sorrow for this accident had boiled down, the gentleman marries a maid of Brescia, and lives with her some years; after which she hears that his first spouse was not killed, but alive and in sorrow in the isle of Malta, and therefore that herself lived in a state of adultery, because not she, but the woman in Malta, was the true wife to her husband. In this agony of spirit, a mariner comes to her house, and secretly tells her, that this woman was indeed at Malta, but lately dead, and so the impediment was removed. The question now arises, whether, upon the taking away this impediment, it be required that the persons already engaged should contract anew? That a new contract is necessary, is universally believed, and is almost certain (as in its proper place will be made to appear); for the contrary opinion is affirmed but by a very few, and relies but upon trifling motives, requiring only the consent of either of the parties as sufficient for renewing of the contract. But this being but a slender probability, ought not to govern her; she must contract anew by the consent of her husband, as well as by her own act. But now the difficulty arises; for her husband is a vicious man, and hates her, and is weary of her, and wishes her dead; and if she discover the impediment of their marriage, and that it is now taken away, and, therefore, requires him to recontract himself, that the marriage which was innocently begun, may be firm in the progression, and legally valid, and in conscience; she hath great reason to believe that he will take advantage of it, and refuse to join in a new contract. In this case, therefore, because it is necessary she should, some way or other, be relieved, it is lawful for her to follow that little probability of opinion which says, that the consent of one is sufficient for the renovation of the contract. And in this case, all the former inconveniences mentioned before do cease: and this is a case of favour in behalf of an innocent marriage, and in favour of the legitimation of children, and will prevent much evil to them both. So that although this case hath but few degrees of probability from its proper and intrinsical causes, yet by extrinsical and collateral appendages, it is grown favourable, and charitable, and reasonable: it is almost necessary, and, therefore, hath more than the little probabilities of its own account.

One case more happens, in which a small probability may be pursued, viz. when the understanding hath not time to consider deeply, and handle the question on all sides; then that which first offers itself, though but mean and weak, yet if it be not against a stronger argument at the same time presented, it may suffice to determine the action; for in case the determination prove to be on the wrong side, yet the ignorance is involuntary and unchosen.

These rules are concerning a conscience that is probable by intrinsical motives, that is, by reason, whether the reason be direct or collateral. But because the conscience is also probably moved, in very many cases, by authority, which is an extrinsical motive, this is also to be guided and conducted.

RULE IX.

Multitude of Authors is not ever the most probable Inducement, nor doth it in all Cases make a safe and probable Conscience. FOLLOWING a multitude is sometimes like the grazing or running of a herd, "Non quo eundum est, sed quo itur, —not where men ought, but where they use to go:" and therefore, Justinian,a in compiling of the body of the Roman laws, took that which was most reasonable, not that which was most followed; "Sed neque ex multitudine auctorum quod melius et æquius est judicabile: cum possit unius forsan, et deterioris sententia multos et majores aliqua in parte superare;-The sentence of one, and of a meaner man, may sometimes outweigh the sayings of a multitude of greater persons." "Nam testibus se, non testimoniis crediturum rescripsit imperator." Sometimes one witness is better than twenty testimonies; that is, one man, good and pious, prudent and disinterested, can give a surer sentence than many men, more crafty and less honest. And in the Nicene Council," when the bishops were purposing to dissolve the priests' marriages, Paphnutius did not follow the

a L. p. ver. Sed neque C. de veteri jure enucleando.

b Cap. Nicæna Synodus, dist. 32.

common vote, but gave them good reason for his single opinion, and they all followed him. This rule is true, and to be practised in the following cases:

C

1. When against the common opinion, there is a strong or a very probable reason, then the common opinion is not the more probable: because a reason is an intrinsical, proper, and apportioned motive to the conscience, but human authority, or citation of consenting authors, is but an extrinsical, accidental, and presumptive inducement, and a mere suppletory in the destitution of reason; and, therefore, Socrates said, "Veritatem in disputando, non ex teste aliquo, sed ex argumento esse ponderandam ;-Truth is to be weighed by argument, not by testimony;" and it is never otherwise, but when men are ruled by prejudice, or want reason to rule them in that particular. "Tantum opinio præjudicata poterat, ut etiam sine ratione valeret auctoritas," said Cicero.d And this is to be extended to all sorts of authors that are not canonical, or Divine. "Meum propositum est antiquos legere, probare singula, retinere quæ bona sunt, et à fide ecclesiæ catholicæ non recedere," said St. Jerome: "My purpose is to read the fathers, to try all things, to retain that only which is good, and never to depart from the faith of the catholic Church,”that is, from the creeds, which all Christendom professes. And at another time when himself asked leave, in discourse with St. Austin, "Patiaris me cum talibus errare,-Suffer me to go along with such great men, though to an error,' it would not be permitted, but reason was chosen, and the authority neglected. And this course all men have followed when they pleased, and knew they might and ought.

2. When the multitude of doctors are reducible to a single, or an inconsiderable principle and beginning. Thus an opinion entertained by a whole family and order of clerks, while they either generally do follow, or think themselves bound to follow the leading man in their own order, is to be reckoned but as a single opinion. The millenary opinion was driven to a head in Papias; the condemning unbaptized

c In Protag. Plat.

d 1 De Nat. Deor. lib. i. c. 5. sect. 10. Heindorf, p. 10.

e Vide Liberty of Prophesying, sect. viii. Daillé, du vrai Usage des Pères.

infants, in St. Austin or St. Ambrose; and, therefore, their numerous followers are not to be reckoned into the account. For if they that follow, consider it not, the case is evident; if they do, then their reasons are to be weighed, not their authority.

3. When it is notorious that there is, or may be, a deception in that number, by reason of some evil ingredient in the production of the opinion; as if it be certain that the opinion was taken up because it serves an interest, the same men having been on the other side when their interest was there. That it is lawful to put heretics, or disagreeing persons, to death, is generally taught by the followers of Calvin and Beza where they do prevail: and yet no man that lives under them hath warrant to rely upon their authority in this question, because it is only where and when they have power, themselves having spoken against it in the days of their minority and under persecution. Under the same consideration it is, if there be any other reason against the men, not relating to their manners, but to their manner of entering or continuing in the persuasion.

4. But when these cautions are provided for, the multitude of authors hath a presumptive authority; that is, when there is no reason against the thing, nor against the men, we may presume upon the multitude of learned men in their proper faculty, that what they teach is good and innocent, and we may proceed to action accordingly. It can never make a conscience sure, but it may be innocent, because it is probable; but he that relies upon authority alone, is governed by chance. Because, if the more be against him, he is prejudiced by multitude; if the fewer be against him, yet they may be the wisest: and whether they be or not, yet a tooth-drawer may sometimes speak a better reason; and one may carry it against multitudes, and neither one nor the other can justly induce a belief, unless they have considered all things; and if I can tell who hath done so, I am myself as well able to answer as they; for he that can judge who speaks best reason, or who is most fit to be trusted in the particular, must be able in himself to consider the particulars by which that judgment is to be made; if he can and does, he hath reason within him, and needs not follow authority alone; if he cannot, then he is governed by chance,

and must be in the right, or in the wrong, according as it happens. For in many cases both sides have many advocates and abettors, and no man can tell who hath most, and each side says that their opinion is the most commonly received. In Venice there is a law, that any man may kill his father if he be banished; some affirm this also to be lawful where such a law is in force, and they affirm this to be the common opinion. Julius Clarius says that it is the common opinion, that though there be such a law, yet that it is unlawful to do it. It is commonly affirmed that it is lawful for such a banished person to defend himself, and, if he can, in his own defence to kill the invader. It is also a common opinion, that this is as unlawful as for a condemned man to kill his executioner; because no war can be just on both sides. It is very commonly taught, that it is lawful by fraud, by surprise, by treason, to slay the banditti. It is also very commonly taught that this is absolutely unlawful. Sometimes that which was the common opinion an age ago, is now rarely maintained but by a few persons. It was a common opinion in Tertullian's time, that the souls departed are in outer courts, expecting the revelation of the day of the Lord; in the time of Pope Leo, and Venerable Bede, and after, it was a common opinion that they were taken into the inner courts of heaven. Sometimes the place diversifies the opinion. In Germany and France, the Romanists worship the cross with a religious worship of the lowest kind of their own distinction; but in Spain they worship it with that which they call λargɛía, or the highest kind; and this is commonly done in the several countries respectively. When this, or any thing like this, shall happen, unless by reason men be determined, they may draw lots for their opinion. But since the better part is not always the greater, it is left to me to choose which I will; and it is ten to one but I call the men of my own communion or my own acquaintance, the best;' and it is certain I cannot judge of those with whom I do not

converse.

For these and many other concurrent causes, the proceeding is inartificial and casual, and fit to lead the ignorant, but not the learned: and concerning the ignorant he can so little skill to choose his authority, that he must