Add to this, they are such which some few the wisest of the heathens did teach by natural reason, for aught we know. And there is a proportion of this truth also in all the wise laws of commonwealths; the reasons of which are nothing but the proportions of nature, and the prime propositions of justice, common utility, and natural necessity. And, therefore, supposing that every civil constitution supplies the material part or the instance, every civil law is nothing but a particular of the natural law in respect of its formality, reasonableness, and obligation. And all laws of manners are laws of nature: for there can be but one justice, and the same honesty and common utility, in the world; and as a particular reason is contained in the universal, so is the particular profit in the public: "Saluti civium prospexit, qua intelligebat contineri suam," said Torquatus in Cicero, and so it is in laws. In the observation of the laws of nature, the good of every society and every private person is comprised; and there is no other difference in it, but that in every civil constitution there is something superadded; not to the reasonableness or justice, but it is invested with a body of action and circumstances. "Jus civile neque in totum à naturali ac gentium jure recedere, neque per omnia. ei servire; adeo ut cum juri communi aliquid additur vel detrahitur, jus proprium, id est, civile efficiatur," said Justinian :-"The civil law neither does wholly recede from the law of nature and nations, neither does it wholly serve it for when any thing is added or detracted from the natural law, it becomes the civil:" and another; "Leges positivæ repetunt jus naturæ quum leges sive pactiones quæ sunt jura attingunt utilitatem et scopum naturæ ; - The positive laws of a commonwealth repeat the law of nature, when laws and covenants do promote the profit and this design of nature."

But from hence it follows that the law of nature is the only rule and measure of all laws, and superinduced laws of God and man are but instances of obedience in those general precepts of nature and since the law of Christianity contains in it all the law of nature; and is now the only law that can oblige us primarily, and others in virtue of it: it is the prime

• De Finib.

:

Lib. vi. ff. de Justit. et Jure.

and adequate rule and measure of conscience, and the explication of all its precepts will be a full institution of conscience to which purpose that saying of Lælius in Cicero,o is very pertinent: "Viros bonos appellandos esse putamus, qui assequuntur (quantum homines possunt) naturam, optimam bene vivendi ducem; - Nature is the best guide and measure of living well: and they who exactly observe her measures as far as men can, are to be called good men."

RULE III.

The first and greatest Band of the Law of Nature is
Fear of Punishment.

I HAVE already spoken of this as it is the act and effect of conscience here I am to speak of it more abstractedly, and as itself hath effect upon human actions; there as it is the minister of the judge; here as it is the sanction of the law.

"Omne malum aut timore aut pudore natura suffudit,' said Tertullian; a fear and shame are the waiters and handmaids of every sin, which nature hath provided for it. And indeed fear is the band of all laws. For although there is a pravity in the nature of injustice which natural reason hates, proceeding partly from the deficiency from the perfective end of nature and societies, which is served by justice; partly from the consequent obloquy and disreputation, which all wise men and all talking people put upon it (for they that do it themselves, speak ill of it in others); yet this is but a little. This is a part of the punishment of the breach of the natural law; but not strong enough to make a firm obligation. Now in all laws there must be some penalty annexed, the fear of which may be able to restrain men from doing against the law; which cannot be, unless the evil be greater than the benefit or pleasure of the prevarication can be; and therefore it is, that God establishing this law hath appointed a court within us, a severe judge, who will not

spare; a wise discerner, who will not be deceived; an exact remembrancer, which never forgets any thing that can do the greatest mischiefs: a just witness, who will not be suborned, and is conscious and privy to all that which he is to judge; and the same also is the executioner of the delinquent and sinning people.

The stings of conscience, and fear of the Divine vengeance, is this evil which naturally restrains us; it is the greatest restraint, because it is the greatest of evils, and it is unavoidable, and it is natural. I will not add it is lawful to abstain from evil for fear of punishment, but it is necessary, and it is natural, and that is more, and this is it which Epicurus taught, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῆς ἀδικίας δεῖν ἀπειργεῖν ἢ φόβῳ xoλάoɛwv; which, although Plutarch seems angry at, was well enough spoken by him; meaning that "it is a fear, not of temporal discovery and civil punishment, which is only appointed to restrain evil actions, but a fear of those evils whose apprehension God hath made necessary and congenite with the nature of man;" fear of God's displeasure, and the destruction of our nature and felicities relying upon that natural love of ourselves, and desire of our own preservation, without which a man cannot be supposed sufficiently provided with principles of necessary being and providence.

There is another kind of fear of punishment, that is, a fear of those auxiliary punishments which princes and republics have superadded to the breakers of natural laws, which is in some men, who are despisers of all the evils which are threatened hereafter such as was that of Thrasymachus, in Plato:"Nihil esse melius quam facere injuriam neque pœnas dare, nihil pejus quam pati nec posse ulcisci; medio autem modo se habere justitiam, cum quis nec facit nec patitur: quod ut fiat, esse optabile; sed nempe imbecillibus, quorum proinde interest pacisci aut servare pacta, non autem valentioribus, qui si viri fuerint ac sapuerint, nullatenus pactum de injuria non inferenda accipiendave sint inituri; -Nothing is better than to do injury without punishment; nothing worse than to suffer mischief, and to be able to do none again; in the midst of these is justice, which neither does injury, nor receives any, which is much to be desired d;

b 7. De Repub.

but by whom? By none but by weak people. For the stronger, if they be valiant and wise, will never enter into covenants concerning not doing or receiving injury.” According to this doctrine, there should be nothing of itself just or unjust; and if there were, it were not to be regarded, but so long as justice were profitable, and injustice troublesome and dangerous. And, therefore, strong men or crafty might, in many cases, be exempt from contracts and from doing justice, and would neither do right nor take

wrong.

Against this it is that all wise men in the world do speak: "Vos autem, nisi ad populares auras inanesque rumores, recta facere nescitis; et relicta conscientiæ virtutisque præstantia de alienis præmia sermunculis cogitatis," said Boetius, in indignation against all those who took accounts of themselves by public noises, not by the testimonies of a just conscience, that is, who fear man, but do not fear God. And to do good out of fear of punishment (in this sense) is to do good no longer than I am observed, and no longer than I am constrained: from both which, because very many men are very often freed, and all men sometimes, there would be no habit, no will, no love of justice in the world; that is, there would be no virtue of justice, but single actions as it could happen. This would introduce horrid tyrannies, while princes and generals, having power in their hands, might do all things as they pleased, and have no measure but their own private: and all men's conditions under them would be always precarious, and arbitrary, and most commonly intolerable: and, therefore, this fear is the characterism of evil persons,

Oderunt peccare mali formidine pœnæ.

And against such, civil laws are made: "Justis lex non est posita," saith St. Paul; "The law is not made for the righteous, but for the wicked." If the sons of Israel had continued pious, as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were, the law should not have been given to them as it was upon Mount Sinai; but the necessities of men brought a law upon them, and that law a punishment, while good men ποιοῦσιν ἑκουσίως,

c Dé Consol. Philosoph.

ἃ ποιοῦσιν ἄκοντες οἱ λοιποὶ διὰ τὸν νόμον, as Xenocrates, in Laertius, said of the philosophers; they do it

Sponte sua, veterisque Dei se more tenentes,d

for the love of God; by choice and delight in the actions of virtue, they do excellent things, "Plusque ibi boni mores valent quam alibi bonæ leges," as Tacitus said of the old Germans;-"Good manners prevailed more than good laws." Thus did the patriarchs, and therefore they needed not a law. "Vetustissimi mortalium, nulla adhuc mala libidine, sine probro, scelere, eoque sine pœna et coercitionibus agebant: neque præmiis opus erat, quum honesta suopte ingenio peterentur; et, ubi nihil contra morem cuperent, nihil per metum vetabantur." Our forefathers desired nothing against honesty and injustice, and, therefore, were not forbidden any thing by the instrument of fear.

But, therefore, the civil and positive law is not made for all those men who have other restraints; that is, for good men who are moved by better principles; but because these things that are better, are despised by the vicious and the tyrants, oppressors and the impudent, the civil power hath taken a sword to transfix the criminal, and to kill the crime. And, therefore, Epicurus, in Stobæus, said not amiss: "Laws were made for wise men, not for fear they should do ill, but lest they should suffer evil from the unjust."

And yet even the wise and the good men have a fear in them, which is an instrument of justice and religion; but it is a fear of God, not of the secular judge; it is a fear that is natural, a fear produced from the congenite notices of things, and the fear of doing a base thing; a fear to be a fool and an evil person.

Mî natura dedit leges à sanguine ductas:
Ne possim melior judicis esse metu;

said Cornelia, in Propertius: a good man will abstain from all unrighteous things, though he be sure that no man should hear or see any thing of it, that is, though there were no laws, and superinduced punishments, in republics; and all