CHAPTER XVI.

THE BATTLE.

B.C. 48.

THE evidence about the battle named the battle of Pharsalia consists of two parts, Caesar's own narrative (B. C. iii. 82—99), and the statements of later writers. From these materials and by the aid of some conjecture attempts have been made to determine the position of the two armies before the battle and some circumstances which happened after it. There are also two ways in which a modern writer may construct his narrative of this great event: he may compound a story from Caesar's text and other later authorities; or he may present the narrative of the conqueror as he has left it, and then attempt to supply deficiencies with the help of later writers and some probable conjecture. I think that the second way of telling the story is the true way.

Caesar, who, as I have said, made his three books of the Civil War an apology, neglects no opportunity of showing the folly, presumption and divided counsels of his opponents. When the force of Pompeius was increased by the junction of two large armies, the former expectations of his partisans were confirmed, and the hope of victory was so strong that all the intervening time was considered as so much delay of the return to Italy and if Pompeius ever showed any slowness and circumspection, his advisers would say that a single day was enough to settle the affair, but Pompeius was pleased with the possession of power and having men of consular and praetorian rank as slaves about him. They were already quarrelling about recompenses and priestly offices, and were fixing for

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several years in advance who should be consuls; and some were making claims to the houses and property of those who were with Caesar. There was a great dispute at their meetings whether Lucilius Hirrus, who had been sent by Pompeius on a mission to the Parthians, should be allowed to be a candidate in his absence at the next election of praetors: his friends prayed Pompeius to keep the promise which he had made to Hirrus at his departure, that it might not be said that Hirrus had been deceived by relying on the influence of Pompeius; while those who intended to be candidates objected that when all shared the labour and danger alike, no one man should be preferred to the rest.

Caesar had been Pontifex Maximus since B.C. 63, and many men were ambitious of this high office, which they expected to be soon vacant. L. Domitius, the hero of Corfinium (p. 25), L. Scipio and P. Lentulus Spinther were daily quarrelling about the matter and using the most abusive language. Lentulus urged in behalf of his claim the respect due to his age; Domitius, his popularity in Rome and his exalted rank; and Scipio relied on his affinity to Pompeius. Acutius Rufus charged L. Afranius before Pompeius with betraying the army in Spain. In a council of war L. Domitius proposed that when the war was finished, a court should be formed of the senators who had been with Pompeius in the war, that each member of the court should have three tablets, and they should pass judgment on all who had stayed in Rome, or had been within the lines of Pompeius and had discharged no military duty one tablet would express complete acquittal; a second, condemnation, and a third, a fine. In short all of them were looking after their own promotion, or their pecuniary interest, or about taking vengeance on their enemies; they never thought about the means of victory, but only how they should use it. Cicero in a letter to Atticus (xi. 6) written at the end of November of this year and after the death of Pompeius, speaks of the cruel designs of Pompeius' party and their intention to seize the property of their political enemies. L. Lentulus, he says, claimed the house of Hortensius, and Caesar's gardens and his house at Baiae. There was the same disposition, he adds, in Caesar's partisans, but the greediness

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of Pompeius' faction had no bounds, and all who had stayed in Italy were considered their enemies.

When Caesar had secured his supplies, and his soldiers had recovered their spirits, and sufficient time had passed since the loss at Dyrrhachium to make him sure of the temper of his men, he determined to try what the purpose of Pompeius was, or what inclination he had to fight. Accordingly he led his army out of the camp and put it in battle order, at first within the limits where he was master of the ground,' and at some distance from the camp of Pompeius. On the following successive days he advanced further from his camp and finally placed his order of battle at the base of the hills on which Pompeius was encamped. He thus gave his army more confidence every day. As his cavalry was much inferior in numbers to the cavalry of Pompeius, he followed a practice which he had already adopted; he took a number of young men from the Antesignani, who were selected for their activity, and distributed them among the cavalry, that by daily practice they might be accustomed to this manner of fighting. The result was that Caesar's thousand horsemen even in tolerably open ground, when it was necessary, ventured to stand the attack of Pompeius' seven thousand and were not much alarmed by their numbers. Caesar's cavalry was even so successful that they had the advantage in a skirmish and killed one of the two Allobroges who had deserted.

Pompeius always drew up his troops at the foot of the hill, in the expectation, as it seemed, that Caesar might place himself in a disadvantageous position. Caesar, thinking that Pompeius could not be induced to fight, determined to move his camp and to be always on the march; for by going from place to place he would have better supplies, and might also find some opportunity of fighting, and by daily marches he would weary the army of Pompeius, which was not accustomed to fatigue. All through this campaign we observe that the men of Pompeius were inferior to Caesar's in power of marching and working with the spade. The signal had been given and the tents were struck, when it was observed that the army

1 "Suis ocis:" "innerhalb des durch seine Vorposten besetzten Terrains," is Goeler's explanation (p. 75).

of Pompeius had advanced further from the front of the camp, and there was an opportunity for Caesar to fight without being on unfavourable ground. The men were just leaving the gates of the camp when Caesar said, "We must defer our march at present and think about fighting as we have always wished: let us be ready for battle; we shall not easily find another opportunity:" and he immediately put the troops in order.

Pompeius also, as it was afterwards known, by the persuasion of all those who were about him, had determined to fight; and in a council of war some days before he had said that Caesar's army would be routed before the two lines met. Most of those who heard him expressed some surprise at what he said, but Pompeius added, "I know that what I promise you is almost incredible, but I will tell you my reasons for thinking so, that you may go to battle with greater confidence. I have persuaded our cavalry, and they have promised to do what I wish, as soon as the two armies have come near to one another, to attack Caesar's right flank where it will be exposed, and when they are in the rear of this part of the line to drive it forward in confusion before a single missile is discharged by us against the enemy; and so without any danger to the legions and almost without a man being wounded we shall finish the war; and this is not difficult to do, when we are so much superior in cavalry." He gave them notice to be ready when the time came, and since there was now an opportunity for fighting, not to let their acts fall short of what was expected from them.

Labienus followed Pompeius. After expressing his contempt for Caesar's forces and highly praising the plan of Pompeius, he said, "Do not suppose, Pompeius, that this is the army which subdued Gallia and Germania. I was in all the battles in those countries, and I do not speak rashly about that of which I know nothing. A very small part of that army remains; a great part has perished, which was a necessary consequence of so many battles; the sickly autumn season in Italy carried off others; many also have gone off to their homes, and many were left in Italy. Have you not heard that cohorts were formed at Brundisium of those who stayed behind on account of sickness? The forces which you see are recruits

raised in Gallia Citerior in the last few years, and most of them are from the colonies north of the Po. All Caesar's veterans have been destroyed in the two fights at Dyrrhachium." He concluded by swearing that he would not return to the camp except victorious, and he urged the rest to follow his example. Pompeius commended what Labienus had done and took the oath; and all the rest did the same. The members of the council separated with great hopes and great rejoicing already they anticipated victory, for they thought that in a matter of such importance no unfounded assurance could be given by so experienced a commander.

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When Caesar had approached the camp of Pompeius, he saw that his battle was ordered in this manner. On the left wing were the two legions which Caesar had given up to Pompeius in pursuance of the Senatus consultum (vol. iv. 410), one of which was now named the first, and the other the third. On the left wing was Pompeius, and L. Domitius commanded under him. Scipio occupied the centre with the legions from Syria. The Cilician legion and the Spanish cohorts which were brought by Afranius, were on the right wing under Lentulus (Appian ii. 76). Pompeius considered these to be his most trustworthy troops. The rest of the cohorts he had placed between the centre and the wings, and thus made up the number of one hundred and ten cohorts, or 45,000 men. There were about two thousand "evocati," who had joined him out of the men ("beneficiarii") who had formerly served under him these "evocati" were dispersed among the whole force. The remaining seven cohorts he had placed in the camp and the adjoining forts. His right wing was protected by a stream with high banks, for which reason he had placed all the cavalry and the archers and slingers on the left wing.3

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2 The junction of the Spanish troops with Pompeius is not mentioned in Caesar's present text; but as he here refers to this junction, we may suppose that the passage has been lost.

3 Pompeius had nine legions, 2000 evocati and the fifteen cohorts of C. Antonius (B. C. iii. 4; Kraner's note); also the cohorts of Afranius, the number of which is not stated, and the two legions of Scipio. Goeler estimates the number of cohorts of Pompeius thus: ninety in the nine legions, fifteen cohorts of C. Antonius, twenty in Scipio's two legions and seven of Afranius, as Goeler assumes; in all one hundred and thirty-two. By deducting the seven cohorts