Amyntas and his remaining brothers, nevertheless, so well defended themselves, that they were declared innocent. Amyntas then requested leave to go in search of Polemon. His request was granted, and on the same day he returned with him to the camp. Fortune was less propitious to the Lyncestian Alexander. After having undergone an imprisonment of three years he was brought to trial, and was condemned to death.

That these violent measures could be executed without being disapproved of by very many in the army, was not to be expected. Philotas, brave and generous, could not be without admirers among those who loved valour, or stood in need of assistance; and Parmenio, who had so often led them to victory, and who was the valued friend of Philip, of him who raised Macedon from the dust, was dear to the veterans. Accordingly, very considerable dissatisfaction appears to have been manifested. So far did it extend, that Alexander is said, by Diodorus, to have thought it necessary to remove the malecontents from the divisions to which they belonged, and form them into a separate body, to which was given the name of the turbulent, or unruly, battalion. Letters sent to Macedonia by the soldiers were also opened, as well to prevent the spreading of discontent in that country, as to learn the real sentiments of the writers. The important command of the Companion cavalry it was no longer thought prudent to confide to one person, and it was consequently divided between Hephæstion, son of Amyntor, and Clitus, son of Dropidas; and, finally, on suspicion of his having shared in the guilt of Philotas, Demetrius, one of the generals of the body-guard, was deprived of his station and imprisoned, and Ptolemy, son of Lagus, was substituted in his place. This last change was made while the army was encamped in the territory of the Agriaspæ.

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR.

O portion of the Roman history is more fertile in the wonders of character, and the vicissitudes of fortune, than the period which commences with the first Punic war, and terminates with the establishment of the empire under Julius Cæsar and Augustus. I have, therefore, chosen this period for the subject of a rapid sketch, relying chiefly on the authority of Taylor. I shall afterwards give some extracts, exhibiting the wonderful atrocities of Caligula, Claudius, and Nero.

Certain Mamertine mercenaries, who had seized Messena and slaughtered the citizens, justly dreading the vengeance of the Syracusans, divided into two parties, one seeking the protection of the Carthaginians, the other that of the Ro

Thus the first pretence of quarrel between the two mightiest republics of ancient times was, which should have the honour, or rather dishonour, of shielding from merited punishment a piratical banditti, stained by every species of crime. The Romans were long delayed by their reluctance to acknowledge such discreditable allies; but finding that the Carthaginians had gained possession of the Messenian citadel, they made speedy preparations to prevent their rivals from becoming masters of Sicily. An army, entrusted to the command of the consul Appius Claudius, was conveyed across the straits (the vigilance of the Carthaginian fleet being eluded by stratagem), and gained possession of Messena. Successive victories over the Syracusans and Carthaginians soon procured the Romans allies among the Sicilian states, and inspired them with the hope of becoming masters of the island. Hiero, king of Syracuse, deserted his former allies, and, by his early alliance with Rome, secured the tranquillity of his kingdom in the coming contest. The Cartha

ginians, on the other hand, who had looked upon Sicily as an almost certain conquest, were filled with rage when they learned the danger that threatened their possessions in that island. They hired a vast number of mercenaries in Gaul, Liguria, and Spain; they made Agrigentum their chief naval and military depot, storing it plentifully with the munitions of war. Notwithstanding the great natural and artificial strength of Agrigentum, the Romans, eager to seize the Carthaginian magazines, laid siege to the city, and defeated an immense army that had been sent to its relief (B. c. 262). Dispirited by this misfortune, the garrison abandoned the city, which, with all its stores, fell into the hands of the Romans. But this success only roused the senate and people of Rome to fresh exertions; they saw that their conquests could not be secure while the Carthaginians held the supremacy of the sea; and they, therefore, directed all their energies to the preparation of a fleet.

Though not wholly unacquainted with ships, the Romans had hitherto paid little or no attention to naval affairs; and their model for building ships of war was a Carthaginian vessel that had been driven ashore in a storm. After some indecisive skirmishes, the consul Duilius, relying on his invention of the "corvus," a machine which served both as a grappling-iron and drawbridge, hazarded an engagement with the Carthaginian fleet (B. c. 260). No sooner had the hostile ships closed, than the Romans lowered the new machines on the enemy's decks, and, fighting hand to hand, carried no fewer than fifty galleys by boarding. The Carthaginian admiral finding naval tactics of no avail, drew off the rest of his fleet. To commemorate this, their first victory by sea, the Romans erected a rostral column (one ornamented with representations of the rostra, or beaks of ships,) in the forum, which still continues in excellent preservation, the chief injury it has sustained being the loss of part of the inscription. In a second naval engagement, near the island of Lipara, (B. C. 256,) the Carthaginians lost eighteen vessels, of which eight were sunk and ten taken. From this time forward the

Romans began to pay great attention to maritime affairs; they maintained navies in the two seas of Italy; and when the ships were not employed in war, they were sent to make surveys of the coasts. The increasing importance of navigation appears manifest, from the repeated representations of war-galleys on the Roman coins; these do not occur before the first Punic war, but after that period we find them becoming very common.

The struggle between the rival republics had lasted about eight years, when the Romans, following the example of the Syracusan Agathocles, resolved to invade Africa, knowing that the native tribes of that continent were weary of the tyranny and rapacity of Carthage. An armament of three hundred and thirty ships was prepared for this great enterprise, and entrusted to the command of the consuls Regulus and Manlius (B. c. 255). A third sea-fight was a necessary preliminary to this invasion; the Carthaginians were once more defeated; sixty-four of their galleys were taken, and thirty destroyed. The victorious fleet pursued its voyage: Regulus effected a landing without loss, and took the city of Clypea by storm. Soon after, he defeated the Carthaginian army in a general engagement, and seized the city of Tunis. In great terror, the Carthaginians sought for peace; but the terms demanded by Regulus were so harsh, that they resolved, at all hazards, to continue the war, and were confirmed in their determination by the arrival of a body of mercenary troops from Greece under the command of Xanthippus, a Spartan general of high reputation. To this foreigner the Carthaginians entrusted the command of their army: he eagerly sought an opportunity of bringing the enemy to an engagement: the Romans did not decline his challenge, but they found that one man was sufficient to change the fortune of the war. Xanthippus won a complete victory; the greater part of the Romans were taken prisoners or cut to pieces, two thousand alone escaping to the city of Clypea; Regulus himself was among the captives.

The Spartan general, after this brilliant exploit, returned

home. A Roman fleet was sent to bring off the garrison of Clypea, and gained on the voyage a great victory over the Carthaginians; but on the return of the ships, three hundred and twenty of them, with all on board, were destroyed by a tempest. A second naval armament suffered a similar fate; and the Romans, disheartened by these repeated misfortunes, abandoned, for a time, the sea to their enemies. But they were in some degree consoled by a second triumph obtained near Panormus, in Sicily, over Asdrubal (B. c. 249), which gave them a decided superiority in the island.

The Carthaginians daunted by this misfortune, took Regulus from his dungeon to go as their ambassador to Rome, trusting that, weary of a long captivity, he would urge the senate to grant favourable terms of peace. Regulus, however, persuaded his countrymen to continue the war, assuring them that the resources of Carthage were exhausted. It is generally stated, that the patriotic general, after his return to Africa, was tortured to death by the disappointed Carthaginians. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that he died a natural death, and that the tale of his savage murder was invented to excuse the cruelty with which his family treated their Carthaginian captives.