before she became twenty-one years of age, and her father claimed as her heir upon the theory that the limitation over upon the event of A's death before she attained twenty-one years was in terms a reservation, and was bad, as there could be no reservation to a third person, and also because it was an attempted forfeiture of A's estate and equity would not enforce a forfeiture. Apparently, no point was made that this was an attempted shifting future interest and bad for that reason. The court properly recognizes it as a shifting future interest, and without discussing the validity of such limitations beyond the citation of three text books, overthrows the position thus taken by appellant simply by pointing out that appellant's position, that here was a case of reversion to a third person or a forfeiture, was erroneous. The court further says that the limitation here was one of a future interest and not of a contingent remainder, without any particular discussion of the effect of that.

Directing attention again to the limitation in the principal case under comment, one starts with the proposition, first, that if a conveyance can operate under the common law instead of under the Statute of Uses, it will so operate (Fuller v. Black 298 Ill. 353), and, second, that by the first section of the Illinois Conveyancing Act a deed in the form of a bargain and sale must be regarded as having the force and effect of a feoffment and not as operating under the Statute of Uses (Witham v. Brooner 63 Ill. 344, 346). In the limitation in the principal case, the court says in so many words, that it was by a deed in all aspects of the kind recognized as a bargain and sale good before the statute in this state that introduced the short form of conveyance. It was, therefore, just such a deed as the case of Witham v. Brooner had in contemplation and the conveyance involved was, therefore, not one under the Statute of Uses, but one that had effect independently of the Statute of Uses.

Of such, the case of Stoller v. Doyle 257 Ill. 369, above quoted from, says a shifting future limitation could not be created, for if this is, as it is said to be in Witham v. Brooner, a deed at common law, then the shifting future interest is void within the language of Stoller v. Doyle. And of such, the principal case itself says (p. 558): "While at common law a freehold could not be limited to commence in the future, this rule had no application to the declaring of uses ."; and (p. 559): "The operation of the bargain and sale was in this manner: The bargain for the sale of the land by the owner for a valuable consideration had no effect upon the legal title, but the payment of the consideration raised a the statute executed the use, so that the purchaser became seized of the legal estate in the same manner as he had been seized of the use. ." Now suppose, then, no use is raised, as would be the case if the bargain and sale were given the same effect as a feoffment. Then if, as the principal case concedes, the only support for holding that a shifting future interest is good is that it is good as a use and the statute executes the use into legal title, then there would be in the limitation in the principal case no use for the

use,

Statute of Uses to operate on, and the shifting future limitation would be bad. Note the language in Witham v. Brooner 63 Ill. 346:

"Hence under this Statute, a deed in form of a bargain and sale must be regarded as having the force and effect of a feoffment."

In that case the limitation was X, grantor, to A (by bargain and sale) in trust for C and D. This will at once be recognized as a use upon a use which the Statute of Uses did not execute. But Witham v. Brooner points out that due to section 1 of the Conveyancing Act, it is the same as "X enfeoffs A to the use of C and D." So the court there says: "In a deed purely of bargain and sale, independently of the first section of the Conveyance Act, the rule would be different, and the title would vest in the bargainee (A)."

Apparently the litigants in the principal case omitted to call the court's attention to the situation thus developed, for the opinion quite overlooks it. It would seem that if the portion of the opinion in the principal case stands, relative to this part of the problem there involved, then Witham v. Brooner must fall. The latter case cannot be distinguished upon any suggestions that section 1 of the Conveyancing Act there referred to was the one in force prior to the present constitution and different from the present, for substantially the same provision as that then in force appears in the form of section 1 of the present act.

Furthermore, if the only effect of sections 9 and 13 of the Conveyancing Act is to supply a presumption of intention in the absence of express language of intention as to the nature of the estate granted, and the effect of section 9 is merely to render a deed, in form as prescribed in that section, of the same effect as a bargain and sale deed in regular form, it would seem inevitably to follow that deeds in statutory form should be given the same effect under the rule in Witham v. Brooner, as bargain and sale deeds not under the statute. The result, however, so far as the ultimate decision of the case goes, would not be affected because of the court's holding on the other part of the problem in the principal case, that relative to when "death" as there used should refer to.

Upon this angle of the problem the court applied the rule: "If a particular estate precedes a gift over, the latter will usually take effect if the contingency happens at any time during the period of the particular estate" (309 Ill. 567), by taking the life estate which the grantor reserved in himself as the particular estate. As A, in the limitation here involved, outlived the grantor, this application of the rule insured the fee in her. Various circumstances, claimed to indicate an intention to fix the time at a later period, were disregarded by the court within such rules as that there is less license in the construction of deeds than of wills and that parol evidence was not admissible to change the legal effect of the language in the deed, there being no ambiguity on its face, the court holding there was no ambiguity on its face as to the subject matter, the only ambiguity being one of the legal effect of terms plainly enough expressed.

E. M. L.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT. In the case of Jersey Ice Cream Co. v. Ind. Com. 309 Ill. 187, one employed by an ice company to sell ice from the platform of its plant was shot while at his work. He died from the effects of the shooting. There was no evidence of any reason for the shooting, and when found, he had on his person all the money collected by him for ice sold, as well as a considerable sum of money of his own. In that condition of the record the court held there was nothing upon which to base any conclusion that the injury was one arising out of the employment. It was contended that the shooting was for the purpose of stealing the money of the company which the employee had on his person, but the court held that the fact of no attempt having been made to take anything from the person negatived any such theory. It was attempted, however, to suppose a further consideration: that having shot the employee for purposes of robbery, then, because the employee went to the doorway of the ice house and called to another employee inside, the robbers lost heart and ran away without molesting their victim, but this the court apparently viewed as an inference upon an inference, which is not permissible. (Globe Ins. Co. v. Gerisch 163 Ill. 625; Ohio Bldg. Vault Co. v. Indus. Bd. 277 Ill. 102, 110, 111).

The case, however, recalls the earlier case of Mix Dairy Co. v. Indus. Com. 308 Ill. 549, commented upon in ILL. L. REV. XVIII 254-257, in which it was held that a milkman shot and killed in an area way of a house where he was delivering milk, at 3 o'clock in the morning, could not be said to have sustained the injury as arising out of the employment because it did not appear that he was shot because he was a milkman. In the comment adverted to, it was suggested that the court could have held that the injury arose out of a hazard peculiar to the employment of a milkman as consistently as it had held that the injury of a person struck by an automobile while crossing a street to telephone for supplies arose out of such a hazard.

The case here under comment, it would seem, merely accentuates the difficulty of determining where one should draw the line of demarcation between cases of injuries of this kind whether or not it can be said the particular happening was a hazard of the employment. For the difference between the case now under comment and the case commented upon elsewhere in this REVIEW (XVIII 254) seems to be one merely of degree.

E. M. L.

DIVERSITIES DE LA LEY

AGENCY AGREEMENT NOT TO WITHDRAW THE POWER OF AGENCY-DUty of Agent to SurrenDER HIS LETters of AgenCY UPON NOTICE.-[Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Civilsachen III No. 53.]-In March 1879 the plaintiff constituted the defendants general agents for the administration of her property and delivered to the defendants a letter of general agency. The plaintiff sues for a return of the document on the ground that the power has been revoked.

The defendants resisted the restitution of the document of agency in their possession, urging that the plaintiff in August 1879 had agreed in uniting to let the power of agency continue as long as the plaintiff lived, and also contending that they were not obligated to restore the document since they required it for the protection of their acts under the power.

The District Court condemned the defendants in accordance with the complaint. The Provincial Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. A revision of the judgment here is denied on the following grounds:

The plea of the defendants that the plaintiff, in conformity with a document of 7 Aug. 1879, obligated herself not to revoke the power of agency was properly rejected by the judges below. By reason of the nature of agency which rests in a confidence of the principal reposed in the agent it necessarily follows as the sources themselves have provided (Dig. 17.1.12.16; h. t. 22.1: mand.; J. 3.26.9: de mand.) that the power conferred is at all times revocable. A contract not to revoke the power, inasmuch as it is in conflict with the nature of the transaction, is not obligatory. Even though a contract not to revoke a power of agency within a prescribed period should be held valid and as not violating good morals, yet the agent could not resist a revocation of the power, but would be remitted to an action to recover the compensation provided for or to a claim for damages. That the original agreement of 21 March 1879 between the parties was one of agency is shown by the document, and the point is not disputed. If the principal and agent by subsequent arrangement agreed that the agency was not to be revoked that does not change the original transaction, and that situation can only present the question of what claim the agent would have for breach of the contract.

The judges below were also right in holding that upon revocation of the power of agency, the agent was under a duty on demand to surrender the letter of agency. A direct answer

on this point is not found in the sources. D. 17.1.8 pr. deals only with the documents which are delivered for carrying out the agency:

[Si procuratorem dedero nec instrumenta mihi causae reddat, qua actione mihi teneatur? et Labeo putat mandati eum teneri nec esse

probabilem sententiam existimantium ex hac causa agi posse depositi: uniuscuiusque enim contractus initium spectandum et causam.]

But according to 1. 20 pr. (D. h. t.) the agent must restore to the principal everything in his hands acquired by, and in the course of, the agency:

[Ex mandato apud eum qui mandatum suscepit nihil remanere oportet, sicuti nec damnum pati debet, si exigere faeneratam pecuniam non potuit.]

The letter of agency was doubtless obtained by the agent in consequence and in connection with the agency. The principal purpose was to evidence the authority of the agent in dealings with third persons, since a writing is not necessary for the institution of an agent. The purpose of the writing having ended, the agent is under duty to restore the letter of agency.1

THE LAWNESS OF LAW CLUBS AND THE LEGALITY OF LEGAL CLUBS. It seems somewhat curious that the abstract side of the law in our language is better equipped with inflected adjectives than the concrete, practical side. The term 'ius' has three adjectival variants: 'juridical' (= pertaining to the practical administration of law'ius-dicare' or 'ius-dicere'), 'jural' (pertaining to concepts of juristic science in a concrete or specific reference or, conversely, to terms or ideas of legic art in a juristic sense: e. g., ‘a jural relation,' 'the jural ideas of the Romans,' jural person, jural responsibility), and 'juristic' (pertaining to other generalized concepts without concrete or specific or authoritarian references: e. g., 'juristic development,' 'juristic classification,' 'juristic method.'

'Juridical' and 'jural' have an authoritarian or official reference which is lacking in the term 'juristic.' What is 'juridical' or 'jural' has a connection with the actual phenomena of state justice, while 'juristic' is applicable to the methods and systems of jurists.

In practice these terms are often used without discrimination, and this is especially true of 'jural' and 'juristic'; but since there is room and need for discrimination, it seems advisable to attempt the differentiation above suggested. Such discrimination can be insisted upon among lawyers, but the dictionaries used by lay persons can never be reformed when we find every newspaper reporter obsessed with the notion that all judges are jurists.

A probable explanation for the variety of terms based on 'ius' is that ius got an earlier start than 'lex' as a generic concept. 'Lex' in the beginning of the Roman system of law was a special and

1. Cf. Seuffert Archiv XIX No. 40. [The court at this point discusses the interests of the principal and agent respectively and holds that the preponderance of interest lies with the principal in the possession of the letter of agency after the revocation of the power. The agent, however, for his own protection is entitled to a receipt for the letter or an authenticated copy of the letter which shows on its face that the power has been revoked. But the agent may not authenticate a copy without the consent of the principal. Such a copy made by the agent must also be surrendered.]