he placed these, together with some received from Amyntas, in the right wing of his army. Derdas brought him a body of only four hundred, but of superior reputation in the northern countries. Teleutias seems to have proposed a compliment to that prince in placing his cavalry alone in the left wing, of which he took himself the immediate command.

A battle quickly ensued, and the cavalry of the right wing being first charged by the Olynthians, the Lacedæmonian commander was presently dismounted, and severely wounded, numbers killed, and at length the whole body put to flight. The confusion spread among the nearest infantry, and there was imminent danger that a complete defeat would have followed, when Derdas, arriving with his cavalry, encouraged the dismayed phalanx to stand. Teleutias at the same time making a movement with the Peloponnesian infantry to support him, the Olynthians, in danger of being surrounded, retired in haste, and suffered in their retreat. Their infantry then also withdrew within their walls. Teleutias erected his trophy for a victory just sufficing to deter the enemy from molesting his retreat from their territory, which he wasted as he went. The advanced season forbade any farther enterprise; and it was necessary to find quarters for the Peloponnesian army in the friendly towns, while the Macedonian and other troops of the country, were dismissed to their several homes.

During winter, the Olythians made frequent, and often successful incursions upon the lands of the towns in alliance with Lacedæmon. In the beginning of spring, a body of their cavalry, after plunder of the territory, approaching, with improvident carelessness, the town of Apollonia, received a severe check from the activity and bravery of Derdas, who, unknown to them, had arrived there that very day, with his Macedonian horse. Thenceforward they confined themselves more within their walls, and ventured upon the cultivation but of a very small part of their lands.

According to the usual mode of war among the Greeks, Teleutias waited for the season when ravage, being most in

jurious, would be most likely to provoke the enemy to a general engagement, or would best forward the effect of a blockade of their towns. While, with these views, he lay encamped near the walls of Olynthus, he observed a body of cavalry from the town, crossing the river which ran by it, and very leisurely approaching his camp. Indignant at their boldness, he ordered his targeteers to attack them. The horse, turning, very quietly, repassed the river: the targeteers followed confidently, as if pursuing a broken enemy. horse, when so many only had crossed the river as they might readily overpower, turned, charged and routed them, and killed, among many others, Tlemonidas, the general commanding.

The

Teleutias, with manners so popular, and generally so amiable, was, nevertheless, of a temper too hasty to preserve, on all occasions, the cool recollection so important in military command. Irritated by what he saw, he seized his spear, put himself at the head of his heavy-armed, and, with some passion, ordered the targeteers and the cavalry to pursue the enemy without remission. The incautious order was zealously obeyed. The Olynthians retiring within their walls, the Peloponnesians did not stop, till, from the towers, they received a shower of missile weapons. In the necessity of warding off these with their shields, as they hastily retreated, confusion

The able leaders of the Olynthians used the critical moment. Their horse again rushed out of the gates; the tareteers, and then the heavy-armed, followed. The impression was such, that the Peloponnesian phalanx was already in disorder when it was attacked. Teleutias himself was killed; those about him then gave way, and presently the whole army fled. Pursued as they divided, toward Potidæa, Spartolus, Acanthus, Apollonia, a large proportion, and almost the whole effective force of so great an army was destroyed.

DEATH OF AGESIPOLIS AND FALL OF OLYNTHUS.

N reviewing affairs, it now seemed as if the political phenomenon, arising on the frontiers of Thrace and Mace

donia, might, by the terror of arms, have spread political wisdom over the southern provinces of Greece. Had the Lacedæmo

nian government in the least yielded under the severe blow it had received, had it been without able men to promote energy and direct exertion, the consequence of its unfitness to coalesce with other states might have been a rapid downfal, and perhaps complete ruin. But the necessity for exertion was seen by the administration, and able men were not wanting to direct it. The command-in-chief was committed to the king, Agesipolis, a youth of little experience, but of great expectation. Thirty Spartans were appointed to attend him, as formerly Agesilaus, in Asia. The character of Agesipolis being popular, many volunteers offered. We gather from Xenophon, that, in this age, the few remaining families distinguished by the name of Spartans, went on foreign service only in the rank of officers. The volunteers, he says, consisted of men of the best families in the Laconian towns, strangers, or men neither of Spartan nor Laconian origin, distinguished by a name apparently implying, that they received their maintenance from the public stock, and bastards of Spartan families, remarkable for their fine figures, and educated in the best discipline of the city. Volunteers from the allies, moreover, were numerous, and the Thessalian cavalry, ambitious of being known to the Spartan king, were particularly forward in their zeal. The rank of the new commander-in-chief, also, warranting the earnestness of the Lacedæmonian government in the cause, inspirited the exertions of the Macedonian princes. It is not mentioned that any troops were furnished by the cities of the

confederacy to supply the loss in the battle of Olynthus; but it is implied that most, if not all of them, paid compositions in money; and that the new levies were entirely of volunteers. Phlius received the thanks of Agesipolis for the largeness and readiness of its contribution.

The apparent zeal, however, of those who ruled Phlius, was found to have a sinister motive. They proposed to earn the connivance of Lacedæmon at gross injustice towards their fellow citizens. All the anecdotes of Plutarch, who read and speculated when Trajan ruled half a hemisphere, do not paint the internal state of divided and independent Greece, like a few small touches, from the life, by the cotemporary historians. With a view, therefore, to the acquisition of a just idea of that state, the affairs of Phlius will deserve that we should interrupt, for a moment, the narrative of the war in Thrace.

The tyranny of that superintending power which the Greeks had imagined as the best resource for holding together a confederacy of republics, too small to subsist each by its own strength, we have seen remarkably exhibited in the affair of Thebes. Phlius affords an instance, not less remarkable, of oppression from a republican government to its own citizens, in defiance of the superintending power. The Phliasian exiles, restored, at the requisition of Lacedæmon, and entitled, by a decree of their own general assembly, to recover all their property, in vain sought justice from Phliasian tribunals; for the Phliasian tribunals were composed of persons holding that property, or connected with those who held it. Among the Greek republics it was not unusual to refer a case of such a kind to the tribunal of some neighbouring republic; but the Phliasian government would listen to no proposal for an impartial decision. This imprudent iniquity impelled the injured persons to seek redress from Lacedæmon. But it was contrary to all known practice for both kings to be at the same time absent from Sparta. Agesipolis was now far advanced on his march towards Thrace; and in the confidence that Agesilaus would not move, and,

of course, no vigorous measures would be taken, the Phliasian chiefs resolved that, to those from whom they differed in party, it was unnecessary to be just. Instead, therefore, of being disposed to yield to Lacedæmonian interference, they procured a decree, imposing the penalty of a fine on all who, without warrant from the Phliasian government, had made application to Lacedæmon.*

We should admire the spirit of this decree, if it was not so immediately connected with gross injustice: we should approve its wisdom, had it been founded upon any practicable plan of liberal policy. But it appears to have been the result only of daring profligacy, illiberal and improvident. The hope even that Lacedæmon would not instantly interfere with vigour was ill conceived. The ephors resolved, that the injurious insolence of the Phliasians should be restrained by arms, and Agesilaus undertook the command. Among those who had recurred to Lacedæmon for redress, were two families which had particular claim to his protection; that of the venerable Podanemus, who had been connected in hospitality with the revered king Archidamus, his father; and that of Procles, who had the same connexion with Agesilaus himself.

No delay was made: the border-passing sacrifice was not likely to be unpropitious: Agesilaus was ready to enter Phliasia, when an embassy met him, deprecating hostilities, and offering money. He answered, "that he was not coming to injure any, but only to relieve the injured." "They professed themselves ready to do whatever could be required." Professions," he told them, "could find no credit, when deceit had already been practised." Upon being asked, then, what pledge he required, he answered, "The same with which Lacedæmon had formerly been trusted, without injury to Phlius: they must give him possession of their citadel." This being refused, he prosecuted his march, and, without delay, surrounded Phlius with a contravallation.

All the Lacedæmonians, however, were not satisfied with

* B. C. 381.-Olymp. 99, 4; Autumn.