If ever there was a just cause of war, England had it in 1755. By the treaty of October, 1748, (Art. III.,) that of Utrecht (1713), and numerous others, were recognised and confirmed in all their parts; save, of course, such as might be modified by the pact in question — and were formally constituted its basis. By the treaty of Utrecht (Art. XII.,) "all Nova Scotia or Acadia, with its ancient limits, and all its dependencies, was ceded to the crown of Great Britain;" and, furthermore, it was provided (Art. XV.,) that "the subjects of France, inhabitants of Canada. and elsewhere, should not disturb or molest in any manner whatever the five Indian nations which are subject to Great Britain, nor its other American allies." These articles were certainly incorporated into the treaty of Aixla-Chapelle; but with neither stipulation were the French willing to comply. The last clause would evidently always

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"Dominus Rex Christianissimus eodum quæ pacis præsentis Ratihabitationes commutabuntur die, Dominæ Reginæ Magnæ Brittaniæ literas, tabulasve solenne et authenticas tradendas curabit, quarum vigore, insulam Sancti Christophori, per subditos Britannicos sigillatim dehine possidendam; Novam Scotiam quoque, sive Acadiam totam, limitibus suis antiquis comprehensam, ut et portus Portus Regii urbem, nunc Annapolin regiam dictam, cæteraque omnia in istis regionibus quæ ab iisdem terris et insulis pendent, unacum earundarum insularum, terrarum et locorum dominio, proprietate, possessione, et quocunque jure sive per pacta, sive alio modo quæsito, quod Rex Christianissimus, corona Galliæ, aut ejusdem subditi quicunque ad dictas insulas, terras et loca, eorumque incolas, hactenus habuerunt, Reginæ Magna Britannia, ejusdemque coronæ in perpetuum cedi constabit et transferri, prout eadem omnia nunc cedit ac transfert Rex Christianissimus; idque tam amplis modo et formâ ut Regis Christianissimi subditis in dictis maribus, sinubus, aliisque locis ad littora Nova Scotia, ca nempe quæ Eurum respiciunt, intra triginta leucas, incipiendo ab insula, vulgo Sablé dicta, eaque inclusa et Africum versus pergendo omni picatura in posterium interdicatur." Vide also Mem. des Comm. de S. M. T. C., &c.

open to Great Britain a casus belli; for it was impossible for a year at a time to pass by without some troubles between the Iroquois and their Canadian neighbors; and in such cases each party, on the showing of the other, is inevitably the aggressor. But the provision respecting Nova Scotia was widely different. The restoration of Louisbourg, as matters then stood, was a point of equal importance to the settlers in Canada and the colonists of New England. Under its ancient lords, this nursing-mother of privateers would be powerful alike to preserve the French, and to destroy the English trade and fisheries in that part of the world. The annoyance, therefore, of the New England people was extreme and well founded; and at their earnest representations, the Home Government was finally instigated to adopt the only practical method left of peaceably dissipating the dangers with which they were threatened by the constantly increasing power and malignity of the French. The armed occupation and settlement of the province of Nova Scotia, till then unnoticed or disregarded by the Ministry, became now a subject of consideration. In the spring of 1748, and during that and the ensuing year, several thousand colonists were sent thither by the government, at an expense of £70,000, and the town of Halifax was founded. But the French, who had hitherto evaded or disingenuously dallied with their obligations to yield up the peninsula suppressing, wherever they could, the settlements of the English there, and constantly increasing their own strength by reinforcements - now openly resisted, under M. de la Corne, the progress of their rivals. Thus commenced that

scene of constant dissension and strife which ensued between the original settlers, scattered over the land, and the subjects of the crown to which it lawfully pertained; whose melancholy termination was that enforced expatriation which posterity has consecrated to sorrow in the pages of Evangeline. That the Court of Versailles, through its subordinate officers, promoted and encouraged the sturdy denial of British sovereignty by these loyal-hearted Acadians, cannot at this day be doubted or denied; but the result of such a course was as fatal to the fair fame of the conquerors, as to the happiness of the conquered.

Nor did the French government confine itself to an unavowed but well-supported resistance to the progress of Anglo-American power in the north only. Thirty years before, its grand scheme for uniting its colonies, from the Gulf of Mexico to the Bay of Fundy, by a chain of posts along the Mississippi, the Ohio, and the Lakes, had begun to be tangibly developed: ever bent upon the fulfilment of these cherished ideas, already its encroaching grasp was extended, with many ramifications, from Canada to the Lower Mississippi. In 1731, Crown Point was unlawfully erected by the French within the limits of the Five Nations, and of New York: Niagara had been seized on in 1720. In truth, their policy seemed both rational and feasible. During a large portion of the year, the natural outlets of Canada were effectually sealed by the angry elements supplies of troops or provisions-in fact, almost every intercourse whatever with Europe -were utterly shut out from its ports. The facility of water communication between Canada and New Orleans, by the lakes

and rivers of the West would, if made properly available, not only facilitate the secure transmission of supplies, but would inevitably throw the whole peltry trade of those regions into the hands of the French. It is no wonder, then, that they were desirous of procuring so manifest an advantage; but, unhappily for themselves, they grasped at too much, and lost the whole. Like the dog in the fable, they sacrificed not only the hoped-for gain, but all their present good, in the endeavor.'

To have opened a communication between their widelyseparated establishments, by the way of the western lakes and the Illinois, would have been a comparatively safe, and by far the wiser mode of procedure for the French, under the circumstances of their position. So far as its ostensible objects were concerned, it would have perfectly answered the purpose, and the trade it would secure would have been prodigious: nor could the English, everything considered, have made any very effectual opposition. But to adopt this route would have left too wide a margin for British enterprise. The warlike tribes seated between the Illinois and the Alleghanies — the broad lands watered by the Muskingum, the Scioto, and other kindred streams, by whose marge arose the bark lodges of the Shawanoes and the Delawares the gloomy forests, where

Beneath the shade of melancholy boughs,

That the designs of the French were perfectly comprehended in the English colonies, is abundantly proved by Gov. Shirley's letter to Gov. Hamilton, of March 4th, 1754, printed in the Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, Vol. VI., p. 16. And see also I. Entick, 105, and The Contest in America between Great Britain and France. (Lond.

the Six Nations wandered on their distant hunting-parties

these would have still remained open to the visitssubjected to the influence of their hated rivals. The notion of occupying the head-waters of the Ohio, and of planting a line of forts from Lake Erie, by the Le Bœuf, to the Alleghany, and thence down the Ohio to the Mississippi, was a more dangerous but a more fascinating vision. Its execution would probably be fraught with much hazard, but its results, if successful, were too precious to suffer the powers that were to resist the temptation. Out of the nettle danger they hoped to pluck the flower safety; and, at one time, it really seemed as though all their anticipations were to have been crowned with success. But the wisdom of Almighty Providence had ordered the event otherwise.

In an evil hour, then, for themselves, the French decided to persevere in the latter plan. While the Appallachian chain, it was thought, would serve at the same time as a bulwark against the British colonies, and as a well-marked and palpable boundary between the two nations, the whole body of the Western Indians would be thrown completely under their control. Already game had begun to be scarce, or to disappear utterly, east of the mountains, and the best furs were to be found upon the further side. With forts and trading-houses once established in their midst, it would not be difficult to prevent the savages from supplying the English dealers, or receiving in turn their commodities. The peltry traffic, so profitable to European commerce, had already to be pursued on the frontiers; and it was not probable that the Indians would go thither to