and massy; for if the other be wanting, these will sustain the roof sure enough, but with some rudeness in the thing, and imperfection in the whole.

3. If to that which is the surer side, there be a great inconvenience consequent, the avoiding of that inconvenience, being laid on the opposite even part, will outweigh the consideration of the safety. Quintus Milo commands his servant, Aufidius, whom he had taken for the teaching grammar and rhetoric to his children, that he would learn the trade of a shoemaker. Aufidius doubts whether his master, Quintus Milo, hath power to command him to do that which was no part of the employment for which he was entertained, and yet because the thing is of itself lawful and honest, he considers it is the safest course for him to obey, for, certainly, in so doing he sins not; and thus far he is bound, and was in the right. But if to learn that mean trade will dishonour and disable him, make him a fool and contemptible, and ruin his hopes and his interests when he leaves the service of Milo, the servant is not tied to follow that which is more safe, but that which is more charitable and prudent: "In dubiis juris tutior pars sequenda est, et obedire teneor, si commode possim," was the rule: because the reason, abstractedly considered, makes the question safe. on either side, as the determination happens; and the avoiding an intolerable inconvenience is as considerable as the accidental security, and in many cases more complying with charity because in a question, in which the conscience is probable, there is a great safety without taking in the advantage of a safe matter, by the proper efficacy and influence of the reason making a probable and an honest conscience; but then when the safety is provided for fairly otherways, and for the most part sufficiently, and the inconvenience on the other side is not provided for; in all such cases we must leave that which is materially sure, for the choice of that which, in its formality, is equally sure, and, in its matter, more charitable. A little child came to my door for alms, of whom I was told he was run from his mother's house, and his own honest employment; but in his wandering he was almost starved: I found that, if I relieved him, he would return to his mother; if I did not relieve him, he would not be able. I considered, that indeed his soul's interest were

:

VOL. XII.

K

anure so be regarded and secured than his boy, and is sin rotter to be prevented that is sicknes, and Jeraire, 10t to redere inu seemed at first the greater carry Ent vien I weighed against these soundezons de 19 31 3 11ceria, and future, and airy, bu is need is certain. and preet, and satural; that he may choose viether he * 2 elu or no, but cannot, in the present case, choose whether he will perish or no; that if he be on releved, he dies in his eit, but many things may intervene to reárn his Vicious inclination; that the natural necessity is extreme, but that he will ein is no way necessary, and hath in it no degrees of unavoidable necessity; and above all that if he abuses my relief to evil purposes, which I intended not, it is his facit, not mine, but the question being exncerning my duty, not his, and that to relieve him is my dny, and not his, and that, therefore, if I do not relieve him, the sin is also ming, and not his; and that, by bidding of him to do his duty, I acquit myself on one side, but by bidding tim to be warm and fed, I cannot be acquitted on the other; I took that side which was at least equally sure, and certainly more charitable.

This also happens in the matter of justice very often. It is the surer side in many cases to restore, and is a testimony of an honest mind, that, to secure its eternal interest, will quit the temporal. But if to restore will undo a man, and the case is indifferent, or at least probable that he is not bound, then it is not necessary to restore, though to restore be the surer side; and if the interest of a third person, as of wife, or children, be also involved in the question, then the inquiring person is bound not to restore. Because in the present case there is a certain uncharitableness, and but an uncertain justice, that is, a duty certainly omitted, for the securing of another that is not certain.

4. When the more probable is also the more safe, there is no question but the safer is to be chosen. For so the conscience is made the more sure, both materially and formally; that is, by the better reason, and the more advantageous matter; and he that does otherwise, exposes himself to an evident danger of sinning, having nothing to outbalance either the direct reason, or the accidental safety.

5. Sometimes it happens, that what is safe in one regard

is dangerous in another, and on each side of the probability there is a danger and a safety. Vittoria Columbina, a Venetian lady, was married to five magnificoes successively : and they all being dead, and she left very rich, young, and tempted to a sixth marriage, advises with her confessor whether or no she may lawfully do it? He tells her, that it is not only probable, but certain that she may; but it were better if she kept her widowhood, and after so much sense of mortality, retire to religion. But that he may determine her case with more certainty, she tells him, she had once resolved with herself to live a widow, but finds she shall not be free from temptation in that state, and desires him to tell her if she may lawfully marry notwithstanding that resolution, which now to be something altered, he perceives by her question. He answers, that it is the surest course to determine for chastity and abstinence, her state of widowhood being more certainly pleasing than the other. But then she hints her temptation, and asks, if some sure course is not to be taken for her being secured in that point too? This arrests his thoughts upon a new consideration, but the result is this:

1. When there are two one of the thing, and the the person is first to be part of the question to determine on the side of chastity, or virginity, or widowhood; but this may be the unsafer side to the person, who, if he suffers temptation, is to be provided for by that answer which gives him remedy and

securities to be provided for,other of the person,-that of provided for. It is the safer

ease.

2. But if it happens that there is danger on either side to the person, that is the surer side which provides against that temptation which is strongest and most imminent, and which, if it prevails, is of the worst consequence.

3. This is also to be understood in those cases when temporal life is offered in question against the danger of a sin. Michael Verinus, a young gentleman of Spain, by reason of his living a single life, was pressed with so great inconvenience, that he fell into a lingering and dangerous sickness. The physicians advise him to use his remedy, though he be not married, and being it was in order to his health, which was not else to be recovered, they presumed it

lawful, or did not care whether it were or no; but, however, they advise him to it. He doubts of it, and dares not be uncharitable and die for want of remedy, if he might have it, and yet dares not commit an act of uncleanness: but finding on either hand a sin threatening him, and if he flies from a lion, he meets a bear, or is told that a bear is in the way, he at last flies from the evil beast that stood before him, and chooses that way which was evidently the safest, not to his health, but to his salvation; not to his body, but his soul; and chose rather to die, than to do that which he was certainly persuaded to be a sin, and of the other he was not

so sure.

Sola Venus potuit lento succurrere morbo :

Ne se pollueret, maluit ille mori.

In other things, the prudence of a guide must be his only rule.

The sum is this:

1. If the doubt be equal and the danger equal, the doubt must be laid aside, or there can be no action consequent : and for the danger, if you choose one, you may choose either, for there is no difference: a dagger or a sword is all one to him that must die by one.

2. If the doubt be unequal and the danger equal, the resolution must be on that side where there is the most confidence; that is, where the less cause of doubting is apprehended, as if I have but enough to give one alms, and I see two ready to perish, and I can relieve but one; the danger is equal, for "pasce fame morientem; si non pavisti, occidisti," said St. Ambrose; but one is my friend, and the other is a stranger; in this case the doubt is unequal, and I ought to prefer my friend.

3. If the danger be unequal, and the doubt equal, the resolution must be made in compliance with our safety. For there is nothing to weigh down in the doubt, yet there is something to weigh down in the danger, and that is sufficient.

4. If the doubt be unequal, and the danger unequal, there we must take the least danger, though on the least side of the probability, because there can no degree of sin be consented to; and, therefore, when by our own fault or infelicity we must be forced to fall upon one, we must take

the less, by the same reason for which we are to refuse all that we can. Mævius Caligarius, a Roman gentleman, and newly converted to Christianity, observes that his friend Agricola was pursued by his enemies unto death, and was by them asked concerning him, whether he were in his house or no. He knew he was, but knows also that if he confesses it, he shall die. He doubts whether it be lawful to lie to save his friend's life or no, and cannot resolve whether it be or no, but inclines rather to think it is not lawful. But he considers if it be lawful, then he is guilty of his friend's death, who refused to save him at an innocent charge. But if it be not lawful, he does but tell an officious lie; so long as the doubt remains, he must rather venture upon an uncertain sin in the officious lie, than the uncertain but greater sin of homicide. These are the cases in which the danger is on both sides.

5. But if there be danger on one side only, and a doubt on both sides, there is no question but that side is to be chosen where there is no danger; unless the doubt on one side be contemptible and inconsiderable, and the other not so.

RULE VI.

It is lawful for the Conscience to proceed to Action against a Doubt that is merely speculative.

In a sure conscience the speculative and the practical are the same in certain consequence, as I have alreadya proved in its own place; but in a doubting conscience the case is differing. For though it be ordinarily true here also, that he that doubts speculatively does also doubt practically; as if he doubts concerning all usurious contracts, whether it be lawful or no to use any, he doubts all concerning this which himself uses, if it be usurious. But because there may intervene a special case, and that which is true in general may be altered in the particular, it may happen that he may be certain and determined in the particular when he is not

a Chap. ii. rule 3.