case our present state could not be, what both reafon and fcripture declare it to be, a state of probation. Befides: our present fufferings we may, if we pleafe, convert into bleffings; which we fhall do, if we take occafion from them to cultivate the virtues above mentioned: for thus they will prove means of promoting our eternal happiness. The existence, therefore, of Phyfical Evil, being neceffary to train us up in virtue, and confequently to prepare us for future felicity, is a proof of the goodness of God, inftead of being an objection to it. 441. 2. Without virtue, fuch a creature as man could not be happy. In forming an idea of a happy state, we must always fuppofe it to be a state of virtue; the natural tendency of virtue being, to produce happiness; as vice invariably leads to, mifery. Now, man could not be capable of virtue, nor confequently of happinefs, if he were not free, that is, if he had it not in his power to do either good or evil. And if he have this in his power, he must be liable to vice. Vice, therefore, or Moral Evil, is the effect of that 3 F 2 law law of Divine providence, whereby man is made capable of virtue and happiness.— As the poffibility of falling into error, and mistaking falsehood for truth, is neceffary to the improvement of our rational powers, fo the existence of evil, as well as of good, is neceffary, at least in this life, to the improvement of our moral nature. And upon our improvement of our moral nature our future happiness muft depend. 442. Suppofing the prefent life to be preparatory to a future and eternal state, the evils we are now expofed to must to a good man appear inconfiderable. What are a few years of forrow to an eternity of happiness? Not fo much as a headach of an hour is to a thousand years of good health. And who would scruple to fuffer pain for feveral months, if he could thus enfure health for many years?—But, in fact, the evils of life are not fo great as fome people reprefent them. There is in human nature a pliableness, by which it çan adapt itself to almoft any circumftances and contentment, and refignation to the divine will, which are virtues in every perfon's perfon's power, are fufficient to render all the evils of life tolerable. And if to these virtues there be added a well-grounded hope of future felicity, which is also in the power of every person who is willing to be good, our prefent afflictions may become not only tolerable, but light. The wicked, indeed, must be unhappy both now and hereafter. But they will not fuffer more than they deferve; they will be punished according to their works. And fo far is their fuffering from being an objection to the Divine character, that it would be a very strong objection if they were not to fuffer. For he who is perfectly good must be perfectly juft: and a being perfectly just must punish those who deserve punishment. 443. To afk, why we are not made infallible and perfect, and capable of happiness without virtue or liberty, is an impertinent and perhaps an impious question. It may as reasonably be afked, why there are not twenty planets in the folar fyftem; why a stone was not made a man or an angel; or why the Deity did not make all his creatures creatures equal to himself. Such questions deserve no anfwer, but this; that whatever God has been pleased to do must be right, whether we can account for it or not. Creatures who have it in their power to be happy, and whofe happiness will ever increase as they improve in virtue, are furely under the greatest obligations to be thankful to that Providence which has made them what they are. Of the Immortality of the Soul. 444. IT is unnecessary to prove to a ChriI' ftian, that his foul will never die; because he believes that life and immortality have been brought to light by the gofpel. But, though not neceffary, it may be useful, to lay before him thofe arguments, whereby the immortality of the foul might be made appear, even to thofe who never heard of revelation, probable in the highest degree.-Whether the human foul fhall die with the body, or furvive death and live for ever, is an inquiry, which may be faid to comprehend the three following questions. 1. Does the light of nature, unaided by revelation, afford any reason to think, that the foul of man may possibly furvive the body? 2. Does the light of nature afford any reason to believe, that the foul will actually survive the body? 3. If it does, what may be reasonably conjectured concerning a future ftate? 445. SECTION I. Does the light of nature, unaided by revelation, afford any reafon to think, that the human foul may poffibly furvive the body?-Firft: Death destroys the body by difuniting its parts, or preparing them for being difunited: and we have no reafon to think that death can destroy in any other way, as we have never seen any thing die, which did not confift of parts. But the foul confifts not of parts; having been proved to be incorporeal. Therefore, from the nature of death and of the foul, we have no evidence that death can destroy the foul. Confequently, the foul may poffibly, and |