only four hundred, could not sustain the four thousands of the enemy and the missiles discharged by the Numidian lightarmed troops, until Caesar sent up the cavalry from the other wing to support those who were giving way. Being thus encouraged Caesar's men fell with all their force on the enemy and put them to flight: in the pursuit, which was followed up for three miles to the hills, they killed and wounded many, and then retired to the main body. Caesar waited under arms till the tenth hour, when he returned to his camp without the loss of a man. In this fight Pacidius received a severe wound from a pilum in his head through the helmet, and many of his officers and some of his bravest soldiers were killed or wounded. Scipio looked on while his cavalry was pursued and massacred, but he did not move even to make a show of helping them. His behaviour confirmed what had been already proved, that he did not dare to meet with his legions the formidable general whom he could only hope to wear out by famine (c. 78). да VOL. V. CHAPTER XXVII. THAPSUS. B.C. 46. CAESAR seeing that the enemy would not fight on fair ground, and that he could not place his camp nearer to him on account of the want of water, determined to seize Thapsus, which was in possession of Scipio's commander Vergilius. If Caesar succeeded, he would be master of all the coast from Ruspina to Thapsus, and the country south of this place would be open to him. Thapsus was sixteen miles from Aggar on a low neck of land, and the great extent of the ruins, as Shaw observes, show that it was the largest city on this coast south of Carthage. A great part of the Cothon, or artificial port remains, but it is now sanded up: the sea walls were built in frames, and the material was composed of small pebbles and mortar, 66 so well cemented and knit together that a solid rock cannot be more hard and durable" (Shaw).' The position of Thapsus is determined by the modern name (Demas) and by the salt lake, mentioned by the historian, between which and the sea there 1 See also Shaw's description of the walls of Tlem-san (p. 23, 2nd edn.), where he says that "the several stages and removes of these frames are still observable." He also refers to Pliny (35. c. 14), who says that this method of building was used by the Africans and Spaniards in his time. See the notes in Harduin's Pliny; and Vitruvius, ii. 6, "De Pulvere Puteolano." Pliny names these walls "formacei," made in a "forma" or frame. Such walls are constructed at Brighton to resist the sea. Pellissier describes a clever contrivance in the concrete pier of Demas, which is about 478 yards long and 33 wide. All the part which is above the level of the water is pierced by two rows of holes placed in horizontal lines, which were made for the purpose of allowing the sea, when it was tempestuous, to run through the pier and thus to diminish the force of the waves. There are the remains of an amphitheatre at Demas, and of large and fine water cisterns, the construction of which was usual in Africa. was a neck of land not more than fifteen hundred paces wide. This is the modern salt lake (Sebkah) Sidi-Ben-Nour, which is also mentioned by Strabo (Bell. Afr. c. 80). On the 4th of April during the third watch of the night Caesar advanced towards Thapsus, which was held by a strong garrison. He made his camp, and began to form his lines round the town: he also occupied with troops several convenient positions to prevent the enemy approaching near Thapsus and coming between him and the town. Scipio now saw that he must fight or let Caesar take Thapsus, and he quickly followed his enemy along the high ground, and made two camps about eight miles from Thapsus. Scipio's design was to pass between the salt lake and the sea and to relieve Thapsus, but he came too late. The day before his arrival Caesar occupied the passage with a fort, and left a force in it: with the rest of his men he invested Thapsus with his lines which extended in a crescent from sea to sea round the town. Scipio finding the passage closed passed the next day and night above the salt lake on the north side: at day-break he halted not far from Caesar's camp and the fort mentioned above, and about a mile from the coast, and here he began to make his camp. When Scipio's arrival was reported to Caesar, he drew his men from the works, left Asprenas with two legions to protect the camp, and he himself advanced rapidly with some troops unencumbered towards the enemy. He left part of the fleet before Thapsus, and ordered the rest of the ships to move forwards to the rear of the enemy, to keep as close to the shore as they could, and to look out for his signal: when this should be given, they were instructed to raise a loud shout for the purpose of alarming the enemy and making them look behind them. When Scipio had failed in his object of relieving Thapsus, he did not retire, but, as it seems, resolved to fight a battle, even before he had made his camp secure. We can only guess at his designs by seeing what he did. If he had still no intention to fight, he had put himself in a place where he gave Caesar the opportunity of attacking him at an advantage. As soon as Caesar came near the enemy, he saw Scipio's army drawn up in front of the vallum with the elephants on the right and left wing, while part of the men were still working vigorously at the construction of the camp. Caesar formed his troops in three lines: he placed the tenth and thirteenth legions on the right wing, and the fourteenth and ninth on the left. Caesar also formed a fourth line, as he had done at Pharsalia, of five cohorts placed at each of the wings to oppose the elephants: the archers, and slingers were placed on each wing and the light-armed infantry were interposed among the cavalry. Caesar on foot went along the lines he reminded the veterans of their merits and their former battles, and by kind words excited their courage. It was the first battle of the fresh recruits, and Caesar exhorted them to emulate the bravery of the veterans and by gaining a victory to acquire the same reputation, rank, and name as their older comrades. As Caesar was going round his troops, signs of confusion appeared about the enemy's vallum: the soldiers in alarm were hurrying backwards and forwards, at one time passing within the gates of the camp, and then again coming out in a disorderly manner. The historian does not explain what was the cause of this commotion on the side of the enemy, but Guischardt explains it in a passage which is a sample of the many conjectures and inventions which he has introduced into his Analysis of the African Campaign (p. 271). "While Caesar was still engaged in arranging his troops and encouraging the soldiers, an ominous uneasiness seized the enemy's commander, who thought that he perceived great defects in his order of battle. He was imprudent enough to attempt to remedy the matter at the critical moment when the soldier was attentively watching the movements of his enemy. He commanded then the different corps of the second and third line to enter within his lines, apparently to cover the retreat in case of disaster; he replaced them by others who came out of the lines. This movement of troops produced a bad effect on the soldiers, who seeing the irresolution of their general began to be afraid those who were passing behind the lines hurried to reach them in the hope of avoiding the battle; and the others, who were coming out, communicated the alarm to all." : The confusion among the enemy, which Caesar had observed, 2 It is not said how Caesar's centre was formed. Compare Oudendorp and Nipperdey, c. 80. was seen by many of his men, and immediately the Legati and Evocati entreated him to give the signal, for the immortal gods promised a sure victory. Caesar hesitated and resisted their ardour: he said that he did not like making an attack on a camp, and he kept the line in check until suddenly on the right wing a trumpeter, who was forced by the soldiers, gave the signal for battle. Then the whole line moved forward against the enemy, though the centurions put themselves in the way and endeavoured to prevent the men from advancing without the orders of the general. Caesar now seeing that it was impossible to oppose the impetuosity of his troops, gave as the signal word Good Fortune, and putting his horse to his speed rode towards the enemy. On the right wing the slingers and archers showered their missiles on the elephants, who being terrified by the noise of the flying stones turned round, crushed under their feet the close ranks behind and struggled to reach the gates of the camp which were not yet finished. The Moorish horsemen, who were placed to support the elephants, being abandoned by them were the first to fly. The soldiers of Caesar quickly surrounded the elephants and got possession of the enemy's vallum, where a few men made a stout resistance and were killed, but the rest fled as fast as they could and took refuge in the camp which they had left the day before. During the fight the garrison of Thapsus attempted to sally from the town by the sea-gate, either to assist their friends or to secure their own safety, and they advanced into the water up to the middle in the hope of passing beyond Caesar's lines of contrevallation; but the slaves and boys of the camp drove them off with stones and pila and compelled them to return into the town. Scipio's forces were finally overpowered and scattered in disorder through the plain, pursued by Caesar's legions, who allowed them no time to rally. They fled to their old camp in the hope of being able to repair it and make a stand there, and of finding some officer to take the command; but they found none. Their commanders, following the example of the great Pompeius at Pharsalia, had deserted the army to save their own lives. The unfortunate soldiers now yielded to despair by throwing away their arms, the last senseless act of men whose heads are bewildered by fear, and |