of his delights; but we must prove the nobleness of the delights, and thence the nobleness of the animal. The dignity of affection is no way lessened, because a large measure of it may be found in lower animals; neither is the vileness of gluttony and lust abated, because they are common to It is clear, therefore, that there is a standard of dignity in the pleasures and passions themselves, by which we also class the creatures capable of, or suffering them.

men.

§ 3. Use of the terms "temperate," and "intemperate."

The first great distinction, we observe, is that noted by Aristotle,' that men are called temperate and intemperate with regard to some, and not so with respect to others; and that those with respect to which they are so called, are, by common consent, held to be the vilest. But Aristotle, though exquisitely subtle in his notation of facts, does not frequently give us satisfactory account of, or reason for them. Content with stating the fact of these pleasures being held the lowest, he shows not why this estimation of them is just, and confuses the reader by observing casually respecting the higher pleasures, what is indeed true, but appears at first opposed to his own position, namely, that, "in these also men may be conceived as taking pleasure either rightly, or more or less than is right."* Which being so, and evident capability of excess or defect existing in pleasures of this higher order, let us consider how it happens that men are not called intemperate when they indulge in excess of this kind;

2

* ὡς δεῖ, καὶ καθ ̓ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν.3

1 [Ethics, iii. 10, 2-4: "When he who loves honour or learning is delighted by that which he loves, it is not his body that is affected, but his mind. But men are not called either temperate or intemperate for their behaviour with regard to these pleasures; nor for their behaviour with regard to any other pleasures that are not of the body. For instance, those who are fond of gossip and of telling stories, and spend their days in trifles, are called babblers, but not intemperate; nor do we apply this term to those who grieve at the loss of money or friends. Intemperance, then, will be concerned with the pleasures of the body, but not with all even of these: for those who delight in the case of their eyesight, in colours and forms and painting, are not called temperate or intemperate" (F. H. Peters's translation, slightly altered).] [Ed. 1 reads here "we ought to have been told," and at the end of the paragraph adds, "This let us attempt to ascertain."]

2

[These words follow immediately on the passage quoted in the last note but one : "and yet in these also men may be conceived," etc.]

and what is that difference in nature of the pleasure, which diminishes the criminality of its excess.

1

Men are held intemperate, only when their desires over§ 4. Right use come or prevent the action of their reason; and = of the term "in- they are indeed intemperate in the exact degree temperate." in which such prevention or interference takes place, and therefore in many instances and acts which do not lower the world's estimation of their temperance. For so long as it can be supposed that the reason has acted imperfectly, owing to its own imperfection, or to the imperfection of the premises submitted to it,—as when men give an inordinate preference to their own pursuits, because they cannot, in the nature of things, have sufficiently experienced the goodness and benefit of others;-and so long as it may be presumed that men have referred to reason in what they do, and have not suffered its orders to be disobeyed through mere impulse and desire, though those orders may be full of error owing to the reason's own feebleness; so long, men are not held intemperate. But when it is palpably evident that the reason cannot have erred, but that its voice has been deadened or disobeyed; and that the reasonable creature has been dragged: dead round the walls of his own citadel by mere passion, then, and then only, men are of all held intemperate. And this is evidently the case with respect to inordinate indulgence in pleasures of touch and taste; for these, being destructive in their continuance not only of all other pleasures, but of the very sensibilities by which they themselves are received, and this penalty being actually known and experienced by those indulging in them, so that the reason cannot but pronounce right respecting their perilousness, there is no palliation of the wrong choice; and the man, as utterly incapable of Will,* is called intemperate, or ȧkóλaσtos.

It would be well if the reader would for himself follow out

* Comp. Hooker, Eccl. Pol., book 1. chap. viii.

[The italics in this paragraph were introduced in the 1883 edition.

In ed. 1

Aristotle's word ȧkóλaoro was added in brackets after "held intemperate." For other minor variations here, see Appendix iv., p. 396.]

4

this subject, which it would be irrelevant here to pursue farther, observing how a certain degree of intemperance is suspected and attributed to men with respect to higher impulses; as, for instance, in the case of anger, or any other passion criminally indulged; and yet is not so attributed as in the case of sensual pleasures: because in anger the reason is supposed not to have had time to operate, and to be itself affected by the presence of the passion, which seizes the man involuntarily and before he is aware; whereas, in the case of the sensual pleasures, the act is deliberate, and determined on beforehand, in direct defiance of reason. Nevertheless, if no precaution be taken against immoderate anger, and the passions gain upon the man, so as to be evidently wilful and unrestrained, and admitted contrary to all reason, we begin to look upon him as, in the real sense of the word, intemperate; and, in consequence, assign to him his place, for the time, among the beasts, as definitely as if he had yielded to the pleasurable temptations of touch or taste.

We see, then, that the primal ground of inferiority in these pleasures is that which proves their indulgence to be contrary to reason; namely, their destructiveness upon prolongation, and their incapability of coexisting continually with the better delights and true perfections of human nature.1

§ 5. Grounds of inferiority in which are subthe pleasures jects of in

temperance.

And this incapability of continuance directs us to the second cause of their inferiority; namely, that they are given to us as subservient to life, as instruments of our preservation, compelling us to seek the things necessary to our being, and that, therefore, when this their function is fully performed, they ought to have an end; and can be only artificially, and under high penalty, prolonged. But the pleasures of sight and hearing are given as gifts. They answer not any purposes of mere existence; for the distinction of all that is useful or

1 [In all eds. previous to 1883 these words read, "with other delights and true perfections of the system." They were left in the 1883 ed., Ruskin adding in the text:-"(With the better delights and true perfections of human nature,' I should have said)." The revised reading was given in the 1888 and following eds., and is here retained.]

dangerous to us might be made, and often is made, by the eye, without its receiving the slightest pleasure of sight. We might have learned to distinguish fruits and grain from flowers, without having any superior pleasure in the aspect of the latter; and the ear might have learned to distinguish the sounds that communicate ideas, or to recognize intimations of elemental danger, without perceiving either melody1 in the voice, or majesty in the thunder.* And as these pleasures have no function to perform, so there is no limit to their continuance in the accomplishment of their end, for they are an end in themselves, and so may be perpetual with all of us; being in no way destructive, but rather increasing in exquisiteness by repetition.

§ 6. Evidence of higher rank in pleasures of Sight and Hearing.

Herein, then, we find very sufficient ground for the higher estimation of these delights; first, in their being eternal and inexhaustible, and, secondly, in their being evidently no means or instrument of life, but an object of life. Now, in whatever is an object of life, in whatever may be infinitely and for itself desired, we may be sure there is something of divine; for God will not make anything an object of life to His creatures which does not point to, or partake of, Himself. And so, though we were to regard the pleasures of sight merely as the highest of sensual pleasures, and though they were of rare occurrence, and, when occurring, isolated and imperfect, there would still be a supernatural character about them, owing to their selfsufficiency. But when, instead of being scattered, interrupted,

* Modern philosophy, on the other hand, supposes the colours of flowers to be of no use to us at all;-and that a bee couldn't have found its way to a thistle unless the flower had been purple ! [1883.]

un

An entirely unwarranted assertion, made evidently without reflection, and on hearsay. The paragraph down to "self-sufficiency" is just as necessary as it is insecure. The rest of the page [i.e. the rest of § 6] is true, and the proper basis of following argument. [1883.]

1 ["music" in ed. 1.]

2 [Ed. 1 reads, "owing to their permanence and self-sufficiency, where no other sensual pleasures are permanent or self-sufficient."]

3 [See letter about a paper on flowers and insects by Sir John Lubbock (Lord Avebury) in Hortus Inclusus (p. 103, ed. 1887; p. 119, ed. 1902).]

or chance-distributed, they are gathered together, and so arranged to enhance each other as by chance they could not be, there is caused by them not only a feeling of strong affection towards the object in which they exist, but a perception of purpose and adaptation of it to our desires; a perception, therefore, of the immediate operation of the Intelligence which so formed us, and so feeds us.

Out of which perception arise Joy, Admiration, and Gratitude.

Now the mere animal consciousness of the pleasantness I call Esthesis; but the exulting, reverent, and grateful perception of it I call Theoria. For this, and this only, is the full comprehension and contemplation of the Beautiful as a gift of God; a gift not necessary to our being, but added to, and elevating it, and twofold: first of the desire, and secondly of the thing desired.

in rank.

And that this joyfulness and reverence are a necessary part of Theoretic pleasure, is very evident, when we § 7. How the consider that, by the presence of these feelings, lower pleasures even the lower and more sensual pleasures may may be elevated be rendered Theoretic. Thus Aristotle has subtly noted that "we call not men intemperate so much with respect to the scents of roses or herb-perfumes as of ointments and of condiments," though the reason that he gives for this be futile enough. For the fact is, that of scents artificially prepared the extreme desire is intemperance; but of natural and Godgiven scents, which take their part in the harmony and pleasantness of creation, there can hardly be intemperance: not that there is any absolute difference between the two kinds, but that these are likely to be received with gratitude and joyfulness rather than those; so that we despise the seeking of essences and unguents, but not the sowing of violets

1 [Here, in the 1883 ed., Ruskin noted :

"I forget what it is; and the reader need not be troubled to find out.” The passage follows that from the Ethics cited above (iii. 10, 6): " for the intemperate delight in these smells because they remind them of the things that they lust after. You may, indeed, see other people taking delight in the smell of food when they are hungry; but to take delight in such smells (constantly) is the mark of the intemperate man, as he (alone) is (constantly) lusting after such things."]