familiar kind, and we are in no hazard of mistaking the sense of the author, though every word which he uses is not precise and exact.

Many authors offend against this rule of precision. A considerable one, in describing a bad action, expresses himself thus: "It is to remove a good and orderly affection, and to introduce an ill, or disorderly one; to commit an action that is ill, immoral, and unjust; to do ill, or to act in prejudice of integrity, good nature, and worth."

A crowd of unmeaning or useless words it brought together by some authors, who, afraid of expressing themselves in a common and ordinary manner, and allured by an appearance of splendour, surround every thing which they mean to say with a certain copious loquacity.

The great source of a loose style in opposition to precision, is the injudicious use of the words termed synonymous. They are called synonymous, because they agree in expressing one principal idea; but, for the most part, if not always, they express it with some diversity in the circum

stances.

The following instances show a difference in the meaning of words reputed synonymous, and point out the use of attending, with care and strictness, to the exact import of words.

Custom, habit. Custom, respects the action; habit, the actor. By custom, we mean the frequent repetition of the same act by habit, the effect which that repetition produces on the mind or body. By the custom of walking often in the streets, one acquires a habit of idleness.

Pride, vanity. Pride makes us esteem ourselves; vanity, makes us desire the esteem of others. It is just to say, that a man is too proud to be vain.

Haughtiness, disdain.-Haughtiness is founded on the high opinion we entertain of ourselves; disdain, on the low opinion we have of others.

Only, alone.-Only, imports that there is no other of the same kind; alone, imports being accompanied by no other. An only child, is one that has neither brother nor sister; a child alone, is one who is left by itself. There is a differ

ence, therefore, in precise language, between these two phrases: "Virtue only makes us happy ;" and "Virtue alone makes happy."

Wisdom, prudence.-Wisdom leads us to speak and act what is most proper. Prudence, prevents our speaking or acting improperly.

Entire, complete-A thing is entire, by wanting none of its parts: complete, by wanting none of the appendages that belong to it. A man may have an entire house to himself, and yet not have one complete apartment.

Surprised, astonished, amazed, confounded.-I am surprised with what is new or unexpected: I am astonished at what is vast or great: I am amazed at what is incomprehensible; I am confounded by what is shocking or terrible.

Tranquillity, peace, calm.-Tranquillity, respects a situation free from trouble, considered in itself; peace, the same situation with respect to any causes that might interrupt it; calm, with regard to a disturbed situation going before or following it. A good man enjoys tranquillity, in himself; peace with others; and calm, after the storm.

These are some of the numerous instances of words, in our language, whose significations approach, but are not precisely the same. The more the distinction in the meaning of such words is attended to, the more clearly and forcibly shall we speak or write. It may not, on all occasions, be necessary to pay a great deal of attention to very nice distinctions; yet the foregoing instances show the utility of some general care to understand the distinct import of our words.

While we are attending to precision, we must be on our guard, lest, from the desire of pruning too closely, we retrench all copiousness. Scarcely in any language are there two words that convey precisely the same idea; a person thoroughly conversant in the propriety of the language, will always be able to observe something that distinguishes them. As they are like different shades of the same colour, an accurate writer cam employ them to great advan

tage, by using them so as to heighten and complete the object which he presents to us. He supplies by one what was wanting in the other, to the strength, or to the finishing, of the image which he means to exhibit. But, for this purpose, he must be attentive to the choice of his words, and not employ them carelessly, merely for the sake of filling up a period, or of rounding or diversifying his language, as if their signification were exactly the same, while. in truth it is not. To unite copiousness and precision, to be full and easy, and at the same time correct and exact in the choice of every word, is no doubt one of the highest and most difficult attainments in writing.

PART II.

Of PERSPICUITY and ACCURACY of EXPRESSION, with respect to the CONSTRUCTION of SENTENCES.

SENTENCES, in general, should neither be very long, nor very short long ones require close attention to make us clearly perceive the connexion of the several parts; and short ones are apt to break the sense, and weaken the connexion of thought. Yet occasionally they may both be used with force and propriety; as may be seen in the following sentences.

"If you look about you, and consider the lives of others as well as your own; if you think how few are born with honour, and how many die without name or children; how little beauty we see, and how few friends we hear of; how much poverty, and how many diseases there are in the world; you will fall down upon your knees, and instead of repining at one affliction, will admire so many blessings which you have received from the Divine hand.” This is a sentence composed of several members linked together, and hanging upon one another, so that the sense of the whole is not brought out till the close. The following is an example of one in which the sense is formed into short, independent propositions, each complete within itself. "I confess, it was want of consideration that made me an au

thor. I wrote because it amused me. I corrected, because it was as pleasant to me to correct as to write. I published, because I was told I might please such as it was a credit to please."

A train of sentences, constructed in the same manner, and with the same number of members, should never be allowed to succeed one another. A long succession of either long or short sentences should also be avoided; for the ear tires of either of them when too long continued. Whereas, by a proper mixture of long and short periods, and of periods variously constructed, not only the ear is gratified; but animation and force are given to our style.

We now proceed to consider the things most essential to an accurate and a perfect sentence. They appear to be the four following: 1. CLEARNESS. 2. UNITY. 3. STRENGTH.

4. A JUDICIOUS USE OF THE FIGURES OF SPEECH.

CHAPTER I.

Of the CLEARNESS of a SENTENCE.

PURITY, propriety, and precision, in words and phrases separately considered, have already been explained, and shown to be necessary to perspicuous and accurate writing. The just relation of sentences, and the parts of sentences, to one another, and the due arrangement of the whole, are the subjects which remain to be discussed.

THE FIRST requisite of a perfect sentence is Clearness. Whatever leaves the mind in any sort of suspense as to the meaning, ought to be avoided. Obscurity arises from two causes; either from a wrong choice of words, or a wrong arrangement of them. The choice of words and phrases, as far as regards perspicuity, has been already considered. The disposition of them comes now under consideration.

The first thing to be studied here, is grammatical propriety. But as the grammar of our language is comparatívely not extensive, there may be an obscure order of words where there is no transgression of any grammatical rule.

The relations of words, or members of a period, are, with us, ascertained only by the position in which they stand.

Hence a capital rule in the arrangement of sentences is, that the words or members, most clearly related, should be placed in the sentence as near to each other as possible, so as to make their mutual relation clearly appear. It will be proper to produce some instances, in order to show the importance of this rule.

1. In the position of adverbs. "The Romans understood liberty, at least, as well as we." These words are capable of two different senses, according as the emphasis, in reading them, is laid upon liberty or upon at least. The words should have been thus arranged: "The Romans understood liberty as well, at least, as we."

"Theism can only be opposed to polytheism, or atheism." Is it meant that theism is capable of nothing else besides being opposed to polytheism, or atheism? This is what the words literally import, through the wrong placing of the adverb only. It should have been, "Theism can be opposed only to polytheism or atheism.”

"By the pleasures of the imagination, I mean only such pleasures as arise originally from sight." When it is said, "I mean only such pleasures." it may be remarked, that the adverb only is not properly placed. It is not intended here to qualify the word mean, but such pleasures; and therefore should have been placed in as close connexion as possible with the word which it limits or qualifies. The style becomes more clear and neat, when the words are arranged thus: "By the pleasures of the imagination, I mean such pleasures only as arise from sight."

In the following sentence, the word more is not in its proper place. "There is not perhaps, any real beauty or deformity more in one piece of matter than another." The phrase ought to have stood thus: "Beauty or deformity in one piece of matter more than in another."

2. In the position of circumstances, and of particular mem

bers.