idol, fails not to consecrate it by ceremonies, by means of which he believes it becomes animated with the pretended god which it represents, and that a supernatural power is conferred on this vain image. If it be of the masculine sex, he marries it to another of the feminine gender, with all the magnificence of nuptial ceremonies. From that moment the idol is considered the arbiter of his destiny; he pays his adorations to it; offers it food morning and evening; if the weather be hot, refreshes it by the use of a fan; if cold, he places it at night in a comfortable bed. Some Europeans of little information on the subject, Rammohun Roy says, have propagated the opinion, that the idols of the Hindoos were but symbolical beings, employed to lead the soul to the contemplation of the Divine attributes. The details just given prove the erroneousness of this opinion. It has, nevertheless, been adopted by many of the Hindoos who, begiming to feel the absurdity of their worship, are eager to escape the ridicule and shame attached to it, by means of this subterfuge. This circumstance, says the Reformer, gives strength to my hope of seeing them one day abjure their superstitions to embrace the worship of the one God, as prescribed by the Vedas, and taught by common sense. About the middle of the last century, the religion of the Hindoos deteriorated, especially in Bengal, so that on some essential points they differ from the natives of Behar, Tirhoot and Benares; and have estranged themselves from their ancient worship, to adopt an idolatry denominated the religion of the Tuntras, in opposition to that of the Vedas. This idolatry, chiefly of modern date, is more revolting than that of the Greeks and Romans, since it is not only childish and impure like theirs, but still more inimical to the principles of virtue: for the mythology of the Hindoos offers to their imitation the most infamous sensuality, ingratitude, cunning and treachery; all which is the work of the Brahmins, interested in encouraging vices which to them are a fruitful source of gain. It is to be expected that Rammohun Roy should be an object of hatred to these men; and certainly nothing but the high repute in which he is held by the public for his wealth, talents and acquirements, could shield him from their malice and persecution. Only two tracts in defence of idolatry have been published against him: the first was contained in the Journal of Madras, and was answered by Rammohun Roy; the second is an Apology for the present System of Hindoo Worship, by a Brahmin of Calcutta, who sees nothing incredible in his 330 millions of gods and goddesses, the principal of whom are Seva, Vishmes, Kabi, Ganesha, the Sun, the Moon, the Elements. Our author put out an answer in English, entitled A Second Defence of the Monotheism of the Veds. 8vo. Calcutta, 1817. In this work he presents a new series of unanswerable arguments to the Brahmins, whose hypocrisy, baseness and folly he exposes; dwelling, amongst other subjects, on the separation of castes, and the actions by which persons are subject to lose caste. He proves that that institution had no place in the ancient system of theology, and that it is a subsequent invention. At the head of this institution is the caste of the Brahmins, who have raised themselves to the highest possible dignity by investing their birth and quality with fantastic splendour; representing themselves as gods upon earth; the Brahmins are in India what the members of an oligarchy and the feudal lords are in Europe, but still worse, and that is saying a great deal. They have broken the ties of social life, not only by the separations formed by the castes, but by isolating, as it were, the members of the same family from each other: a Hindoo who affects great rigidity cannot share his dinner with his brother whom he is visiting; and if the brother touch any of the provisions of his guest, the latter must instantly throw away what remains, and even destroy the utensils * in which it was contained. The Hindoo religion allows of taking another or several more wives during the life of the first, in such cases as the drunkenness, extravagance, incurable disease, sterility, &c. of the wife; but with respect to this right, such * See a Second Defence of the Monotheistical System, pp. 41, 42. licence has been given, that a private person sometimes marries thirty or forty wives, merely to satisfy his brutal desires.* Ideas of morality are still further debased by the superstition which attaches more value to vain observances than to the precepts of the law of nature: thus, according to the doctrine of the Brahmins, loss of caste, with all its privileges, is incurred by the infringement of certain ceremonies, but not by murder, theft nor perjury. For these crimes there are easy means of expiation, most of which are a source of wealth to the Brahmins. The mere difference of the material, the form and the efficacy of chaplets, and the manner of using them, is a 'boundless science, which would of itself furnish a large library. He who pronounces the word Doorga, a name of the goddess Cali or Parvati, the wife of Siva, is justified, although he be living in adultery; he who exclaims, even involuntarily, Salutation to Hari, and he who does but look at the Ganges, though thinking of some other object, are delivered from their guilt. We may fairly institute a comparison between these privileges and the doctrine of Indulgences propagated in France by certain publications and missionaries. The Veds, or sacred books, containing the religion of the Hindoos, are extremely voluminous, and the subjects of which they treat often obscured by a confused manner and metaphorical style; the great Byas, according to our author, made a sort of harmony and abstract of these books upwards of two thousand years ago. This abstract, entitled the Vedant, the authority of which is scarcely inferior to that of the Vedas, contains all the proof of the unity of God; but as the Brahmins reserve to themselves the explanation of it, Rammohun Roy has translated it into Hindoostanee and Bengalee, and gratuitously distributed the translation among his countrymen. And, in order to convince his European friends that the superstitious practices which déform the Hindoo worship are a departure from its primitive institutions, he last year published in En See a Second Defence of the Monotheistical System, pp. 44, et seq. and p. 55. glish an Abridgment of the Vedant." The sum of his arguments is, that God is an unknown Being, that he is the true Being, the Creator, the Preserver, and the Destroyer of the universe.t In the translation of the Ishopanishad, among the quotations from the sacred books of the Hindoos, we find the passage, I am what he is, similar to the text of Scripture: ego sum qui sum: je suis celui qui est. It is well known that in India there have been preserved to the present time a vast number of traditions, facts, maxims and customs, to be found in our Holy Scriptures. William Jones has given examples of them; Burder has made them the subject of a work in 2 vols. 8vo. ;§ and Ward has lately entered into an extensive and curious investigation of these coincidences. || All the writings of Rammohun, which have been sent over by M. d'Acosta, are in English. Life is so short, time so precious, and every thing relating to religion so worthy of attention, that, whilst lamenting the want of leisure to translate those works into French, we shall, perhaps, be happy enough to inspire some learned and zealous Christian with a resolution_to execute that desirable project. Let us return to Rammohun Roy. The success he has already had leads us to hope for still greater: nor are we without ground for hope, since we find that his perseverance is unabated, and that he has announced the speedy publication of other works of a similar tendency to the former. The moderation with which he repels the attacks on his writings, the force of his arguments, and his profound knowledge of the sacred books of the Hindoos, are proofs of his fitness for the work he has undertaken; and the pecuniary sacrifices he has made, shew a disinterestedness which cannot be admired and encouraged too warmly. The division of the Hindoos into castes has hitherto appeared the greatest obstacle to their conversion to Christianity. That obstacle is not insurmountable; the same may be said of the absurd doctrine of polytheism, which cannot continue to be maintained by a civilized people. If once the Hindoos can be convinced that there is but one God, and that they are all children of the same Father, who is no respecter of persons, then the fall of Brahminical prejudices and of idolatry, will prepare the way for the triumph of the gospel. [We cannot find a fitter place than this for the insertion of a short account of Rammohun Roy, taken from p. 106 of a "Journal of a Route across India, through Egypt to England, in the years 1817 and 1818. By Lieut-Col. Fitzclarence." 4to. 1819. "There has never been, to my knowledge, an instance of any Hindoo of condition or caste being converted to our faith. The only conversion of any kind, if it can be called so, that has come within my observation, was that of a high-caste Brahmin, of one of the first families in the country, who is not only perfectly master of the Sanscrit, but has gained a thorough acquaintance with the English language and literature, and has openly declared that the Brahminical religion is in its purity a pure Deism, and not the gross polytheism into which it has degenerated. I became well acquainted with him, and admire his talents and acquirements. His eloquence in our language is very great, and I am told he is still more admirable in Arabic and Persian. It is remarkable, that he has studied and thoroughly understands the politics of Europe, but more particularly those of England; and the last time I was in his company, he argued forcibly against a standing army in a free country, and quoted all the arguments brought forward by the Members of the Opposition. I think that he is in many respects a most extraordinary person. In the first place, he is a religious reformer, who has amongst a people more bigoted than those of Europe in the middle ages, dared to think for himself. His learning is most extensive, as he is not only conversant with the best books in English, Arabic, Sanscrit, Bengalee and Hindoostanee, but has even studied rhetoric in Arabic and English, and quotes Locke and Bacon on all occasions. From the view he thus takes of the religions, manners and customs of so many nations, and from his having observed the number of different modes of addressing and worshiping the Supreme Being, he naturally turned to his own faith with an unprejudiced mind, found it perverted with the religion of the Vedas to a gross idolatry, and was not afraid, though aware of the consequences, to publish to the world in Bengalee and English his feelings and opinions on the subject; of course, he was fully prepared to meet the host of interested enemies who, from sordid motives, wished to keep the lower classes in a state of the darkest ignorance. I have understood that his family have quitted him-that he has been declared to have lost caste-and is for the present, as all religious reformers must be for a time, a mark to be scoffed at. To a man of his sentiments and rank this loss of caste must be particularly painful, but at Calcutta he associates with the English: he is, however, cut off from all familiar and domestic intercourse; indeed, from all communication of any kind with his relations and former friends. His name is Rammohun Roy. He is particularly handsome, not of a very dark complexion, of a fine person, and most courtly manners. He professes to have no objection to eat and live as we do, but refrains from it, in order not to expose himself to the imputation of having changed his religion for the good things of this world. He will sit at table with us while the meat is on it, which no other Brahmin will do. He continues his native dress, but keeps a carriage, being a man of some property. He is very desirous to visit England and enter one of our universities, where I shall be most anxious to see him, and to learn his ideas of our country, its manners and customs."] and certain solution. The controversy has been embarrassed by the use of the term motive, which is not essential to it, and which being capable of different interpretations has left room for misapprehension and subterfuge. The proposition of the Necessitarian is precisely this, that every volition or determination of the mind is the necessary result of the state of the mind at the time when the determination is formed. Of the truth of this proposition, in regard to myself, I am conscious; and presuming that the general constitution of all human minds is the same, I suspect that, were the question closely urged, the consciousness of every other man would coincide in this respect with my own. And were it not for certain consequences, which are supposed to follow the admission of this doctrine, I am persuaded that no human being would have been found to doubt its truth. But in opposition to this statement the advocate of Liberty maintains, that there is in the human mind a self-determining power, to which, as their proper cause, all the volitions or determinations of the mind are to be referred. What, then, is the operation of this self-determining power? By the very definition, it is not governed in its exercise by the state or disposition of the mind. Does it, then, itself determine the state of mind in which a certain volition shall be formed? Then, as no mental act can be performed except in some certain state of mind, it may be asked, How came the mind to be in that state in which the self-deter * Though I have avoided the use of the term motive, I do not mean to intimate, that motives have nothing to do with volition. By motive, indeed, the Necessitarian means not only the induce ment which is presented to the mind, but the mental disposition in which a given volition is formed. But to use the term in its ordinary acceptation, it may be remarked, that every state of mind in which a volition takes place, results partly from a former state, and partly from the influence of certain motives or considerations which are suggested to the mind. And no truth in the whole circle of intellectual inquiry seems more self-evident than this, that from a definite state of mind, nothing but a definite volition can proceed. mining power was called upon to act? Did this power of its sovereign pleasure decree this state of the mind also, and before this a former state, and so on to the first moment of conscious existence, always acting in a certain state of mind, and always determining that state? But in reality, the determining the state of the mind, in which a given volition shall take place, would not differ from determining the volition itself. In a given state of mind, then, does it determine the volition? If so, can it determine in opposition to the state of the mind at the time when the volition is formed? If not, it can do nothing that is worth contending for. If it can, whenever this case is realized the will inclines one way, and the mind another. But as the will in its exercise cannot, even in imagination, be distinguished from the mind in the act of willing, the mind wills against itself, or wills and does not will the same thing, at the same time. That this reasoning may not be confronted by classical authority, I just remark, that Homer's well-known oxymoron, exwv exoti ye Suu, stands at an immeasurable distance from the case which is here supposed. But let this self-determining power be examined a little more closely. And as it is stated to be the faculty of the mind which determines the volitions, and, therefore, the actions of men, it is reasonable to ask, whether it possesses the properties of judgment, reflection and other qualities which have always been supposed to have some influence upon the determinations of the will? If so, it is no longer a faculty of the mind, but the mind itself; and when we are told that it is the efficient cause of volition, all that is meant is, that our volitions are the volitions of the mind. If it does not possess these properties, it is nothing but the simple power of volition, which, as it will not submit to be governed by the state or habit of the mind, but insists upon the privilege of determining itself, is not distinguishable from blind caprice, or what we usually term chance. Shall it be said that the mind determines its volitions by means of a selfdetermining power, which is inherent in it, and essential to it? Can the mind, then, form either of two opposite volitions at the same time, and in the same frame and disposition? If not, it does not possess a self-determining power, and every thing is conceded which the Necessitarian contends for. If, when the mind is said to possess a self-determining power, it were meant that the volitions of the mind originate in itself, and are not forced upon it by extraneous compulsion nothing would be said but what is true, and nothing but what the Necessitarian admits and maintains. But this will not serve the cause for which this power has been devised. In order to set aside the position of the Necessitarian, this faculty must be supposed to be altogether independent of the feelings and dispositions of the mind, and must, in the strictest sense, determine itself, and govern its own decisions. The advocate of Liberty may say, that this is not what he means, but he will hear in reply, that if he does not mean this, he means nothing. But if the mind can form either of two opposite volitions at the same time, then the true and proper cause of definite volitions is the abstract power of willing; a fit principle, in good truth, to which the government of life should be committed. properties not of a self-determining power, but of intellect and reason. They are not attributes of the will, but of the mind. But what, after all, can we understand by a self-determining power, considered as the efficient cause of volition? It is an incontrovertible truth, that the act of volition implies a certain inclination or disposition of the mind. Does, then, the self-determining power cause this disposition, or is it acted upon and governed by it? If the latter, it is not a self-determining power, and the controversy is at an end. If it be said to determine this disposition, the question arises, whether it must be considered as acting independently of every mental feeling? If so, it is a manifest nonentity, since a volition cannot take place except in some state and disposition of the mind. If it does not act independently of mental feeling, it will again be asked, does it determine that state of feeling in which it acts? To what conclusion this question would lead, it must be needless to remark. 66 But let the advocate of Liberty plead for himself in the language of that able metaphysician, Dr. Clarke: "The true, proper, immediate, physical efficient cause of action," says he, is the power of self-motion in men, which exerts itself freely, in consequence of the last judgment of the understanding." If this power always obeys the last judgment of the understanding, the Necessitarian will ask no more. But can this power, at the very time when it exerts itself freely, in consequence of the last judgment of the understanding, determine without any inducement whatever to set this last judgment at defiance, and to act in direct opposition to it? This Dr. Clarke would not have affirmed. If it cannot, what is gained by maintaining, with an appearance at least of contradiction, that it exerts itself freely, in consequence of this judgment? If it can, then it is in very deed a power of self-motion, a power which, without any reason, can act against the very reason in consequence of which it acts.* Will the advocate of Liberty lay down his proposition in terms to the following effect: that though the state of the mind has a certain influence upon the self-determining power, yet that it does not, strictly speaking, cause the volition, which is the free act of the power for which he contends? What, then, is the nature of the influence supposed? Does it in any way effect that the volition should be what it is? If so, all that the Necessitarian will be solicitous to maintain is granted. If not, we must look somewhere else, that is, to the self-determining power, for the reason why one volition takes place rather than another: that is, a power which bears the same relation to all imaginable volitions, contains in itself the sole cause of every definite and specific volition. And on this faculty depends the moral agency of man! But does the self-determining power, in fact, obey the influence which the mind exerts upon it? Why, then, does it obey it? Because it chooses. Does it, then, reflect and judge, and thus determine on the propriety of * Dr. Clarke is disposed to consider yielding this obedience ? No such the last judgment of the understanding thing. Reflection and judgment are as the same with the act of volition. VOL. XV. C |