change but a certain truth, with apparent usefulness in order to charity, piety, or institution.

These instances are in the matter of religion; it may also happen thus in the matter of justice. When Lamech perceived something stir in a bush, it was very probable it was a wild beast; but when he came to reduce his opinion to practice, he shot at it, and killed a man. And, in the matter of justice, there is a proper reason for this rule: because, in matters of right or wrong, possession is not to be altered without certainty ; and therefore neither can I seize upon my goods in another man's hand, unless I be sure they are mine, though I were not otherwise restrained by human laws; neither may I expose any thing to danger of which I am not certainly master.

This also is, with great caution, to be observed in the matter of chastity. Although it may be true, that, in many cases, such or such aspects or approximations may be lawful; that is, those things, so far as they are considered, have no dissonance from reason; yet he that shall reduce this opinion to practice, must also remember, that he is to deal with flesh and blood, which will take fire, not only from permissions, but from prohibitions and restraints, and will pass instantly from lawful to unlawful: and although this may not be a sin in consideration and discourse, but is to be acquitted by the sentence of the schools and pulpit, yet when it comes to be viewed and laid before the judgment in the court of conscience, and as it was clothed with circumstances,-it will be found, that when it came to be practised, other parts or senses were employed, which cannot make such separations, but do something else.

But if it be asked, 'To what purpose it can be, that any man should inquire of the lawfulness of such actions, which, whether they be lawful or unlawful, yet may not be done?' I answer, that 'the inquiry is necessary for the direct avoiding a sin in the proper matter of the instance;' for he that never inquires, sins for want of inquiry, and despises his soul, because he takes no care that it be rightly informed: but if he inquires, and be answered that the opinion is false, or the action criminal,-he finds by the answer, that it was worth his pains to ask, because by it he is taught to avoid a sin : but then, besides the question of lawful or unlawful, there

are further inquiries to be made concerning fitting and unfitting, offensive or complying, safe or dangerous, abstractedly or in relation; for many things, which are lawful in themselves, become very bad to him that does them, and to him that suffers them.

RULE V.

The greater Probability destroys the less.

THAT is, it is not lawful directly' to choose an opinion, that seems less probable, before that which is more probable; I say, 'directly; for if the less probable be more safe, it becomes accidentally more eligible; of which I have alreadya given account, and shall add something afterward. But without this accident, the degrees of safety are left to follow the degrees of probability. For when the safety does not depend upon the matter, it must depend upon the reasons of the inducement: and because the safety must increase consequently to the probability, it is against charity to omit that which is safer, and to choose that which is less safe.

For it is not in moral things, as it is in natural, where a less sweet is still sweet, though not so sweet as that which is more and the flowers of trefoil are pleasant, though honey be far more pleasant; and Phædon may be wise, though he be not so wise as Plato: because there are degrees of intension and remission in these qualities: and if we look upon two probable propositions, and consider them naturally, they are both consonant to reason in their apparencies, though in several degrees. So that if Sempronius choose a less probable, before he hath learned what is more probable, he hath done well and safely. But when the two probables are compared, to reject that which is more probable is to do, 1. Unnaturally; 2, and unreasonably; 3, and imprudently.

1. Unnaturally.

In matters proposed to the will,-the will may choose a less good, and reject the greater; and though it is most commonly a great imperfection to do so, yet it is many times

a Rule 2, of this sect.

b

Chap. v. rule 4.

innocent; because it is in the choice of the will, to which it is propounded, and no commandment laid upon it. But in matters of opinion and intellectual notices, where there is no liberty, there is a necessity of following the natural proportions, that is, that the stronger efficient upon the same suscipient should produce the more certain and regular effect. "To think or to opine is not free," said Aristotle ;* and yet he that chooses the less probable, omitting that which is more, makes the determination by his will, not by his understanding; and, therefore, it is not an honest act or judgment of conscience, but a production of the will.

2. It is unreasonable: because in all those degrees of unreasonableness, in which the less probable is excelled by that which is more probable, a man does wholly proceed without and against that reason. And why does he choose the less probable? I do not ask why he chooses the less probable opinion,—that I mean which is so in itself; for he may do that because it seems more reasonable, or he knows nothing else: but I ask, why he proceeds according to a less probable conscience? that is, why does he choose that which he believes to be less probable? for what reason does he choose that for which he hath the least reason? If there be no reason to choose that rather than the other, then

it is an unreasonable thing to do so. If there be a reason, which is not in the other, or which is not excelled or equalled by it, then the case is altered, and this is not the less probable, but equally or more. But, supposing it less probable, it is a contradiction to say a man can reasonably choose it. For if he could, there must be some greater reason in that which hath less reason; something there must be in it, whereby it can be preferred, or be more eligible, which is directly against the supposition and state of the question. The unreasonableness of this we may also perceive by the necessities of mankind, which are served by the more probable, and disserved by that which is less. For thus judges are bound for the interest of all parties, and the reasonableness of the thing, to judge on that side where the sentence is most probable and the physician, in prescribing medicines, must not choose that which he least confides in, and reject

Lib. ii. de Anima, text. 153.

that which he rather trusts. And why do all the world, in their assemblies, take that sentence which is chosen by the greater part? but because that is presumed more probable, and that which is so, ought to be followed; and why it ought not to be so in matters of our soul, is not easily to be told, unless our conscience may be governed by will rather than by reason, or that the interest of souls is wholly inconsiderable.

3. It is also imprudent: a man that believes a less probable, is light of heart, he is incurious of his danger, and does not use those means in order to his great end which himself judges the most reasonable, effective, and expedient. He does, as Rehoboam did, who rejected the wiser counsel of the seniors, and chose the less likely sentence of the young gallants, and does against the advice of all those rules which are prescribed us in prudent choice; and if no man ever advised another to choose that which is less reasonable, he that does so, does against the wisdom and the interest of all the wise men in the world.

4. After all this, it is not honest to do it. For in two probables, only one of them is true; and which that is, he can only take the best way of the best reason to find out; and it is impossible he should believe that which to him seems less likely, to be the more likely; and, therefore, so far as is in him, he chooses that which is false, and voluntarily abuses his conscience;-which, besides the folly of it, is also criminal and malicious.

This doctrine thus delivered was the opinion of the ancient casuists, Angelus, Sylvester, Cordubensis, Cajetan, and some others; but fiercely opposed by the latter, who are bold and confident to say that their opinion is the common and more received, and it relies upon these reasons:

1. Because if it were unlawful to follow the less probable and to leave the greater, it is because there is danger in so doing, and no man ought to expose himself to a danger of sinning but this pretence is nothing; for, by the consent of all sides, it is lawful to follow the more probable, though it be less safe; and, therefore, all danger of sinning is not, under pain of sin, to be avoided.

2. The people are not tied to greater severity in their practices, than the doctors are in their sermons and

discourses, nor yet so much: because, in these, an error is an evil principle, and apt to be of mischievous effect and dissemination; whereas an error in practice, because it is singular and circumstantiate, is also personal and limited. But the doctors may lawfully teach an opinion less probable, if they be moved to it by the authority of some more eminent person.

3. It is confessed to be lawful to follow the opinion that is more probable; but that it is lawful to leave the more probable and to follow the less, say they, is the more common and received opinion, and therefore also more probable; and therefore this opinion may be chosen and pursued; and then, because we may follow that opinion which is more probable, we may follow that which is less, because it is more probable that we may.

These objections I answer:

1. That the danger of sinning is not the only reason why we may not follow the less probable opinion; for it is not always lawful to expose ourselves to a danger of sinning; for sometimes it is necessary that we endure a noble trial, and resist openly, and oppose an enemy, which cannot be done without danger, but is often without sin; but to leave the more probable for the less is not only a danger of sinning, but a sin directly, and beyond a danger; and if it were not more than a mere danger, it could not be a sin. For besides that this hath danger, it is a most unreasonable and a most unnatural thing against the designs of God, and the proper effects of reason. But, besides, this way of arguing is neither good in logic nor in conscience. He that can answer one of my arguments, does not presently overthrow my proposition; and it is not safe to venture upon an action, because the contrary relies upon one weak leg. But then as to the instance in this argument, I answer, he that follows the more probable, though it be less safe, does not expose himself to any danger at all of sinning, because though he does not follow his greatest fears, yet he follows his greatest reason, and in that he is sometimes safest, though he perceives it not: however, there is in this case no danger that is imputable to the man that follows the best reason he hath. But this excuses not him who follows that which seems to him to have in it less reason; for unless it be by some other