CHAPTER XIV.

BLOCKADE NEAR DYRRHACHIUM.

B.C. 48.

THE Men of Pompeius having discovered by Caesar's fires that the cohorts bivouacked at night near their lines, used to approach them without making any noise, when the whole body of the assailants would discharge their missiles at once and immediately retire. Taught by experience Caesar's men made their fires in a different place from that in which they bivouacked. As it was summer, the fires were not made to warm the men, as Goeler justly remarks, but they were used to light the intervals between the forts and to prevent a night attack by the enemy. When the men bivouacked near the fires, the enemy could easily see them, and Caesar's men could not see the enemy approaching in the dark. Caesar's men made a great mistake. They should have placed their fires at some distance in front of their lines, as a military writer, quoted by Goeler, advises.

Between the end of the fiftieth chapter (Book iii.) and the fifty-first there is a defect in the manuscripts of Caesar, and we see in the fifty-eighth chapter evidence of this defect; for there Caesar refers to something which he has said, and that which he refers to is not in our present text. It appears also from this chapter that Pompeius had sent cavalry to Dyrrhachium in ships.

Appian (B. C. ii. 60) states that Caesar in the expectation that Dyrrhachium would be betrayed to him came according to agreement with a few men by night to the gates of the

city and the temple of Artemis; but here the narrative ends abruptly and the Greek text is defective. Dion Cassius (41. c. 50) who, as Goeler truly observes, is not a careful writer about military events, reports that "Caesar expecting that Dyrrhachium would be betrayed to him came by night to that part of the town which is between the marshes and the sea, and he advanced as far as the isthmus and had a battle with the defenders of the town; but he was attacked in front by large numbers, and also in the rear by many who had been conveyed to the place in vessels and suddenly fell upon him: Caesar lost many men and narrowly escaped himself." Here we have the story of Caesar's attempt to take Dyrrhachium, founded on some authority, but told imperfectly, and in a way of which we have numerous examples in Dion. Goeler has constructed the story by conjecture, which may not be far from the truth.

Caesar (iii. 58) had occupied two narrow roads which led to Dyrrhachium and joined at the isthmus. At the present day two roads still lead to Dyrrhachium and unite in front of the town. North of the junction of these two roads was the great swamp, which has been described, and south of this junction is the sea. Pompeius' cavalry was suffering for want of fodder, and he sent them by sea to Dyrrhachium for the purpose probably with the aid of the force in the town of making a sally against Caesar's troops and breaking out to forage. Caesar, who was in his camp on the right wing of his line of contrevallation, when the cavalry of Pompeius was observed, left his position with some troops to protect his men who were before Dyrrhachium and to maintain possession of the two narrow roads. Pompeius, who could see Caesar's movements, appears to have taken advantage of his absence to attack the line of contrevallation (c. 51). He fell on a fort occupied by a cohort of the sixth legion, for this is probably the attack which is described by Suetonius (Caesar, c. 68). The cohort defended themselves, according to the story, against four legions until P. Sulla,' whom Caesar had left in command of the camp, came to their relief with two legions

1 P. Sulla was a nephew of the Dictator Sulla, and the man whom Cicero defended in an extant speech (vol. iii, p. 367).

and easily repelled the forces of Pompeius. Sulla recalled his men from the pursuit. Most persons thought that if Sulla had allowed his troops to follow the flying enemy, he might have finished the war on that day. But Caesar says that Sulla did right; for the duties of a subordinate commander and a commander-in-chief are different: the first must act in conformity to orders; the commander-in-chief directs everything according to his own judgment. Caesar always strictly maintained the commander's authority and he allowed no man to act independently of the orders which he had received. Sulla, who had been left in the camp by Caesar, was satisfied with saving the men and had no intention of fighting a battle, which would have been equivalent to an assumption of the authority of the commander-in-chief; and besides this, it was possible that a battle might have been followed by some unfortunate result. The nature of the ground made a retreat difficult for the soldiers of Pompeius, who had advanced along rising ground and taken their place on the top of it: if they attempted to retire down the slope, they might be attacked by Caesar's troops pursuing them from higher ground; and it was also near sunset, for in the hope of breaking through Caesar's lines, the enemy had deferred the attack almost to nightfall. Pompeius therefore was obliged to do the best that he could, and he occupied a certain height which was not far from Caesar's fort, but far enough removed to be beyond the reach of any missile from the military engines. On this height he fixed himself, fortified the place, and kept all his troops together there. At the same time there was a fight in two other places, for Pompeius attacked several forts for the purpose of dividing Caesar's forces and preventing the adjacent forts from aiding those which were assaulted. In one of these places Volcatius Tullus with three cohorts resisted the attack of a legion and drove it off: in the other place Caesar's Germans sallied from the lines, killed many of the enemy and made their way back in safety.

2 Volcatius Tullus. See B. G. vi. 29.

3 Goeler supposes that the Germans were in the army of Pompeius, that they broke through Caesar's lines, killed some of Caesar's men and retired in safety to their own place. Kraner has the same, and he refers to B. C. iii. 4, where it

In this one day, Caesar remarks, six battles were fought, three before Dyrrhachium, the narrative of which has disappeared from Caesar's text, and three at Caesar's line of contrevallation; and when a reckoning was made the result was that two thousand men of Pompeius were killed, with many evocati and centurions. Caesar did not lose more than twenty men in these fights, and six military standards were taken from the enemy. His loss is incredibly small; unless there is an error in the text.

In the fort which Pompeius attacked there was not a single soldier left unwounded, and four centurions of one cohort lost their eyes. As a proof of their efforts and their danger, they counted out before Caesar about thirty thousand arrows which had been shot into the fort, a number which Suetonius (Caesar, c. 68) or his copyists have magnified to one hundred and thirty thousand. The shield of Scaeva a centurion was brought to Caesar, in which there were counted one hundred and twenty holes. This veteran, as Suetonius reports, also lost an eye on this day: his thigh and shoulder were pierced through and yet he maintained his place at the gate of the fort which had been entrusted to him. As a reward for his great services Caesar gave Scaeva two hundred thousand sesterces, and promoted him from the rank of a centurion of the eighth cohort to the rank of a primipilus or first centurion of the first cohort, for it was through him in a great degree that the fort had been saved. Caesar afterwards allowed to all this cohort double pay, a double allowance of corn, and decorated them most amply with military honours.

Pompeius, as we have seen, had left his camp on the coast

is stated that Pompeius had some Germans in his army. Caesar had lightarmed Germans with him in Spain, and I assume that he brought these useful men with him, when he crossed over from Brundisium. Appian also (ii. 64) speaks of Caesar having Germans in his army at the capture of Gomphi in Thessaly (B. C. iii. c. 80); and he had them also in Egypt. Oudendorp mentions a reading "aggressi," which would make Goeler's interpretation possible. I do not understand how he could make such a mistake, and Kraner also. Caesar says that the Germans sallied out from "our" lines (egressi): he does not say that these Germans crossed (transgressi) Caesar's lines. Besides Caesar declares that his loss in these fights did not exceed twenty men, and therefore " compluribus interfectis" does not apply to his men.

to attack Caesar's lines, and not being able to make his retreat safe he had taken a position near Caesar's contrevallation, and he strengthened it during the night. On the following days he built towers, and raised his works to the height of fifteen feet, of which the depth of the ditch would be nine feet and the height of the rampart six. He also protected by "vineae" or covered galleries that part of his works which lay between the towers. Pompeius remained five days in this position when he took advantage of a cloudy night and stopping up with all materials that he could find the gates of the camp, at the beginning of the third watch he silently drew his troops out and returned to his old camp.

On several successive days Caesar (c. 56) brought out his troops and placed them on ground equally favourable to both sides. It was a challenge to the enemy. Caesar's legions even advanced close up to the camp of Pompeius, and the first line was only so far from the enemy's rampart that it could not be reached by a missile thrown by the hand or discharged from an engine. In order to maintain his reputation Pompeius placed his troops in front of his camp, yet in such a manner that the third or rear line was close to the rampart and all the army was under the protection of the missiles which might be thrown from it. There was no battle, but the result was that Pompeius' fear of a general engagement on fair terms was made manifest.

It appears that the cavalry of Pompeius was still at Dyrrhachium looking out for an opportunity of foraging outside the town, which Caesar resolved to prevent. He therefore strengthened the two narrow approaches to Dyrrhachium, which he says that he has described; but, as I have already explained, the passage, in which he spoke of these two roads, is not in our present text. He also built forts to command these two roads.

...

The words "eam partem" have caused some difficulty. I suppose that they refer to "in altitudinem . . operibus." Goeler's plate (Taf. iv. fig. 1) refers it to the towers, but he represents the "vineae" or covered sheds as extending also on each side of the towers; and he supposes that they were intended to protect the intervals between the towers. Goeler (p. 41) compares the description of Caesar's works in the war with the Bellovaci, B. G. viii. 9. Vol. iv. p. 373.