions in a state is upon the scramble for more power than its own (as one or other of them generally is), unless due care be taken by the other two, upon every new question that arises, they will be sure to decide in favour of themselves, talk much of inherent right; they will nourish up a dormant power, and reserve privileges in petto, to exert upon occasions, to serve expedients, and to urge upon necessities; they will make large demands and scanty concessions, ever coming off considerable gainers: thus at length the balance is broke and tyranny let in; from which door of the three it matters not. To pretend to a declarative right, upon any occasion whatsoever, is little less than to make use of the whole power: that is, to declare an opinion to be law which has always been contested, or perhaps never started at all before such an incident brought it on the stage. Not to consent to the enacting of such a law, which has no view beside the general good, unless another law shall at the same time pass with no other view but that of advancing the power of one party alone; what is this but to claim a positive voice as well as a negative? To pretend that great changes and alienations of property have created new and great dependencies, and, consequently, new additions of power, as some reasoners have done, is a most dangerous tenet. If dominion must follow property, let it follow in the same pace; for change in property through the bulk of a nation makes slow marches, and its due power always attends it. To conclude that whatever attempt is begun by an assembly ought to be pursued to the end, without regard to the greatest incidents that may happen to alter the case; to count it mean and below the dignity of a house to quit a prosecution; to resolve upon a conclusion before it is possible to be apprised of the premises; to act thus, I say, is to affect not only absolute power, but infallibility too. Yet such unaccountable proceedings as these have popular assemblies engaged in, for want of fixing the due limits of power and privilege. Great changes may indeed be made in a government, yet the form continue and the balance be held : but large intervals of time must pass between every such innovation, enough to melt down and make it of a piece with the constitution. Such, we are told, were the proceedings of Solon, when he modelled anew the Athenian commonwealth; and what convulsions in our own, as well as other states, have been bred by a neglect of this rule, is fresh and notorious enough: it is too soon, in all conscience, to repeat this error again. Having shown that there is a natural balance of power in all free states, and how it has been divided, sometimes by the people themselves, as in Rome; at others by the institutions of the legislators, as in the several states of Greece and Sicily; the next thing is, to examine what methods have been taken to break or overthrow this balance, which every one of the three parties has continually endeavoured, as opportunities have served; as might appear from the stories of most ages and countries: for absolute power in a particular state is of the same nature with universal monarchy in several states adjoining to each other. So endless and exorbitant are the desires of men, whether considered in their persons or their states, that they will grasp at all, and can form no scheme of perfect happiness with less. Even since men have been united into governments, the hopes and endeavours after universal monarchy have been bandied among them, from the reign of Ninus to this of the Most Christian King; in which pursuits, commonwealths have had their share as well as monarchs: so the Athenians, the Spartans, the Thebans, and the Achaians, did several times aim at the universal monarchy of Greece; so the commonwealths of Carthage and Rome affected the universal monarchy of the then known world. In like manner has absolute power been pursued by the several parties of each particular state; wherein single persons have met with most success, though the endeavours of the few and the many have been frequent enough: yet, being neither so uniform in their designs nor so direct in their views, they neither could manage nor maintain the power they had got, but were ever deceived by the popularity and ambition of some single person. So that it will be always a wrong step in policy for the nobles and commons to carry their endeavours after power so far as to overthrow the balance and it would be enough to damp their warmth in such pursuits, if they could once reflect that in such a course they will be sure to run upon the very rock that they meant to avoid; which, I suppose, they would have us think is the tyranny of a single person. Many examples might be produced of the endeavours of each of these three rivals after absolute power; but I shall suit my discourse to the time I am writing in, and relate only such dissensions in Greece and Rome, between the nobles and commons, with the consequences of them, wherein the latter were the aggressors. I shall begin with Greece, where my observation shall be confined to Athens, though several instances might be brought from other states thereof. CHAPTER II. Of the dissensions in Athens between the few and the many. THESEUS is the first who is recorded, with any appearance of truth, to have brought the Grecians from a barbarous manner of life, among scattered villages, into cities; and to have established the popular state in Athens, assigning to himself the guardianship of the laws and chief command in war. He was forced, after some time, to leave the Athenians to their own measures, upon account of their seditious temper, which ever continued with them till the final dissolution of their government by the Romans. It seems the country about Attica was the most barren of any in Greece, through which means it happened that the natives were never expelled by the fury of invaders (who thought it not worth a conquest), but continued always aborigines; and therefore retained, through all revolutions, a tincture of that turbulent spirit wherewith their government began. This institution of Theseus appears to have been rather a sort of mixed monarchy than a popular state; and, for aught we know, might continue so during the series of kings till the death of Codrus. From this last prince Solon was said to be descended; who, finding the people engaged in two violent factions of the poor and the rich, and in great confusion thereupon, refusing the monarchy which was offered him, chose rather to cast the government after another model, wherein he made provisions for settling the balance of power, choosing a senate of four hundred, and disposing the magistracies and offices according to men's estates; leaving to the multitude their votes in electing, and the power of judging certain processes by appeal. This council of four hundred was chosen, one hundred out of each tribe, and seems to have been a body representative of the people; though the people collective reserved a share of power to themselves. It is a point of history perplexed enough but this much is certain, that the balance of power was provided for; else Pisistratus, called by authors the tyrant of Athens, could never have governed so peaceably as he did without changing any of Solon's laws [Herodot. lib. i.]. These several powers, together with that of the archon or chief magistrate, made up the form of government in Athens, at what time it began to appear upon the scene of action and story. The first great man bred up under this institution was Miltiades, who lived about ninety years after Solon, and is reckoned to have been the first great captain, not only of Athens, but of all Greece. From the time of Miltiades to that of Phocion, who is looked upon as the last famous general of Athens, are about 130 years: after which, they were subdued and insulted by Alexander's captains, and continued under several revolutions a small truckling state, of no name or reputation, till they fell with the rest of Greece under the power of the Romans. During this period from Miltiades to Phocion, I shall trace the conduct of the Athenians with relation to their dissensions between the people and some of their generals; who, at that time, by their power and credit in the army, in a warlike commonwealth, and often supported by each other, were, with the magistrates and other civil officers, a sort of counterpoise to the power of the people; who, since the death of Solon, had already made great encroachments. What these dissensions were, how founded, and what the consequences of them, I shall briefly and impartially relate. Whereas I must here premise that the nobles in Athens were not at this time a corporate assembly, that I can gather; therefore the resentments of the commons were usually turned against particular persons, and by way of articles of impeachment. the commons in Rome and some other states, as will appear in a proper place, though they followed this method upon occasion, yet generally pursued the enlargement of their power by more set quarrels of one entire assembly against another. However, the custom of particular impeachments being not limited to former ages, any more than that of general strug gles and dissensions between fixed assemblies of nobles and commons, and the ruin of Greece having |