town, that boufe; and an idea of man, mountain, bouse, town. It were to be wished, that the words idea and notion had been ftill thus diftinguished; but they have long been applied to other purposes. And now idea feems to exprefs a clearer, and notion a fainter, conception.

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20. Of the manner in which the mind forms general ideas, fo much has been faid by metaphyfical writers, that without great expence of time, not even an abridgement of it could be given: and I apprehend it would not be easy to make fuch an abridgement ufeful, or even intelligible. It appears to me, that, as all things are individuals, all thoughts must be so too. thought therefore is still but one thought; and cannot, as fuch, have that univerfality in its appearance, which a general term has in its fignification. In fhort, as I understand the words, to have general ideas, or general conceptions, is nothing more, than to know the meaning and use of general terms, or common appellatives. Proper names occur in language much more feldom than general terms. And therefore,

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fore, if we had not this faculty of arran ging things according to their genera and fpecies, general terms would not be underftood, and confequently language (as already obferved) would be impoffible.

21. There is another fort of abstraction, which affects both our thinking and our fpeaking; and takes place, when we confider any quality of a thing separately from the thing itself, and fpeak and think of it as if it were itself a thing, and capable of being characterised by qualities. Thus from beautiful animal, moving animal, cruel animal, feparate the qualities, and make nouns of them, and they become beauty, motion, cruelty; which are called in grammar abstract nouns; and which, as if they stood for real things, may be characterised by qualities, great beauty, fwift motion, barbarous cruelty. Thefe qualities, too, may be abstracted and changed into nouns,, greatness, fwiftnefs, barbarity, &c. Of these abstract nouns there are multitudes in every language.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Of the Faculty of Speech.

22. THE philosophy of speech is an important and curious part of science. In treating of it, I fhall, first, explain the origin and general nature of speech; and, fecondly, confider the Effentials of Language, by fhowing how many forts of words are neceffary for expreffing all the varieties of human thought, and what is the nature and ufe of each particular fort.

ORIGIN AND GENERAL NATURE OF SPEECH.

23. MAN is the only animal that can fpeak. For speech implies the arrangement and feparation of our thoughts; and this is the work of reafon and reflection. Articulate founds refembling fpeech may be uttered by parrots, by ravens, and even by machines;

machines; but this is not speech, because it implies neither reflection, nor reafon, nor any feparation of fucceffive thoughts; because, in a word, the machine or parrot does not, and cannot, understand the meaning of what it is thus made to utter.

24.The natural voices of brute animals are not, however, without meaning. But they differ from fpeech in these three respects. First, Man speaks by art and imitation ; whereas brutes utter their voices without being taught, that is, by the instinct of their nature. Secondly, The voices of brutes are not feparable into fimple elementary founds, as the fpeech of man is; nor do they admit of that amazing variety whereof our articulate voices are fufceptible. And, thirdly, They seem to exprefs, not separate thoughts or ideas, but fuch feelings, pleasant or painful, as it may be neceffary, for the good of those animals, or for the benefit of man, that they should have the power of uttering.

25. We learn to fpeak, by imitating the fpeech of others; fo that he who is born quite deaf, and continues fo, must of neceffity

ceffity be dumb. Inftances there have been of perfons, who had heard in the beginning of life and afterwards became deaf, using a strange fort of language, made up partly of words they had learned, and partly of other words they had invented. Such perfons could guess at the meaning of what was fpoken to them in their own dialect, by looking the speaker in the face, and obferving the lips, and those other parts of the face, which are put in motion by speaking.

26. We speak, in order to make our thoughts known to others. Now thoughts themselves are not vifible, nor can they be perceived by any outward fenfe. If therefore I make my thoughts perceptible to another man, it must be by means of figns, which he and I understand in the fame fense. The figns, that exprefs human thought so as to make it known to others, are of two forts, Natural and Artificial.

27. The Natural Signs of thought are those outward appearances in the eyes, complexion, features, gefture, and voice, which accompany certain emotions of the